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REMEDIATION OF BROWNFIELDS UNDER THE COLORADO
VOLUNTARY CLEANUP AND REDEVELOPMENT ACT
TERRI L. CARVER*
The cleanup and subsequent reuse of "brownfields" has been touted
as a key component of economic redevelopment.' Brownfields are
* Terri L. Carver is an environmental attorney from Colorado Spring', Colorado.
She received her J.D. from Marquette University (1984), and a Master of Laws (L.L.M) in
Environmental Law (with highest honors) from George Washington University (1996).
1. In January 1995, Carol Browner, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator,
announced the Brownfields Action Agenda to help states and municipalities clean up and reuse
contaminated sites. U.S. EPA, #500-K-95-001, THE BROWNFIELDS AGENDA (1995) [hereinafter
BROWNFIELDS AGENDA].
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) firmly believes that
environmental cleanup is a building block to economic development, not
a stumbling block-that revitalizing contaminated property must go
hand in hand with bringing life and economic vitality back to the com-
munity. EPA's Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative will
empower States, localities, and other agents of economic redevelopment
to work together in a timely manner to prevent, assess, safely clean up,
and sustainably reuse brownfields .... Benefits of the Brownfields Ini-
tiative wil be realized in affected communities through a cleaner envi-
ronment, new jobs, an enhanced tax base, and a sense of optimism about
the future ....
Implementation of the Brownfields Action Agenda will help reverse the
spiral of unaddressed contamination, declining property values, and in-
creased unemployment often found in inner city industrial areas, while
maintaining deterrents to future contamination and EPA's focus on as-
sessing and cleaning up "worst sites first."
Id. at 1.
The first EPA grant for a brownfields remediation was a $200,000 grant to Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, in November 1993. See id. at 3. The EPA reported that this grant leveraged
$1.6 million in private cleanup dollars, generated over $625,000 in new tax dollars, and
resulted in the creation of nearly 100 new jobs. See id. In 1999, EPA brownfields grants
were announced for communities across the nation, including Aurora and Westminster in
Colorado. OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, VICE PRESIDENT GORE
ANNOUNCES GRANTS TO 23 COMMUNITIES TO EXPAND EFFORTS TO CLEAN UP AND
REDEVELOP "BROWNFIELDS" (March 12, 1999) (announcing brownfields grant for Aurora,
CO); OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, VICE PRESIDENT GORE
ANNOUNCES $11 MILLION TO CLEANUP AND REDEVELOP DISTRESSED AREAS (June 21,
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"abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities
where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived
environmental contamination.' '2 Currently, forty-four states have volun-
tary cleanup programs to facilitate clean up and reuse of brownfields.3
In 1994, Colorado passed the "Voluntary Cleanup and Redevelop-
ment Act" (VCRA) to encourage property owners to clean up brown-
fields.4 The intent of the VCRA was to "foster the transfer, redevelop-
ment, and reuse of facilities and sites that have been previously contami-
nated with hazardous substances or petroleum products. 5 The VCRA
gives property owners "a method of determining what the clean-up re-
,,6sponsibilities will be when they plan the reuse of existing sites. The
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) is
responsible for administering the VCRA.7
The VCRA recognized that brownfields remediation would not prog-
ress unless landowners had assurances that future state. and federal reme-
8diation requirements would not be imposed. The federal Comprehensive
1999) (announcing brownfields grant for Westminster, CO). The cities of Denver,
Englewood, Lakewood, and Loveland, in coalition with the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment, also received an EPA brownfields grant in 1999. OFFICE OF THE
VICE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, VICE PRESIDENT GORE ANNOUNCES OVER $30
MILLION TO HELP COMMUNITIES CLEAN UP AND REDEVELOP BROWNFIELDS (May 25,
1999). As of August 4, 1999, the EPA had awarded 307 brownfield pilot grants to states,
municipalities, and tribes. Legislation to Improve the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Finance &
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 22 (1999) [herein-
after Hearings] (statement of Mr. Tim Fields, U.S. EPA).
2. BROWNFIELDS AGENDA, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Hearings, supra note 1, at 24.
4. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-16-301 to -310 (2000).
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-302 (2000) (Legislative Declaration).
6. Id.
7. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-102(2) (2000). The Colorado Department of Public Health
and Environment (CDPHE) did not promulgate regulations implementing the VCRA. Instead, the
CDPHE issued a guidance document on VCRA cleanups. See HAZARDOUS MATERIALS & WASTE
MGMT. DIV., COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV'T, VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP (1997)
[hereinafter VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP]. The rationale for not promulgating VCRA regula-
tions was to allow the VCRA program "to operate quickly and with a minimum of administrative
processes and costs." Id. at 9.
The CDPHE guidance above includes an appendix entitled "Voluntary Clean-up
Program Application Guidance Document and VCRA Checklist." See HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS & WASTE MGMT. DIV., COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV'T, VOLUNTARY
CLEANUP ROADMAP APP. (1997) [hereinafter VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE].
8. Under the VCRA, the CDPHE was directed to seek a determination by the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") that future remediation would not be required for a site cleaned
up under the VCRA. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-309(2) (2000). Specifically, the VCRA states:
If the United States [E]nvironmental [Pirotection [A]gency indicates that
it is investigating a site which is the subject of an approved voluntary
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Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (also called
the "Superfund" law) authorizes the EPA to require remediation of con-
taminated sites.9 By 1996, the CDPHE had approved only twenty- seven
companies for approval to clean up brownfields under the VCRA. l0
Landowners remained wary of VCRA cleanups, due to fear of additional
federal remediation requirements."
One of the biggest challenges is obtaining a lender's backing to de-
velop a brownfield. Even after a landowner has cleaned up a mess, banks
still fear that the EPA will impose costly additional Superfund require-
ments. As a result, landowners want state and federal environmental offi-
cials to certify that their land is safe enough to be developed.
12
In April 1996, the CDPHE and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Region VIII, signed a Memorandum of Agreement on EPA's
support for VCRA remediation of brownfields. 3
clean-up plan or no action petition, the [CDPHE] shall actively pursue a
determination by the United States [E]nvironmental [Pirotection
[Algency that the property not be addressed under the federal [Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability A]ct or,
in the case of property being addressed through a voluntary clean-up
plan, that no further federal action be taken with respect to the property
at least until the voluntary clean-up plan is completely implemented.
Id.
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. mH 1997). The 1980 Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) authorized the President to take
enforcement action against responsible persons, to require remediation of contaminated sites. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606, 9607 (1994). The President delegated this authority to the U.S. EPA in 1987.
Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1987), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1994).
The EPA has promulgated regulations for CERCLA cleanups at 40 C.F.R. Part 300, known as the
"National Contingency Plan."
10. Mark Obmascik, Waste sites rescued. State, feds OK reuse proposal, DENVER POST, April
12, 1996, at B-01. One of these sites was a Home Depot development of the old Robinson Brick-
yards property in Denver, Colorado.
Decades of mine-smelting operations turned the old Robinson Brick-
yards into a toxic stew of lead, zinc, cyanide, and radium. But decades of
surrounding urban growth also turned the same tract into a prime retail
development site. When executives from Home Depot tried to transform
the polluted land into a profitable new store in south Denver, they ran
into a heap of bureaucratic trouble ... The Home Depot site already was
cleaned up under a $20 million EPA project, but some toxic heavy metal
remained. After a year of negotiations, state and federal officials agreed




13. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COLO. DEPT OF PUB. HEALTH & THE
ENV'T & THE U.S. EPA, REGION VIII (undated) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT]. The
Denver Post reported the CDPHE-EPA Memorandum of Agreement was signed on April 11, 1996,
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This article will examine the VCRA cleanup process. The first sec-
tion will describe what sites are eligible for remediation under the
VCRA. The second section will explain what the property owner must do
to apply for a VCRA cleanup. The last section will discuss the CDPHE
review process and the conditions EPA has imposed for EPA "forbear-
ance" of further cleanup requirements. The last section also spells out the
conditions under which the CDPHE or EPA may impose future cleanup
requirements on the VCRA site.
I. IS THE SITE ELIGIBLE FOR VCRA REMEDIATION?
The VCRA excludes contaminated sites covered by other environ-
mental programs. 14 Specifically, VCRA excludes five categories of sites
from its voluntary cleanup regime: (1) a site that is listed or proposed for
listing on the National Priorities List of Superfund sites, established un-
der the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA);15 (2) a release from a facility that treated,
stored, or disposed of hazardous waste which has or should have a Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit;16 (3) a site cov-
ered by a RCRA corrective action order or agreement;17 (4) a site which
is subject to a Water Quality Division enforcement action;18 or (5) a site
covered by the state Underground Storage Tank (UST) program.19
The first exclusion is for sites that the U.S. EPA has listed or pro-
20posed for listing on the National Priorities List (NPL), under its
CERCLA remediation authority. 2' The EPA identifies contaminated sites
and noted the purpose of the agreement was to allay fears of landowners and financial lenders about
future cleanup requirements. Mark Obmascik, Waste sites rescued. State, feds OK reuse proposal,
DENVER POST, April 12, 1996, at B-01.
14. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b) (2000).
15. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(1) (2000).
16. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(IV) (2000) (emphasis added).
17. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(II) (2000).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(III) (2000) (emphasis added).
19. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(V) (2000).
20. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(I) (2000). The federal CERCLA law authorizes the
President to take actions to remediate contaminated sites. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 11I
1997).
21. See supra note 9, on EPA's delegated CERCLA authority. Pursuant to CERCLA section
104, the EPA is authorized to remediate contamination
[wihenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a sub-
stantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a
release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pol-
lutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare ....
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that have priority for remediation by adding those sites to the NPL.22 The
EPA proposes a site for listing on the NPL through a public notice in the
Federal Register.23 The Federal Register publishes as a final rule the
EPA's decision to list a site on the NPL.24 A site under an EPA CERCLA
investigation would be eligible for VCRA cleanup if EPA has not taken
25
the formal step of proposing the site for inclusion on the NPL.
The next two VCRA exclusions involve contaminated sites addressed
26under RCRA. The federal RCRA statute authorized the EPA to regulate
hazardous waste from the point of generation to ultimate disposal.
27
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1994). The EPA is also authorized to issue enforcement orders to
persons responsible for causing the contamination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606, 9607 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8) (1994). The "National Priorities List" (NPL) is "the list, compiled
by EPA pursuant to CERCLA section 105 [42 U.S.C. § 9605], of uncontrolled hazardous substance
releases in the United States that are priorities for long-term remedial evaluation and response." 40
C.F.R. § 300.5 (2000).
The EPA has promulgated regulations on the procedure and criteria for adding or nominating a site
to the NPL. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425 (2000). A contaminated site is eligible for the NPL in the following
three situations:
(1) The release scores sufficiently high pursuant to the Hazard Ranking
System described in appendix A to this part [300];
(2) A state (not including Indian tribes) has designated a release as its
highest priority. States may make only one such designation; or
(3) The release satisfies all of the following criteria:
(i) The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
has issued a health advisory that recommends dissociation
of individuals from the release;
(ii) EPA determines that the release poses a significant
threat to public health; and
(iii) EPA anticipates that it will be more cost-effective to
use its remedial authority than to use removal authority to
respond to the release.
40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c) (2000). The NPL sites are a subset of the contaminated sites that are covered
by EPA remedial authority under CERCLA.
23. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(d)(5)(i) (2000).
24. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(d)(5)(ii) (2000). When the EPA publishes the final rule adding sites
to the NPL, the EPA must also "make available a response to each significant comment and any
significant new data submitted during the comment period." Id. The NPL is published in the Code of
Federal Regulations, where the sites are listed by state. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (2000).
25. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 9.
26. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-16-303(b)(II), (IV) (2000).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee report described the scope of federal hazardous waste regulation under
RCRA, as follows:
Pursuant to the regulatory authority . . . [under RCRA], EPA will ad-
minister the federal hazardous waste provisions of this legislation. They
require the Administrator to develop criteria for determining what is a
hazardous waste, and then to list those wastes determined to be hazard-
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States may administer the RCRA hazardous waste program as long as
their programs are equivalent to the EPA's federal hazardous waste pro-2?8
gram. The EPA's comprehensive hazardous waste regulations cover the
generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. 29 All
facilities that treat, store (over 90 days), or dispose of hazardous waste
must have an RCRA permit.3° The RCRA corrective action program may
require remediation of hazardous waste releases.3 ' Since 1984, Colorado
has administered the RCRA hazardous waste program.32
The VCRA excludes contamination at facilities that treat, store, or
33dispose of hazardous waste under the RCRA permit program, and ex-
cludes contaminated sites covered by the RCRA corrective action pro-34
gram. The owner/operator of a facility that has or should have a RCRA
permit is barred from using the VCRA remediation process.35 Since No-
vember 1980, a RCRA permit has been required for facilities that treat,
ous. From point of generation, through transportation, storage, treatment
and disposal, those wastes listed as hazardous are federally regulated.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6242.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1994) (Authorized State Hazardous Waste Programs). The EPA regu-
lations specify minimum requirements for delegated state hazardous waste programs. See 40 C.F.R.
pt. 271 (2000). The EPA must approve a state hazardous waste program, before the state may ad-
minister the RCRA hazardous waste program. 40 C.F.R. § 271.1 (2000). The states may impose
hazardous waste regulations that are more stringent than federal RCRA regulations. 40 C.F.R. §
271. 1(i) (2000).
29. 40 C.F.R. pts. 261 (Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste), 262 (Standards Ap-
plicable to Generators of Hazardous Waste), 263 (Standards Applicable to Transporters of Hazard-
ous Waste), 264 (Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and
Disposal Facilities), 265 (Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste
Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities), 266 (Standards for the Management of Specific Haz-
ardous Wastes and Specific Types of Hazardous Waste Management Facilities), 268 (Land Disposal
Restrictions), and 270 (EPA Administered Permit Programs) (2000).
30. See 40 C.F.R. § 270..1(c) (2000). This permitting requirement must also be part of the
delegated state hazardous waste program. 40 C.F.R. § 271.13(a) (2000). Facilities which generate
hazardous waste may qualify for a permit exemption. Hazardous waste generators who store hazard-
ous waste on-site for 90 days or less are exempt from the RCRA permit requirement. 40 C.F.R. §§
262.34(b), 270.1 (c)(2)(i) (2000). Another permitting exemption covers generators of more than 100
kilograms but less then 1000 kilograms of hazardous waste per month who store hazardous waste for
180 days or less. 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.34(d), 270.1(c)(2)(i) (2000).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1994). For regulations on remediation of hazardous waste releases
from permitted facilities, see 40 C.F.R. pt. 264, subpts. F and S (2000). For monitoring requirements
and possible RCRA remediation at interim status facilities, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 265.1(b), 265.4, 265.90-
.94 (2000). An "interim status" facility is a facility that has applied for a RCRA permit within the
required time period, but has not yet received the permit. 40 C.F.R. pt. 265 (2000). Remediation is
also authorized under RCRA if the hazardous waste release might present "an imminent and sub-
stanti-il endangerment to health or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1994).
32. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15-301 to 316 (2000). See also VOLUNTARY
CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 19.
33. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(IV) (2000).
34. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(1I) (2000).
35. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(IV) (2000) (emphasis added).
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36
store (over 90 days), or dispose of hazardous waste. This exclusion
includes any "interim status" facility that has applied for a RCRA permit,
but the CDPHE has not issued a permit. 37 The CDPHE Compliance Pro-
gram must address a release from a facility with either a RCRA permit or
interim status, and the facility is not eligible for a VCRA cleanup.
38
This RCRA permitted facility exclusion also includes facilities that
39
failed to apply for a RCRA permit, in violation of RCRA regulations.
The CDPHE's view is "any facility with a release of a RCRA hazardous
waste after 1980 is deemed to have illegally disposed of hazardous waste
without a [RCRA] permit .... 40 In other words, the contamination oc-
curred at a facility that should have had a RCRA permit. However, de-
spite the apparent exclusion of these facilities from VCRA remediation,
the CDPHE may defer these "illegal disposal sites" to the VCRA pro-
gram if the sites meet certain criteria.4a
First, the amount of contaminated soil must be "relatively small and
,,42contained on the property. Any groundwater contamination must "not
exceed state standards at the site boundary. 43 There are no adverse im-
pacts to surface water, and a "non-aqueous phase is not present. ' 44 Fi-
nally, CDPHE believes the contamination can be successfully remediated
within 24 months,45 and no long-term monitoring will be required.46 The
CDPHE does not mandate that the facility meet all the above criteria to
47
qualify for deferral to a VCRA remediation. The CDPHE will look at
whether site-specific conditions "diminish the severity of the release, and
,,48
threats to human health and the environment are minimal.
36. 40 C.F.R. § 270.10 (2000). Under the EPA regulations, "hazardous waste management
facilities," i.e., facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste, must have a RCRA permit.
40 C.F.R. §§ 270.2, 270.10 (2000). Hazardous waste management facilities constructed after No-
vember 1980 were required to have a RCRA permit prior to construction. 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.2,
270.10(f) (2000). Hazardous waste management facilities in operation or under construction on or
before November 1980 were required to apply for a RCRA permit within a certain time period, in
order to qualify for interim status. 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.2, 270.10(e) (2000).
37. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 9.
38. See id. at 9, 19.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 9.
41. See id. at 10.
42. Id.
43. Id. The CDPHE will also evaluate "[mlobility and potential biodegradation of the
contaminants," in its decision to defer to a VCRA cleanup. Id.
44. Id.
45. An approved VCRA cleanup must be completed within 24 months or it lapses. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(4)(a) (2000).
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The VCRA excludes contaminated sites covered by the RCRA cor-
rective action program.49 Specifically, contaminated sites that are under
an RCRA corrective action order or agreement are not eligible for
cleanup under the VCRA. 50 The CDPHE has already taken RCRA en-
forcement action on these sites and the administrative order or settlement
agreement controls the cleanup.5'
A contaminated site subject to a Colorado Water Quality Control Di-
vision compliance order or agreement is excluded from VCRA remedia-
52
tion. The CDPHE views a site as "subject to" a Water Quality Control
Division order or agreement if there is groundwater contamination pres-
ent and the current property owner (the VCRA applicant) is responsible
for that contamination. If the site meets these two conditions, the
VCRA usually cannot clean up the site, even though no order has been
issued and no agreement has been made regarding the contamination.
However, the CDPHE's Water Quality Control Division (WQCD) has
the discretion to defer these (otherwise ineligible) sites to a VCRA
49. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(ll) (2000). "Corrective action may be required for
permitted TSD facilities (CHWR, Section 264.101) and at interim status TSD facilities seeking
permits (CHWR, Section 265.5), or at generator facilities where a release of hazardous constituents
to the environment has occurred." HAZARDOUS MATERIALS & WASTE MGMT. Div., COLO. DEP'T OF
PUB. HEALTH & ENV'T, INTERIM FINAL POLICY AND GUIDANCE ON RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR
CORRECTIVE ACTION AT RCRA FACILmES 3 (1994). "CHWR" stands for "Colorado Hazardous
Waste Regulations: See id. at 2. A "TSD facility" is a facility that treats, stores, or disposes of haz-
ardous waste, and therefore requires a RCRA permit. Standards for Owners and Operators of Haz-
ardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities, 40 C.F.R. pt. 264 (2000); Interim Status
Standards For Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facili-
ties, 40 C.F.R. pt. 265 (2000). A TSD facility is also known as a hazardous waste management
facility. See supra note 36.
50. A property owner of contaminated property cannot use the VCRA remediation process if
the property is covered by a corrective action order or agreement under either the EPA hazardous
waste program or the Colorado hazardous waste program. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(II)
(2000); See also VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 10. Colorado has administered
the hazardous waste program since 1984. See id. at 19. Specifically, the CDPHE may issue orders
for violations of state hazardous waste requirements section (including illegal disposal of hazardous
waste). COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-15-308(2) (2000). The CDPHE may also enter into settlement
agreements concerning RCRA violations. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-15-309(4) (2000).
51. For an overview of the Colorado RCRA Corrective Action program, see VOLUNTARY
CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 19-25.
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(III) (2000) (emphasis added). The CDPHE "may
issue orders to any person to clean up any material which he, his employee, or his agent has acci-
dentally or purposely dumped, spilled, or otherwise deposited in or near state waters which may
pollute them." COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-606 (2000).
53. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 10. With regards to the second re-
quirement, a site would be eligible for a VCRA cleanup if the contaminated groundwater were
caused by the previous owner or an adjacent property owner. See id. Since the current property
owner/applicant is not responsible for the contamination, the site would not be "subject to" a Water
Quality Control compliance order. See id.
54. Contrast this exclusion from the VCRA with the RCRA corrective action exclusion that
requires the site be covered by an administrative order or consent agreement. See supra notes 50-51
and accompanying text.
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cleanup "if the contamination does not present an imminent threat to
human health (i.e., low concentrations confined to the applicant's prop-
erty). 55 In addition, contaminated sites that require Water Quality Con-
trol permits for continuous discharges can still qualify for VCRA
cleanup.
56
Finally, the VCRA excludes contamination covered by the Under-
ground Storage Tank (UST) program.57 However, the CDPHE interprets
this exclusion broadly to include registered underground and above-
ground storage tanks that contain petroleum products or "regulated sub-
,,58stances. A VCRA cleanup would be available for residual contamina-
tion from a UST pulled before December 22, 1988, 59 if the residual con-
tamination did not affect surface water or drinking water.6
The CDPHE has put together a flow chart to assist the property
owner in determining eligibility for VCRA cleanup.61 This flow chart
appears at Appendix A.
II. THE VCRA REMEDIATION PROCESS - WHAT MUST THE PROPERTY
OWNER Do?
A. Environmental Assessment
Initially, the applicant (usually the owner of the contaminated indus-
trial property) must determine the extent of contamination. The VCRA
62requires an environmental assessment of the property. The environ-
55. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 10.
56. See id. The example cited by the CDPHE is a site that has drainage from mining adits to
surface waters. See id. Obviously, the property owner must still get the necessary permits, even if the
CDPHE defers to a VCRA cleanup. See id.
57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(V) (2000). The Underground Storage Tank (UST)
program is authorized by Colorado Revised Statutes sections 8-20.5-201 to 8.20.5-209. This is Title
8, Article 20.5, Part 2, referred to in the VCRA exclusion. See id. When a release occurs at an UST
site, the owner or operator is required to submit a corrective action plan to clean up subsurface soil,
groundwater, and surface water. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-20.5-209 (2000). The UST program is ad-
ministered by the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP
ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 10.
58. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 10. "A regulated substance is any
substance defined in Section 101 of CERCLA, but not including any substance regulated as a haz-
ardous waste under RCRA." Id. at 10-11.
59. This is the effective date of federal UST regulations. See Technical Standards and Cor-
rective Action Requirements For Owners and Operators of Underground Storage Tanks (UST), 40
C.F.R. pt. 280 (2000).
60. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 1I.
61. See id. at 5.
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-304(2)(a) (2000). An environmental assessment must include
the following information:
(a) The legal description of the site and a map identifying the location
and size of the property;
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mental assessment includes the site history and characterization of the
63contamination. A "qualified environmental professional" must prepare
the environmental assessment.6
The applicant begins with a detailed site history, to determine
whether there are any sources of contamination on the property.a5 "An
evaluation of past land uses and waste-handling practices should be con-
ducted for at least 50 years into the historical record.' 66 The applicant
67should also determine if the site had prior environmental assessments.
(b) The physical characteristics of the site and areas contiguous to the
site, including the location of any surface water bodies and ground water
aquifers;
(c) The location of any wells located on the site or on areas within a one-
half mile radius of the site and a description of the use of those wells;
(d) The current and proposed use of on-site groundwater;
(e) The operational history of the site and the current use of areas con-
tiguous to the site;
(f) The present and proposed uses of the site;
(g) Information concerning the nature and extent of any contamination
and releases of hazardous substances or petroleum products which have
occurred at the site including any impacts on areas contiguous to the site;
(h) Any sampling results or other data which characterizes the soil,
groundwater, or surface water on the site; and
(i) A description of the human and environmental exposure to contami-
nation at the site based upon the property's current use and any future
use proposed by the property owner.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-308(2) (2000). The City of Englewood, Colorado, used its EPA brown-
fields grant to set up a low-interest loan revolving fund, to help businesses and property owners
finance environmental assessments of their properties. Brownfields may blossom. Englewood uses
loans to reclaim property, DENVER POST, May 8, 1998, at C-01.
63. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-16-308(2) (2000).
64. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-16-308(1) (2000). A "qualified environmental professional" is a
person "with education, training, and experience in preparing environmental studies and assess-
ments." Id. In addition, the CDPHE requires that a qualified environmental professional have at least
5 years experience in the preparation of environmental studies and assessments. VCRA Application
Guidance, supra note 7, at 2.
65. Voluntary Cleanup Roadmap, supra note 7, at 11. The CDPHE "strongly considers the
agreement between historical uses and characterization efforts in reviewing the [VCRA] application.
.T. iThis historical knowledge is needed in order to identify all potential contaminant sources."
VCRA Application Guidance, supra note 7, at 2. The inclusion of an "operational history of the site"
is a statutory requirement. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-16-308(2)(e) (2000). If the property owner finds
that all sources of contamination are off-site, i.e., the contamination source is on adjacent property,
the property owner files a petition for a "no action" determination. See infra pp. 13-16.
66. VCRA Application Guidance, supra note 7, at 2. "It may be appropriate to review facility
records going further back in cases where wastes of a more persistent nature were handled on-site. If
records do not go back that far, it should be stated as such with the reference noted." Id.
67. See id. Prior assessments can assist the property owner in putting together a detailed site
history. The prior environmental assessment should include the following:
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If so, the applicant should include the prior environmental assessments in
the VCRA submittal to CDPHE.68
After completing the site history, the applicant must do a site char-
acterization.69 The purpose of the site characterization is to define the full
extent of contamination in all environmental media.70 For example, if
soil contamination has the potential to migrate to groundwater or surface
water, then these media should also be assessed. The CDPHE advises
that site characterization efforts should be "tied" to the site history in-
formation, to show that the applicant was "looking for the right contami-
nants in the right places. ' '72 Usually, the applicant must do sampling as
Sp . 73
part of site characterization.
In the sample plan, the applicant draws on site history information to
determine sampling locations.74 The sample plan should "explain the
reasoning behind each sample location as well as any justification for
eliminating assessment of any source areas."75 If there is insufficient
historical data on which to base sampling, then random sampling may be
[Olperational history of the property, description of all busi-
nesses/activities on [the] property, history of releases of petroleum prod-
ucts or hazardous substances on the property, history of management ac-
tivities of hazardous substances at the property, notifications to county
emergency response personnel pursuant to Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know statutes, notifications made to state and/or
federal agencies as reporting spills/accidental releases, list of all permits
obtained from state and federal agencies related to activities at [the]
property and [a] brief description of current land uses, zoning, and zon-




70. See id. A complete delineation of the contamination is not required if the contamination is
derived solely from an upgradient, off-site source. See id. However, the applicant must still investi-
gate potential sources on his property. See id. The applicant must also document that his property
"could not serve as a source of contamination." Id. The CDPHE advises that an applicant can get a
letter absolving him of liability for cleaning up contamination caused by an upgradient source,
without characterizing the site. See id. However, the applicant can only obtain a "clean bill of
health," i.e., a "no action" determination, if the site characterization is done. See id. For a discussion
of "no action" determinations, see infra at pp. 13-16.
71. VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 3. One instance where sampling might not be required is if the site history
showed no possible source of contamination, and other data confirmed the contamination resulted
from an upgradient source. Telephone Interview with Dan Scheppers, Superfund and Voluntary
Cleanup Unit Leader, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (April 12, 2000).
74. VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 3.
75. Id.
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appropriate. The applicant should also include sampling to evaluate
conditions at upgradient and downgradient property boundaries. 7
Since the CDPHE approval of a VCRA cleanup covers only current
78 79
site conditions, 7 recent sampling data is usually required. Groundwater
data should be less than a year old. However, older data on groundwa-
ter and soil contamination may be acceptable, where the sole contamina-
tion source is on upgradient property.8'
For water sampling, the wells should indicate the direction of the
water flow. 82 The applicant may use pre-existing wells and existing data
83if it will assist in understanding site conditions. If the applicant reaches
groundwater during soil excavation, the groundwater should be
84sampled. Concerning soil contamination, the applicant must take a
85minimum of three samples to establish background levels. The sample
86plan should also include a description of the soil sample method used.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See infra p. 20 and note 171.
79. VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 3.
80. See id. "Ground water data which is older than one year at the time of receipt of the
application normally will not be considered as indicative of current conditions." Id.
81. See id.
[D]ata which is older than one year should be submitted if it is coupled
with more recent data in order to indicate conditions with the passage of
time. Exceptions may be made for soil data or in cases where the appli-
cant only desires absolution from the responsibility of dealing with con-
tamination from an upgradient source, as in a contaminated aquifer de-
termination.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
82. See id. The applicant needs data on the direction of the groundwater flow "to verify that
water quality downgradient of any sources is being monitored. The wells should also have a
screened interval appropriate for the contaminant." Id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 4. In addition, the applicant should sample groundwater if the groundwater "is
anticipated to be in close vertical proximity to the bottom of an excavation ..... Id.
85. See id. at 3. "[A] minimum of three samples should be collected to account for natural
constituent occurrences and inherent variability. Sample locations for background should be in areas
which have not been impacted by the release of concern or any on-site activities." Id.
86. See id.
One should sample for contaminants, which tend to group heterogene-
ously in the subsurface in the following manner: in fines and silts, sam-
ple the interfaces with larger grains; in clays, sample the sand lenses; in
medium sands or larger grains, sample the sidewalls near the excavation
floor. Lithologies containing precipitates or excess organic carbon
should be sampled. To characterize a site where contaminants have been
deposited in a homogeneous manner, such as air deposition, one should




The sampling data must be attached to the environmental assessment.
87
The applicant should also include site maps (drawn to scale), boring logs,
and well construction diagrams.
88
The site assessment must analyze current and proposed future uses of
the site, to determine impacts to public health and the environment.
89
"Assessment activities should determine if future activities might pro-
mote movement of a contaminant plume or pose threats to future users of
the site, others downgradient, and surface and ground water quality in the
future." 90 The site assessment should also discuss measures to ensure the
contamination (e.g., volatile soil contamination) does not pose a hazard
to future users of the property. 91 If the contamination has migrated off-
site, the site assessment should address the potential impact to off-site
92wells, utility corridors, or other targets.
B. Is Remediation Required?
Once the site assessment is completed, the applicant must determine
whether'site contamination exceeds the state standards. 93 Specifically,
the applicant must identify "applicable promulgated state standards es-
tablishing acceptable concentrations of constituents in soils, surface wa-
ter, or groundwater .... ,,9 If state standards do not exist for certain con-
stituents in soils, surface water, or groundwater, then the applicant may
propose risk-based standards for those constituents, based on the appli-
cant's current or proposed use(s) of the site.95 Thus, risk-based cleanup
standards are only available to fill in the gaps.
Colorado has state standards for protection of surface water and
groundwater quality.96 However, Colorado currently has no cleanup
To characterize a site with numerous discrete sources, such as mine
waste piles, submission of a composite sample from each pile would be
appropriate.
Id.
87. See id. at 4.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 7. The environmental assessment must include a "description of the human and
environmental exposure to contamination at the site based upon the property's current use and any
future use proposed by the property owner." COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-308(2)(i) (2000).
90. VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 7.
91. See id
92. See id.
93. See id. at 5.
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-304(2)(c) (2000).
95. See id.
96. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 12. See Basic Standards and Method-
ologies for Surface Water, 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-31 (2000); Basic Standards for Groundwa-
ter, 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-41 (2000).
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S • 97standards for soil contamination. Therefore, VCRA cleanups can utilizeS • 98
risk-based cleanup standards for soil contamination. The CDPHE en-
courages a "simplified approach" to developing risk-based standards. 99
"For most sites, a narrative description of the exposure pathways (and
lack of completed pathways) is sufficient." In addition, a risk calcula-
97. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7, at 12.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Id. "For example, if the land use (a paved parking lot) will interrupt exposure to contami-
nated soil, then as long as that soil is not a source of ground water contamination[,] an acceptable
level of risk has been demonstrated." Id. The narrative description would include a summary of all
site-specific information, contaminant levels, and the likelihood of impacting targets or completing
exposure pathways. VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 5-6. The CDPHE lists the
following factors which the applicant should consider, as part of the risk assessment:
1. Ground [W]ater & Surface Water Usage-A water well search
listing the locations of any wells located on the site or on areas within a
one-half mile radius of the site and a description of the use of those wells
should always be provided. An explanation is needed for the current and
proposed use of on-site ground water. A similar summary of local usage
of surface water should be prepared.
2. Vapor Migration-If the contaminant is of a volatile and/or flamma-
ble nature[,] the application should indicate how the proposed land use
will not present a hazardous situation or promote the migration of al-
ready existing contamination. Examples of exposure might be construc-
tion of a building basement where a volatile contaminant exists in close
vertical proximity and may infiltrate the foundation.
3. Geology & Hydrogeology-An evaluation of the ability of the site's
geology and hydrogeology to immobilize contaminants or minimize mi-
gration may be warranted to determine the extent of the overall cleanup
efforts.... If actions of the applicant might promote migration of ex-
isting contamination along preferred pathways (such as newly-installed
utilities)[,] measures to prevent this occurrence should be mentioned in
the overall evaluation of risk.
4. Ground Water Monitoring-A proposal to monitor the ground wa-
ter might be utilized as a means to ensure that the proposed actions do
not present an unacceptable risk. The intent of any ground water moni-
toring program, where the site is the source of the contamination, should
be to verify that the plume has stabilized and will diminish with time or
that the current state does not pose a risk to human health and the envi-
ronment....
5. Other Exposure Pathways-Assessment of other exposure pathways
may be appropriate on a site-specific basis.
6. Proposed Land Use-Declaration of a proposed land use is necessary
in all applications as the applicant's evaluation of the risk is contingent
upon this parameter ....
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tion (such as one in one million or 106) is only needed when there is a
completed pathway.1
0 l
The applicant may be able to leave the contamination on-site if it is
not a threat to public health or the environment, given the proposed land
use.102 For example, the applicant might propose "breaking the com-
pleted pathways (i.e., capping the contamination)" 0 3 as part of the
VCRA submittal.'1 4
The applicant does not have to take remedial action if the contamina-
tion on-site is below applicable state standards or risk-based standards, or
if the contamination originates from nearby property, for which another
party is responsible. 05 In these two cases, the applicant files a written
petition with CDPHE requesting a "no action" determination.10
C. Petition for a "No Action" Determination
Under the VCRA provisions, the CDPHE must approve a petition for
a "no action" determination ("no action" petition) under the following
conditions:
(I) The environmental assessment.., indicates the existence of con-
tamination which does not exceed applicable promulgated state stan-
dards or contamination which does not pose an unacceptable risk to
human health and the environment; or
(II) The department finds that contamination or a release or threat-
ened release of a hazardous substance or petroleum product origi-
nates from a source on adjacent or nearby real property if a person or
entity responsible for such a source of contamination is or will be
taking necessary action, if any, to address the contamination.
107
101. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP, supra note 7. at 12. Under the VCRA, the goal is to
approach a 1 in 1,000,000 (0 ) additional risk, "based on the actual exposure scenario for the an-
ticipated land use. Potential exposure or potential land uses are not considered." Id. A full baseline
risk assessment is only required for complex sites. See id. A
site-specific risk assessment may be required "if there are receptors (completed pathways) and the
applicant is proposing less than complete removal of the contamination." VCRA APPLICATION
GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 5.
102. VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 6.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 6-7.
105. These are the two situations where the CDPHE will approve a "no action" determination.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(2)(a) (2000).
106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307 (2000).
107. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(2)(a) (2000).
2000]
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When the contamination source is on-site, the CDPHE must determine if
the environmental assessment supports a finding that "no action is neces-




The situation is more complicated when an off-site upgradient source
causes the contamination. If the "no action" petition only documents that
an upgradient source impacts the site (but does not include a full site
assessment), the CDPHE cannot approve a "no action" determination.
0 9
However, the CDPHE could write a letter absolving the applicant from
cleanup liability related to the upgradient source. A full site assess-
ment is required to support a "no action" determination, since the
CDPHE approval must include a finding that the site itself does not pose
a risk to public health or the environment.111 When contaminated
groundwater has migrated onto the site, the site assessment must include
information about groundwater direction flow and contaminant levels.
112
The likelihood of a change in groundwater direction flow must also be
addressed.' 3 Finally, the site assessment should discuss whether the cur-
rent or proposed future uses of the site "promote movement of the plume
or cause a threat to future users of the site or others in downgradient lo-
cations."
1 14
A "no action" determination is a conditional finding by CDPHE that
no further remediation is required." 5 In its written notification to the
applicant, the CDPHE must provide the basis for its "no action" determi-
108. VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 7.
109. See id. at 8.
110. See id. In this event, the site assessment could be more limited, "requiring only a demon-
stration that the applicant's site is within the current hydrologic bounds of the other's contamina-
tion." Id.
Ill. See id.
The applicant must demonstrate that they are being impacted by an off-
site source and must fully characterize their property, to insure that there
are no additional contaminant sources. This is necessary because the
statutory language included in the State's approval letter says that the
site in question does not pose a risk. Without a site characterization[,] the
state cannot make that conclusion.
Id. For the required statutory language used in a "no action" determination, see infra note 116.
112. VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 8.
[T]he assessment should [also] ... document a contaminant concentra-
tion gradient. If possible, document usage of the contaminant found on
the site in a near upgradient location. Include groundwater samples as
well as soil samples taken from the same or multiple borings which veri-
fies that the contaminant has been transported via the ground water and




115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(2) (2000).
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nation. 1 6 If the CDPHE disapproves the "no action" petition, the
CDPHE notifies the applicant in writing of the reasons for the disap-
proval.' 7 If the applicant failed to provide required information, the
CDPHE's written notification must identify the specific information
omitted. "'8
D. Voluntary Cleanup Plan
When the contamination on-site exceeds applicable state standards or
risk-based criteria, the applicant prepares a voluntary cleanup plan
(VCP)." 9 The VCP consists of three parts: (1) the environmental assess-
ment; (2) the proposal for remediation; and (3) a description of cleanup
standards for the hazardous constituents found at the site. 12 The envi-
ronmental assessment requirements and cleanup standards have been
• • .. ,121
previously discussed.
The proposal for remediation addresses "any contamination or con-
dition which has or could lead to a release which poses an unacceptable
risk to human health or the environment, considering the present and any
differing proposed future use of the property .... 122 Under the VCRA,
all remediation proposals must be based on actual risk to human health
and the environment currently posed by contaminants on-site. 123 The
remediation proposal must take into account the following factors: (1)
present and proposed uses of the site; 24 (2) ability of contaminants to
migrate which might result in violation of state standards or risk-based
criteria; 125 (3) economic and technical feasibility;1
26 and (4) reliability. 127
116. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(2)(b) (2000). The written notification must also include
the following statement:
Based upon the information provided by [insert name(s) of property
owner(s)] concerning property located at [insert address], it is the opin-
ion of the Colorado [Dlepartment of [P]ublic [H]ealth and
[E]nvironment that no further action is required to assure that this prop-
erty, when used for the purposes identified in the no action petition, is
protective of existing and proposed uses and does not pose an unaccept-
able risk to human health or the environment at the site.
Id.
117. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(4) (2000).
118. See id.
119. VCRA APPLICATION GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 7. The CDPHE guidance document
refers to the VCP as the remediation plan. See id.
120. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-304(2) (2000).
121. See supra pp. 11-15.
122. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-304(2)(b) (2000).
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-305(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
124. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-305(l)(a) (2000).
125. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-305(l)(b) (2000).
126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-305(l)(c) (2000).
127. See id.
2000]
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The remediation proposal should also include a schedule for cleaning up
and monitoring the site.
28
The CDPHE will approve the VCP if the following criteria are met:
(I) [The VCP aittain[s] a degree of clean-up and control of hazardous
substances or petroleum products, or both, that complies with all
promulgated applicable state requirements, regulations, criteria, or
standards; [or]
(II) For constituents not governed by subparagraph (I)... [the VCP]
reduce[s] concentrations such that the property does not present an
unacceptable risk to human health or the environment based upon the
propert%'9s current use and any future uses proposed by the property
owner.
The CDPHE must state the basis for its VCP approval in writing to
the applicant.1 30 If the CDPHE disapproves the VCP application, the
CDPHE's notification includes the reasons for the denial and specifies
what information, if any, is missing from the application.'
3'
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-304(2)(b) (2000). Note that a VCP remediation does not
exempt the property owner from other regulatory obligations "including any requirement to obtain
permits or approvals for work performed under a voluntary clean-up plan." COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-
16-309(1) (2000).
129. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(1)(b) (2000).
130. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(2) (2000). The CDPHE's written notification must also
include the following statement:
Based upon the information provided by [insert name(s) of property
owner(s)] concerning property located at [insert address], it is the opin-
ion of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment that
upon completion of the voluntary clean-up plan no further action is re-
quired to assure that this property, when used for the purposes identified
in the voluntary clean-up plan, is protective of existing and proposed
uses and does not pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the envi-
ronment at the site.
Id.
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(1)(c) (2000).
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III. CDPHE REVIEW OF VCRA SUBMITTALS AND RELIEF FROM FUTURE
REMEDIATION REQUIREMENTS.
A. Time and Cost of Review
The CDPHE must act on a VCRA submittal (either a VCP or "no
action" petition) within forty-five days or it is deemed approved. 132 The
CDPHE conducts its review based on the documents submitted by the
applicant, and other information readily available to the department. 133 In
addition, the CDPHE staff has a right to access the contaminated prop-
erty upon reasonable notice to the property owner.'34
The applicant must pay a filing fee to cover all direct and indirect
costs associated with CDPHE review of VCRA submittals. 135  The
CDPHE will determine the amount of the filing fee, which by statute
cannot exceed $2,000.136 Within 30 days of approving or disapproving
the VCRA submittal, the CDPHE must send a bill to the applicant indi-
cating the total review cost (based on published hourly rates). 137 In any
event, the review cost cannot exceed the maximum filing fee amount of
$2,000."' All monies paid under the VCRA program go to the state haz-
ardous substance trust fund.
139
132. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(1) (2000) ("no action" petition); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-
16-306(1)(a) (2000) (VCP). However, if the CDPHE has already received eight VCRA submittals in
the calendar month, the CDPHE may start the 45-day review period for the next VCRA submittal on
the first day of the following month. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(l)(a) (2000). The CDPHE must
notify the applicant of the delay in the review period. See id. The property owner and the CDPHE
can also agree to an extension beyond the 45-day period. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(1) (2000)
("no action" petitions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(l)(a) (2000) (VCP).
133. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(1) (2000) ("no action" petitions); COLO. REV. STAT. §
25-16-306(l)(a) (2000) (VCP).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(5) (2000).
135. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(4)(a) (2000).
136. See id.
137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(4)(b) (2000). "The department shall establish and publish
hourly rates for review charges performed by the department in connection with applications for
approval of voluntary clean-up plans and petitions for no action ...." Id. If the review cost is lower
than the initial filing fee, the CDPHE will refund the difference. See id. "The department's charges
shall be billed against the [initial] application fee ... ." Id.
138. See id
139. COLO. REV.. STAT. § 25-16-303(4)(c) (2000). This is the hazardous substance trust fund
created under Colorado Revised Statutes section 25-16-104.6(1). See id. "Moneys collected... shall
be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly only to defray the direct and indirect
costs of the department in processing voluntary clean-up plans and petitions for no action determi-
nation .... Id.
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B. CDPHE Review Process
Upon receipt of a "no action" petition or a VCP, the CDPHE con-
ducts a two-part screening process. 14 The CDPHE first determines if
another environmental program already covers the site.141 If so, the site is
not eligible for VCRA cleanup. 142 If the site is eligible for VCRA
cleanup, then CDPHE must determine EPA's interest in the site.'
43
First, the CDPHE will check the EPA's CERCLIS database. 144 If all
or a portion of the site is listed in the CERCLIS database, the CDPHE
will request that the EPA suspend additional CERCLA cleanup actions1
45
and allow the VCRA to remediate the site.146 If the site is already subject
to an EPA CERCLA Administrative Order, 147 the EPA will not suspend
its actions regarding site remediation.'4
For a site on the EPA CERCLIS database that is not subject to an
EPA CERCLA Administrative Order, the EPA decides whether to accept
140. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP: MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION Vill APP. 2 (undated) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM
OF AGREEMENT APPENDIX].
141. See id. For an extensive discussion of VCRA exclusions, see supra pp. 3-8.
142. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-303(3)(b) (2000). See also MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
APPENDIX, supra note 140, at 3.
143. Memorandum of Agreement Appendix, supra note 140, at 3.
144. See id.
CERCLIS is ... EPA's comprehensive database and data management
system that inventories and tracks releases addressed or needing to be
addressed by the Superfund program. CERCLIS contains the official in-
ventory of CERCLA sites and supports EPA's site planning and tracking
functions.... Inclusion of a specific site or area in the CERCLIS data
base does not represent a determination of any party's liability, nor does
it represent a finding that any response action is necessary.
40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2000).
145. For a description of EPA's CERCLA authority, see supra p. 4 and notes 20-2 1.
146. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT APPENDIX, supra note 140, at 4; Telephone Interview
with Dan Scheppers, Superfund and Voluntary Cleanup Unit Leader, Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment (April 12, 2000) (As of April 2000, the EPA had supported all VCRA
cleanups submitted under this procedure).
147. These EPA Administrative Orders are commonly known as "Section 106 Administrative
Orders," based on section 106 of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994). See also, Exec. Order No.
12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1987), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1995). In 1987, President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12580 which delegated authority under CERCLA Section 106 to the
EPA Administrator and the U.S. Coast Guard. Executive Order 12580 authorized the EPA to issue
orders or seek judicial relief to require clean up of hazardous substance releases under section 106 of
CERCLA. In 1996, President Clinton expanded this delegation of authority, so that other federal
agencies may issue section 106 orders under CERCLA. See Exec. Order No. 13,016, 3 C.F.R. 214
(1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1995).
148. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT APPENDIX, supra note 140, at 3.
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VCRA cleanup in lieu of further EPA CERCLA actions. 149 The CDPHE
may approve the VCP or "no action" petition, even if the EPA refuses to
defer to the VCRA process. 150 However, the applicant has less incentive
to proceed with the VCRA cleanup if the EPA retains the option of im-
posing additional remediation requirements on the site. If the EPA sus-
pends further action, the CDPHE agrees to keep the EPA informed of
progress on the site.1
5'
If the site is not on the EPA CERCLIS database, the CDPHE must
determine if the site is of "NPL caliber."' 52 A site of "NPL caliber" is a
site "where significant human exposure to hazardous substances has been
documented or where sensitive environments have become contami-
nated."' 53 If the CDPHE determines the site is of "NPL caliber," the
149. See id. at 4.
150. See id. at 4-5.
151. See id. ("The CDPHE will notify EPA of the owner's completion or failure to complete
the remedial action." Field conditions or new information may trigger a modification of the ap-
proved VCP. The property owner must inform the CDPHE of any proposed deviations from the
approved VCP and the CDPHE determines if a plan modification is required or if the property owner
must submit a revised application based on the new site information). See id. at 7.
152. See id. at 4-5.
153. Id. (The following non-exclusive list of site characteristics may indicate an "NPL caliber"
site:
I I Public drinking water supplies or private wells are contaminated with
a hazardous substance above the concentration listed in the Risk-Based
Concentration Table for tap water, January 1995;
[2] Soils on school, day care center, or residential properties are con-
taminated by a hazardous substance significantly above background lev-
els and are above concentrations for soil ingestion (residential) listed in
the Risk-Based Concentration Table, January 1995;
[3] Soils on school, day care center, or residential properties are con-
taminated by lead concentrations significantly above background levels
and the lead soil concentration is above 400 ppm;
[4] A hazardous substance is detected in an off-site air release in a
populated area and the release is above the concentration listed in the
Risk-Based Concentration Table for ambient air;
[5] A highly toxic hazardous substance known to persist and bioaccu-
mulate in the environment (e.g., PCB[s], mercury, dioxin, PAHs), is dis-
charged into surface waters;
[6] A highly toxic hazardous substance known to be mobile in the sub-
surface (e.g,, vinyl chloride; trichloroethylene, acetone, phenol, cad-
mium, mercury), is discharged to significant useable aquifers; [and]
[7] Sensitive environments are contaminated with a hazardous substance
significantly above background levels and water quality standards where
appropriate.
Id. If releases from the applicant's property have contributed to off-site contamination, the EPA
considers the sources of hazardous substance contamination and the areas where contamination has
migrated, to be part of the "NPL caliber" site). See id.
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CDPHE notifies the applicant of this determination.15 4 The EPA will
only be notified regarding the site if both the CDPHE and applicant agree
to do so.155 In that event, the VCP is sent to EPA for its review and coin-156
currence. The EPA will provide its comments on the VCP expedi-
tiously. 
157
If the CDPHE and the applicant jointly decide not to submit the VCP
to the EPA, the EPA's pledge of forbearance does not apply. 158 The
CDPHE may still approve the VCP pursuant to the VCRA.159 In addition,
the applicant is not protected from EPA CERCLA actions regarding the
property in the future.
Within 30 days of CDPHE approval, the applicant must provide
"adequate public notice" of the VCP or the "no action" determiaton.
While the VCRA contains no public participation requirements, the EPA
included this public notice requirement as a condition of their deferral to
VCRA cleanups. 161 "Adequate public notice" depends on the specific
site. 162 However, public notice "should include publication of the avail-
ability of the cleanup plan in a local newspaper or posting of any public
notice plan required by [a] building permit or zoning ordinance proce-
,,163dures. The CDPHE may request the applicant hold a public meeting
on the VCRA cleanup, if the site is large or there is public interest in the
site cleanup.164
The VCP cleanup process is complete when the applicant sends the
CDPHE a certification by a qualified environmental professional that the
154. See id.
155. See id; Telephone Interview with Dan Scheppers, Superfund and Voluntary Cleanup Unit
Leader, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (April 12, 2000) (As of April 2000,
there have been very few VCRA sites which have been of "NPL caliber." However, in those few
instances, the applicant wanted EPA participation to obtain EPA assurances of no future remediation
requirements).




160. See id. at 6.
161. See id. (All VCRA files are public records, and are available for public review upon
request. The CDPHE notifies local health departments "to see if there is any knowledge of or interest
in the site, and will make a copy of the application available for local review if requested." The
Memorandum of Agreement recognizes that local governments may have additional public review
procedures for redevelopment actions that might be applicable to these sites).
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See id. The Memorandum of Agreement assumes there is public interest in a site if the site
has received publicity or is in close proximity to a Superfund site.
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VCP has been fully implemented. 165 However, after submitting this certi-
fication, the applicant must take one more step to obtain continued EPA
forbearance. The applicant must file a "no action" petition accompanied
by a completion report, to the CDPHE.116 The completion report "de-
scribes how the applicant has complied with the initial or modified
cleanup plan as approved by CDPHE."' 67 The EPA will remove the site
from its CERCLIS database, 168 following a CDPHE "no action" determi-
nation. 1
69
C. Relieffrom Future State and Federal Cleanup Requirements
Once the VCRA process is complete, no further remediation action is• 170
required. However, this is contingent on no change in (1) property. • 71 • 72173
conditions,' 7' (2) state standards, 7 2 or (3) proposed property uses from
the time of the VCRA submittal.174 The property owner must understand
the limits to CDPHE forbearance under the VCRA. While the CDPHE
165. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(5) (2000). The property owner must submit this certifica-
tion within 45 days of completing the VCP remediation.
166. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT APPENDIX, supra note 140, at 7.
167. Id. If the VCP involved excavation of soil contamination, the following sampling results
should be included in the completion report: "One confirmation sample per 500 ft2 as measured at
the base of the excavation OR two confirmatory samples; whichever method results in the collection
of the most samples. In addition, one composite sample from each wall of the excavation is neces-
sary." Id. at 8 (emphasis in the original). Other types of sampling may be required, based on the size
or configuration of the excavation. See id. The completion report must also include an explanation of
sampling method(s) and the depth of samples collected. See id. If the VCP called for in-situ soil
remediation, soil borings should be taken, and the results included in the completion report. See id. at
9. At a minimum, two soil borings should be taken, and larger sites may require a boring per 10,000
ft2. See id. ("The soil sample submitted for laboratory analysis (from each boring) would be that
sample with the highest field screening reading or if the field screening is non-detect[,] then submit
the soil sample located at the ground water interface"). With regards to ground water remediation,
the completion report must describe the monitoring system. See id. The monitoring must provide
information on two key questions: "1. Has the ground water which was most severely impacted by
the source had a chance to flow past the POC [Point Of Compliance] during the monitoring period?
[and] 2. If there is contamination remaining, is it mobile at levels that it may present a risk in the
future?" Id. he completion report should verify that the specific goals set forth in the VCP have been
met. See id.
168. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT APPENDIX, supra note 140, at 2.
169. See id. The EPA's forbearance is conditioned upon actual CDPHE review of the "no
action" petition. In other words, the EPA will not defer to the CDPHE decision if the "no action"
petition is deemed approved after 45 days due to CDPHE inaction. See id.
170. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(2) (2000) (VCP); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(2)(b)
(2000) ("no action" determination). See supra notes 116 and 130 for the CDPHE written certifica-
tions indicating no further remediation required upon issuance of a "no action" determination or
VCP completion, respectively.






173. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(2)(b)(2000).
174. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-307(2)(c) (2000) ("no action" determination); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 25-16-306(1)(d) (2000) (VCP).
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cannot enforce the VCP against the property owner,175 the state can still• • 176
take enforcement action under other environmental regulations. If the
CDPHE assesses a penalty against the property owner as part of an en-
forcement action, the state cannot use information provided by the prop-
erty owner during the VCRA process in the penalty assessment. 7 The
VCRA requires the state to consider the voluntary disclosure of informa-
tion as a mitigating factor in reducing or eliminating the penalty.
178
The EPA's deference to VCRA cleanups is defined not by the
VCRA, but by the terms of the CDPHE-EPA Region VIII Memorandum
of Agreement. 79 Under the Memorandum of Agreement, the EPA agrees
not to plan or otherwise conduct any CERCLA remediation actions re-
garding a site, once a VCRA application to clean up the site is filed with
the CDPHE 1 81 The EPA's forbearance in initiating CERCLA actions
depends on actual CDPHE review and approval of the VCP application
or "no action" petition. The EPA reserves the right to take CERCLA
actions regarding a site if the VCP application or "no action" petition is
deemed approved due to CDPHE's failure to act within 45 days. 182 In
addition, the EPA reserves the right to take CERCLA actions if the prop-
erty owner and the CDPHE jointly decide not to obtain an EPA review of
the VCP application for a "NPL caliber" site."'
Even if the procedural requirements for EPA's deferral to VCRA are
met, the EPA retains the right to take CERCLA actions against VCRA
sites, in the following situations: (1) "the site is an NPL caliber site or the
site poses an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health,
welfare, or the environment and exceptional circumstances warrant EPA
[CERCLA] action";" 84 (2) the CDPHE's approval of the cleanup plan
becomes void;' 85 or (3) the applicant fails to complete or materially com-
ply with the cleanup plan as approved by the CDPHE. In addition, if
175, COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-16-310(1) (2000).
176. See id.
177. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-310(2) (2000).
178, See id.
179, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 13.
180 See id. at 1.
181 See id. at 2.
182 See id.
183. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT APPENDIX, supra note 140, at 5. See also supra p. 18,
for a discussion on CDPHE's options with regards to a "NPL caliber" site.
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the site is already subject to an EPA CERCLA Administrative Order, the
187EPA will not concur in the VCRA cleanup.
Several situations will void the CDPHE approval. The applicant's
failure to complete or materially comply with the VCP will void the
CDPHE approval.188 The applicant's submission of materially misleading
information in the VCP application or the "no action" petition will void
the CDPHE approval.189 Discovery of significantly new information
about the site will void the CDPHE approval. 90 The CDPHE approval of
the VCP will "lapse" if the applicant fails to timely remediate the con-
taminated property. 191 Specifically, remediation must begin within 12
months of the CDPHE approval, and reach completion within 24 months
of the CDPHE approval.' 9' If the CDPHE's approval is voided for any
reason, the EPA's agreement to defer to the VCRA cleanup is
nullified. 193
187. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT APPENDIX, supra note 140, at 3. The Memorandum of
Agreement also recognizes EPA's statutory duty under CERCLA to perform a preliminary assess-
ment on a site involving a suspected release of hazardous substances, when requested by a citizen's
petition. See also id. at 2. Section 105(d) of CERCLA states:
Any person who is, or may be affected by a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance . . . may petition the President to conduct a
preliminary assessment of the hazards to public health and the environ-
ment which are associated with such release or threatened release. If the
President has not previously conducted a preliminary assessment of such
release, the President shall, with 12 months after the receipt of any such
petition, complete such assessment or provide an explanation of why the
assessment is not appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (1999). This duty was delegated to EPA in 1987. Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3
C.F.R. 193 (1987), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1995). See also supra note 147. If
the release or threatened release poses a threat to human health and the environment, EPA must
evaluate the contaminated site under the hazard ranking system that is used to determine listing on
the National Priorities List (NPL). 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (1994). See supra pp. 4-5 and notes 20-25,
on the process for placing a site on the NPL. Contaminated sites that are proposed for listing or are
listed on the NPL are not eligible for VCRA cleanups. See supra p. 4 and note 15. The EPA must
respond within 12 months to a citizen's petition alleging a release or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance, by either conducting a preliminary assessment of the suspected release or providing
an explanation of why an assessment is not appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (1994).
188. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 13, at 2.
189. See id.
190 See id.
191. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(4)(a) (2000).
192. See id. The CDPHE may grant an extension of the deadline for completion of VCP reme-
diation. See id. If the property owner fails to complete remediation within a 24-month period and
does not get an extension, the property owner can file a petition for reapplication to the CDPHE.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-306(4)(b) (2000). The reapplication petition must include a written
certification by a qualified environmental professional "that the conditions on the subject real prop-
erty are substantially similar to those that existed at the time of the original approval." Id. The
CDPHE must complete its review of the reapplication petition within 30 days. COLO. REV. STAT. §
25-16-306(4)(c) (2000). However, if the condition on the site has substantially changed since the
initial VCP approval, then the reapplication petition will be treated as a new application. See id.
193. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 13, at 1.
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IV. CONCLUSION -THE FUTURE OF BROWNFIELDS REMEDIATION IN
COLORADO
In 1999, Colorado reaffirmed its commitment to brownfields reme-• • 194
diation by extending the VCRA indefinitely. Over 200 VCRA appli-
cations have been filed with the CDPHE since the program's inception in
1994.195 The CDPHE has issued over 90 "no action" determinations,. . 196
which is the "go-ahead" for redevelopment.. Colorado is also encour-
aging brownfields remediation through the Colorado Brownfields Re-
volving Loan Fund pilot program, which provides low interest loans to
private businesses in the Denver area. 197 Only sites with VCRA cleanup
plans are eligible for loans under this program. 198 These loans are only• .• 199
for cleanup activities. Pre-cleanup activities such as site assessment
and site characterization are not eligible for funding under the Brown-
fields Revolving Loan Fund.
2 0°°
Remediation of brownfields received strong support from Governor
Owens, as part of his "Smart Growth: Colorado's Future" initiative an-
nounced in November 1999.
Colorado is currently "the place to live," making some growth inevi-
table. So it is important that we partner with local governments to
take advantage of areas already developed but not necessarily fully
utilized, before looking to develop pristine land. Today I am an-
nounciig that my Smart Growth plan contains state sales tax and in-
come tax relief for those who rehabilitate and renovate brownfields
and other land in our cities and towns. Land recycling has the added
benefit of encouraging growth where supporting infrastructure such
194. On April 9, 1999, Governor Owens signed into law House Bill 99-1213, which repealed
section 25-16-311, the July 1, 1999 sunset provision for the Voluntary Cleanup Redevelopment Act.
1999 Colo. Legis. Serv. 139 (West).
195. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND WASTE MANAGEMENT DIVISION,
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT: Voluntary Cleanup and Rede-
velopment Act Application Tracking Report (Mar. 21, 2000)
<http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/hm/rpvclist.asp> The CDPHE Hazardous Materials and Waste
Management Division updates their Voluntary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act Application Track-
ing Report regularly, and posts it on their web page.
196. See id.
197. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND WASTE MANAGEMENT DIVISION,
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, Fact Sheet Colorado Brown-
fields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund (1999), p. I
<http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/hm/bfprogguide.pdf> ("At the present time, only sites located within
the Denver metropolitan area are eligible for this loan program .... The money used for making
loans originated as a grant from the Environmental Protection Agency's Brownfields Program....
The funds are made available to borrowers a[t] below market interest rate loans").
198. See id. at 2.
199. See id. at 2-3.
200. See id.
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as roads and sewers already exist, thus lessening the need to build
more and more infrastructure. Developing and redeveloping land
within our current metro areas also means less commuting and, in
turn, less traffic on our roads and highways.
20'
More than a million people are expected to move to Colorado in the
next 15 years, which will increase development pressures on open202
spaces, wildlife habitat, farms, and ranches. Aggressive remediation of
brownfields will be critical in Colorado's struggle to accommodate
growth and still preserve Colorado's heritage and quality of life.
201. Governor Bill Owens, Announcement of Smart Growth: Colorado's Future 3, Draft
Remarks at Denver, CO (November 29, 1999) (emphasis in the original). See also, 26 U.S.C. § 198
(1999) (The federal government has already implemented tax incentives for brownfields remedia-
tion, as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Under section 198, remediation costs for properties
in certain target areas are fully deductible business expenses in the year in which the costs are in-
curred or paid. In other words, the remediation costs do not have to be capitalized). 26 U.S.C.A. §
198(h) (West Supp. 2000) (This federal tax incentive is in effect until Dec. 31, 2001).
202. Governor Bill Owens, Announcement of Smart Growth: Colorado's Future 3, Draft
Remarks at Denver, CO (November 29, 1999).
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RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EXCESS INSURERS
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND*
I. INTRODUCTION
The terms "primary," "excess" and "umbrella" are generic labels for
the types of liability insurance policies sold today. A primary policy pro-
vides the first layer of insurance coverage. Primary coverage attaches
immediately upon the happening of an "occurrence," or as soon as a
claim is made.' The primary insurer is first responsible for defending and
indemnifying the insured in the event of a covered or potentially covered
occurrence or claim.2 Because most losses are within primary policy
limits and therefore create greater exposure for primary insurers, and
because primary insurers are generally obligated to defend their insureds,
primary insurers charge larger premiums for coverage than do excess and
umbrella carriers.3 Primary policies are widely seen and understood by
way of example: individuals purchase automobile and homeowners in-
surance, professionals purchase errors and omissions (E&O) coverage,
businesses purchase commercial general liability (CGL) policies, and
many financial institutions and corporations insure themselves and their
leaders under directors' and officers' (D&O) liability policies. Larger
businesses often self-insure up to some amount, with their self-insured
retentions (SIRs) substituting for primary insurance.
* Partner, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Kansas City, Missouri. B.S., Fort Hays State
University; M.Ed., University of Nebraska; J.D., University of Kansas. The opinions expressed in
this Article are the author's alone. This Article sometimes uses the masculine pronoun "he" for
simplicity's sake; it does not evidence any sort of gender bias.
1. Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., 984 F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The word
'primary' is used also in the field of excess insurance to distinguish coverage which attached imme-
diately upon the happening of an occurrence, from excess coverage, which attaches only after a
predetermined amount of 'primary' coverage has been exhausted."); See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Md. Cas. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 311 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Primary coverage provides immediate
coverage upon the 'occurrence' of a 'loss' or the 'happening' of an 'event' giving rise to liability.");
Bailey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 642 N.E.2d 1323, 1326 (111. App. Ct. 1994) ("Primary insur-
ance coverage is insurance which attaches immediately upon the happening of the occurrence that
gives rise to the liability."). In the liability insurance context, "occurrence" is a term of art. Standard
liability insurance policies define an "occurrence" to mean "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." I SUSAN J. MILLER &
PHILIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICtES ANNOTATED 419 (4th ed. 1995).
2. See Firenan's Fund, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311 ("[A] primary insurer generally has the
primary duty to defend and to indemnify the insured, unless otherwise excused or excluded by
specific policy language."); See also Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 879,
881 (Mich. 1995) ("The logical rule ... is that the 'true' excess insurer is liable for defense costs
only after the primary insurer is excused under the terms of its policy.").
3. See Reliance Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 638-39 (CL
App. 1999); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 81 (Kan. 1997);
Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 20 S.W.3d 692, 700-01 (Tex. 2000).
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An excess policy provides specific coverage above an underlying
limit of primary insurance. Excess insurance is priced on the assumption
that primary coverage exists; indeed, an excess policy usually requires by
its terms that the insured maintain in force scheduled limits of primary
insurance. In keeping with the reasonable expectations of the parties,
including the insured, which paid separate premiums for its primary and
excess policies, excess coverage generally is not triggered until the un-
derlying primary limits are exhausted by way of judgments or settle-
ments.4 Because an excess insurer's duties to its insured are not triggered
until the limits of the underlying primary policy (or policies) are ex-
hausted within the meaning of the excess policy,5 courts sometimes refer
to excess insurance as "secondary insurance, 6 or as "supplemental" or
"supplementary insurance."7 Additionally, the first layer of coverage
above an SIR is sometimes described as "excess insurance."8
A true excess policy does not broaden the underlying coverage.'
While an excess policy increases the amount of coverage available to
compensate for a loss, it does not increase the scope of coverage.'0 An
excess policy may be written on a "stand alone" basis or as a policy that
"follows form." A stand-alone excess policy relies exclusively on its own
insuring agreement, conditions, definitions, and exclusions to grant and
limit coverage. A following form excess policy incorporates by reference
the terms, conditions, and exclusions of the underlying policy.1 An ex-
cess policy that follows form is designed to match the coverage provided
by the underlying policy, although some following form policies contain
4. See generally Tex. Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Underwriting Members of Lloyds, 836 F.
Supp. 398, 407 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (noting that to require an excess insurer to share in defense costs
incurred before the primary carrier's policy limits were exhausted "would overturn the reasonable
expectations of the parties").
5. See Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 748, 751 (Alaska 1996);
M.H. Detrick Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 701 N.E.2d 156, 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), appeal denied,
707 N.E.2d 1240 (Ill. 1999); Northfield Ins. Co. v. Montana Ass'n of Counties, 10 P.3d 813, 817
(Mont. 2000); Allstate Ins. Co. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 452 S.E.2d 859, 861-62 (Va. 1995);
Rees v. Viking Ins. Co., 892 P.2d 1128,1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
6. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 14, 17 (I11. App. Ct.
1995); Northfield, 10 P.3d at 817.
7. See, e.g., Penn Am. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 710 So. 2d 597, 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (describing excess insurer as "the supplemental insurance provider"); George v. Empire
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 S.E.2d 107, 111 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) ("An excess policy is designed as
supplementary insurance and would not exist except for the underlying primary policy.").
8. See, e.g., Vons Cos. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 597, 604-05 (Ct. App. 2000).
9. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 539 n.2 (Ct. App.
1995) (differentiating between excess and umbrella policies, and defining "'excess coverage' or
,excess policy' to mean insurance that begins only after a predetermined amount of underlying
coverage is exhausted and that does not broaden the underlying coverage").
10. See Globe Indem. Co. v. Jordan, 634 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Me. 1993).
11. See Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 825 F. Supp. 705, 707
(E.D. Pa. 1993); Rivere v. Heroman, 688 So. 2d 1293, 1294 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Mass. Bay Transp.
Auth. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Mass. 1992).
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exclusions beyond those found in the primary policy, and policy provi-
sions sometimes conflict.' 2 To the extent the language of a primary pol-
icy and a following form excess policy differ, the terms of the excess
policy control where the excess coverage is implicated. Of course, an
insured that purchases two or more concurrent excess policies to insure
against large risks may layer both stand alone and following form poli-
cies. 3
An umbrella policy is like an excess policy in that it is written in
addition to a primary policy to protect the insured against liability for
catastrophic losses that would exceed the limits of affordable primary
coverage.' 4 Like many excess policies, umbrella policies are written to
stand alone. An umbrella policy differs from an excess policy in a critical
aspect: an umbrella policy typically insures against certain risks that a
concurrent primary policy does not cover. 5 An umbrella policy is thus a
"gap filler";1 6 by design, it provides first dollar liability coverage where a
primary policy and an excess policy do not. 7 For example, an umbrella
policy may insure against "personal injury" when a primary policy only
insures against "bodily injury" and "property damage." By essentially
dropping down to provide primary coverage or by filling a gap in pri-
mary coverage, an umbrella policy broadens the insured's primary cov-
erage where an excess policy does not. 18 The terms "excess policy" and
"umbrella policy" are not synonymous.' 9
12. See Housing Group v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass'n, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378, 381-82 (Ct. App.
1996); See, e.g., Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Am. Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 99-3869, 2000 WL
92097, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2000).
13. Following form policies are often used in multi-layer insurance packages because re-
peating identical exclusions in multiple policies is cumbersome, and because they contribute to
uniform coverage and the spreading of risk among the insurers. See Rummel v. St. Paul Surplus
Lines Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 985, 989 (N.M. 1997).
14. See Bailey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 642 N.E.2d 1323, 1326 (I11. App. Ct. 1994)
(discussing an umbrella policy that provided both primary and excess coverage, and stating that
"[t]he purpose of excess insurance is to protect the insured from 'catastrophic loss"'); Rivere, 688
So. 2d at 1294 (stating that an umbrella policy is designed to guard against catastrophic loss, and
discussing lower cost of umbrella and excess coverage); Davis v. Allied Processors, Inc., 571
N.W.2d 692, 694-95 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (observing that umbrella coverage insures against cata-
strophic loss, and explaining why it costs less than primary coverage), rev. denied, 579 N.W. 2d 45
(Wis. 1998).
15. See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 628 A.2d 880, 886 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
16. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 1047, 1053 (1st Cir. 1993);
Wells Fargo Bank v. Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 539 n.2 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764, 771 (Cal. 1982)).
17. Typically, umbrella policies are intended to provide comprehensive excess liability cover-
age and are not intended to insure against first party losses, as an underlying homeowners or auto-
mobile policy might. See Doto v. Russo, 659 A.2d 1371, 1374-75 (N.J. 1995).
18. This does not mean that primary policies and umbrella policies are equivalents, for they
clearly are not. See Meyer v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Wis. Ct. App.), review
denied, 612 N.W.2d 733 (Wis. 2000). In addition, regardless of whether an umbrella policy's cover-
age is primary or excess, the policy still affords only that coverage for which its terms provide.
Umbrella coverage is not boundless. See, e.g., Greene v. Hanover Ins. Co., 700 So. 2d 1354, 1358
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The importance of excess insurance and excess insurers' involve-
ment in, coverage disputes and related controversies has grown signifi-
cantly in recent years.2° This is because more insureds are purchasing
excess coverage, excess insurers are increasingly involving themselves in
the supervision and management of litigation implicating their policies,
and many areas of tort litigation have become characterized by sizable
jury verdicts and a lottery ticket mentality or atmosphere.2 As might be
expected, the relationships between primary insurers, excess insurers,
and their insureds now raise difficult questions in a variety of circum-
stances. The question is no longer simply one of settlement within pri-
mary policy limits versus a primary insurer's bad faith liability to an ex-
cess or umbrella carrier for failing to do so, although such disputes are
common. Notice of a loss is an issue at many levels, exhaustion of un-
derlying policies is a recurring source of controversy, excess insurers are
increasingly willing to sue defense counsel hired by primary insurers for
perceived malpractice, and relationships between insurers become com-
plicated when an insured is covered by overlapping or successive poli-
cies, all of which are implicated by a particular loss.22
This article attempts to explain critical excess insurance issues in a
manner useful to courts, practitioners, and scholars alike. Part II looks at
primary and excess insurance fundamentals and differences, including
notice of loss requirements, as well as excess and umbrella insurers' ob-
ligations to participate in the defense of their insureds. It is important to
note here that while the insurance industry promulgates standard primary
liability insurance policies, there are no standard forms for excess insur-
ance policies. Excess policy terms therefore vary widely. Part III exam-
ines the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the excess insurance con-
text. Part IV discusses exhaustion and allocation issues. Finally, Part V
examines an excess insurer's ability to sue defense counsel hired by a
primary carrier for malpractice. The article points out differences be-
tween umbrella coverage and excess coverage as the need arises, rather
than devoting a section to umbrella coverage.
(Ala. 1997) ("Regardless of whether the Umbrella Policy coverage takes the form of excess or non
excess coverage, it is still subject to the Umbrella Endorsement's exclusion for [the] injuries [at
issue]."). "
19. Unfortunately, some courts and commentators wrongly believe that the terms "excess
policy" and "umbrella policy" are synonymous. See, e.g., Heyman Assocs. No. I v. Ins. Co. of the
State of Pa., 653 A.2d 122, 125 n.3 (Conn. 1995) ("An excess liability policy, also known as an
'umbrella policy,' provides coverage that is secondary to an insured's primary policy.").
20. See Scott M. Seaman & Charlene Kittredge, Excess Liability Insurance: Law and Litiga-
tion, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 653, 653 (1997).
21. See id. at 653-54.
22. See Shaun McParland Baldwin & Dawn Midkiff, Primary and Excess Relationships:
Examining the Evolving Duties, in THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURANCE
CARRIERS 1, 1 (Def. Research Inst. 1993).
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II. PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURANCE: SOME FUNDAMENTALS AND
DIFFERENCES
Insureds purchase liability insurance, including excess and umbrella
policies, for peace of mind. There are, however, key differences between
primary and excess coverage. These differences often manifest them-
selves in the notice of loss context and when it comes time to defend an
insured against a claim or suit by a third-party.
A. Notice of Loss
Liability insurance policies require the insured to give the insurer
notice of a loss shortly after an occurrence, or when a claim is made or a
suit is filed against the insured. Timely notice is a condition precedent to
coverage.23 The primary purpose of a notice of loss provision is to give
the insurer the opportunity to adequately investigate the circumstances of
the occurrence, claim, or suit so that it can defend or settle as appropri-
ate.24 The longer the wait between an occurrence and notice to an inter-
ested insurer, the greater the chance that evidence will be destroyed or
lost, or that potential witnesses will disappear or their memories will
fade. 25
Excess and umbrella policies, like primary liability policies, contain
notice requirements. A typical excess policy provides:
23. See Greycoat Hanover F Street Ltd. P'ship v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 657 A.2d 764, 768
(D.C. 1995); S.E. Express Sys., Inc. v. S. Guar. Ins. Co., 482 S.E.2d 433, 436 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997);
Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 729 N.E.2d 915, 920-21 (ill. App. Ct.),
appeal denied, 738 N.E.2d 928 (ill. 2000); Askren Hub States Pest Control Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 721 N.E.2d 270, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. ACC Chem. Co., 538
N.W.2d 259, 262 (Iowa 1995); Koski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 572 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Mich. 1998); Craig
v. Dye, 526 S.E.2d 9, 11-12 (Va. 2000).
24. See Sybron Transition Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1997); S.E.
Express, 482 S.E.2d at 436; Northbrook, 729 N.E.2d at 921; Herman Bros., Inc. v. Great W. Cas.
Co., 582 N.W.2d 328, 333, 335-36 (Neb. 1998); Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp. v. Employers Ins.
of Wausau, 725 N.E.2d 646, 655 (Ohio 2000); See also Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d
357, 363 (Kan. 1998) ("From the insurer's perspective, notice of a loss ... would trigger an investi-
gation, and delay might hamper a thorough independent investigation."). There are other valid rea-
sons for requiring prompt notice of a loss. The early discovery of information may help insurers
defeat fraudulent claims. See Sybron, 107 F.3d at 1257. Notice also plays a role in the rate-setting
process: the shorter the time between a loss and notice, the more predictable the amount of the
insurer's payment becomes. This tends to reduce the level of reserves that insurers must maintain,
and makes it more likely that rates will fairly reflect insurers' risks. See Tenovsky v. Alliance Syndi-
cate, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 1144, 1146 (Mass. 1997) (quoting Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 551 N.E. 2d 28, 29-30 (Mass. 1990)); See also ROBERT H. JERRY, H, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW § 81[a], at 524 (2d ed. 1996).
25. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 538 N.W.2d at 266 ("The appearance of the site had been
changed. At least one key witness had died, many had left, and many relevant documents had been
destroyed. The witnesses who were available could not reasonably be expected to fully recall the
events of five years earlier."); Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp., 725 N.E.2d at 655-56 (discussing
late notice and the problems posed by key witnesses dying, witnesses' memories fading and docu-
ments being destroyed).
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Upon the happening of any occurrence reasonably likely to involve
the coverage of this policy, written notice containing particulars suf-
ficient to identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable infor-
mation with respect to the time, place, and circumstances thereof, and
the names and addresses of the injured and of available witnesses,
shall be given by or for the insured to the company or any of its
authorized agents as soon as practicable. 6
Many excess policies actually include two notice requirements, one
linked to an occurrence that may result in a claim or suit, and the second
addressing the insured's responsibilities when a claim is made or a suit is
filed.27 For example:
DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF OCCURRENCE, CLAIM, OR SUIT
1. You must see to it that WE receive prompt written notice
of an occurrence which may result in a claim. Notice should in-
clude:
a. How, when and where the occurrence took place;
b. The names and addresses of any injured persons and
witnesses.
2. If a claim is made or a suit is brought against YOU, YOU
must see to it that WE receive prompt written notice of the
claim or suit.
28
Notice provisions can be quite simple. For example, the umbrella policy
at issue in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nikitow 9 provided that
"[i]f something happens that might involve this policy, you must let us
know promptly."3 °
1. Notice: Whose Obligation?
It is normally the insured's obligation to give an insurer notice of a
loss.3 1 This seems a simple proposition, inasmuch as the insured is a
party to the contract imposing the notice requirement, and a standard
policy expressly assigns the obligation to the insured.32 As far as notice
26. 1 MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 1, at 626.
27. See generally Am. Ins. Co. v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1995)
(explaining the difference between the two types of notice provisions).
28. TIG Insurance Co., Excess Liability Policy, at 3 (1992) (on file with the author).
29. 924 P.2d 1084 (Colo. CL App. 1995).
30. Nikitow, 924 P.2d at 1087.
31. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 14, 18 (N.Y. 1997) (noting that
excess policies were direct agreements with the insured, and stating that excess carriers were entitled
to notice from the insured).
32. It should not matter to the insurer who timely notifies it of a loss inasmuch as a notice
provision is included in a policy for the insurer's benefit. See Gencorp, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Underwrit-
ers, 178 F.3d 804, 817 (6th Cir. 1999) (observing that notice provision exists for insurer's benefit).
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to an excess insurer, a primary insurer might be in a better position than
the insured to evaluate the severity of the loss or to predict verdict po-
tential, such that it might fairly be required to give an excess insurer no-
tice of a loss that implicates the excess insurer's coverage. If a primary
insurer owes a duty to an excess insurer to notify it of a loss, that duty
must be implied as part of a duty of good faith and fair dealing that exists
by virtue of the excess carrier's reliance on the primary carrier to control
the insured's defense.33
A primary insurer's obligation to notify an excess insurer of a loss
was at issue in American Centennial Insurance Co. v. Warner-Lambert
Co. 4 In 1979, Warner-Lambert was insured under a $3 million combined
single limit primary policy issued by Continental Insurance Co. and a $4
million excess policy issued by American Centennial Insurance Co.
(ACIC). Unknown to ACIC, Continental had relinquished to Warner-
Lambert all authority to negotiate and settle product liability claims in
exchange for Warner-Lambert's promise to reimburse it for all related
costs and expenses up to Continental's policy limits.
35
In 1982, Donna and Thomas Ricci sued a Warner-Lambert subsidi-
ary in a product liability action. Warner-Lambert sent ACIC a standard-
ized form indicating that the Riccis had made a claim. This was the only
notice provided to ACIC during the seven and one-half years that the
Ricci suit lingered. ACIC was never informed of settlement demands that
implicated its policy. ACIC was not even notified of the Ricci suit when,
in 1986, Continental determined that its primary policy limits were ex-
hausted, such that ACIC was directly at risk.36
In July 1989, the Riccis received a $2,165,000 verdict against War-
ner-Lambert's subsidiary. In November 1989, Warner-Lambert finally
advised ACIC of the Ricci litigation and of the fact that its policy might
be obligated to pay the full amount of the judgment. ACIC ultimately
paid over $500,000 in partial satisfaction of the judgment.37 ACIC then
filed a declaratory judgment action against Warner-Lambert and Conti-
nental seeking, among other things, a refund of its payment toward the
Ricci judgment.38
Continental argued that it could not be liable to ACIC because under
established New Jersey precedent, an insurer cannot avoid paying a
claim based on late notice unless improper notice is given by the insured
Of course, in most instances the insured is best positioned to notify the insurer by virtue of its
knowledge of the occurrence, claim, or suit, and its knowledge of the insurer's identity.
33. See Baldwin & Midkiff, supra note 22, at 2. For a discussion of primary and excess
insurers' duties of good faith and fair dealing, See infra Section Il1.
34. 681 A.2d 1241 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).
35. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 681 A.2d at 1243.
36. See id. at 1244.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1243.
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and the insurer suffers appreciable prejudice as a result.3 9 The Warner-
Lambert court disagreed, reasoning that what constitutes proper notice to
a primary insurer may differ from what constitutes proper notice to an
excess carrier. "When a primary carrier/excess carrier relationship is
involved, proper notice entails the primary carrier, not the insured, ad-
vising the excess carrier of the existence of the claim."''4 To ensure
proper notice, the primary carrier must further notify the excess insurer
on an ongoing basis of any pending litigation or settlement discussions.4
The Warner-Lambert court concluded that ACIC was not properly
notified of the Riccis' claim because the insured, not Continental, gave
inadequate notice. "Adequate notice cannot constitute a single mailing of
a form letter."42 Moreover, Continental failed in its notice obligation
twice: it first failed to provide initial notice of the Riccis' claim and it
then failed to advise ACIC of any settlement discussions or litigation
developments.43 Continental's notice obligation arose out of its "distinc-
tive relationship" with ACIC.4
The unique relationship results because the excess insurer relies
upon the primary carrier to act in good faith in processing claims. This
includes reliance upon a primary carrier to act reasonably in: (1) dis-
charging its claims handling obligations; (2) discharging its defense obli-
gations; (3) properly disclosing and apprising the excess carrier of
events which are likely to effect that carrier's coverage; and (4) safe-
guarding the rights and interests of the excess carrier by not placing the
primary carrier's own interests above that of the excess insurer.45
In imposing a notice obligation on Continental as a primary insurer,
the Warner-Lambert court also looked to industry custom and, more par-
ticular, to "The Guiding Principles for Primary and Excess Insurance
Companies."46  Both Continental and ACIC were signatories to the
Guiding Principles, the fifth of which provided:
If at any time, it should reasonably appear that the insured may be
exposed beyond the primary limit, the primary insurer shall give
prompt written notice to the excess insurer, when known, stating the
results of investigation and negotiation, and giving any other infor-
mation deemed relevant to a determination of the total exposure, and
39. See id. at 1245 (emphasis added).
40. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 681 A.2d 1241, 1245 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1995).
41. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 681 A.2d at 1245.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 1245-46.
44. Id. at 1246.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 681 A.2d 1241, 1246 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1995).
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inviting the excess insurer to participate in a common effort to dis-
pose of the claim.
47
Continental clearly violated this Guiding Principle. It disregarded its
obligation to notify ACIC of the Riccis' claim, instead allowing its in-
sured to provide inadequate notice. Continental never advised ACIC of
its investigation or settlement negotiations, and never invited ACIC to try
to participate in disposing of the claim.48
Because Continental failed to notify ACIC of the Riccis' claim, and
because Continental breached its duty of good faith to ACIC in other
ways, the Warner-Lambert court granted ACIC's motion for summary
judgment.49 The court ordered Continental to reimburse ACIC for its
payment toward satisfying the Ricci judgment, plus interest.
50
Not all jurisdictions follow the Warner-Lambert direct duty ap-
proach to notice. In Evanston Insurance Co. v. Stonewall Surplus Lines
Insurance Co.,5 a third-level excess insurer (Evanston) sued a primary
insurer (Truck Insurance Exchange) and two second-level excess insurers
(Stonewall) for bad faith for failing to timely notify it of a lawsuit impli-
cating its policy limits. The trial court awarded Truck and Stonewall
summary judgment because they neither owed nor breached any duty to
Evanston. They had no direct contractual relationship with Evanston.
Their contractual relationships were with their common insured, Schnei-
der National Carriers. If Evanston had any rights against either Truck or
Stonewall, those rights derived from their policies issued to Schneider.
Furthermore, under principles of equitable subrogation, Truck and
Stonewall could assert all defenses against Evanston they could assert
against Schneider.52
Schneider was based in Green Bay, Wisconsin, and the accident at
issue occurred in Georgia. Applying Georgia and Wisconsin law, the
Evanston court concluded that neither Truck nor Stonewall owed
Evanston a direct duty. Any duties Truck or Stonewall owed Evanston
derived from their contractual relationships with Schneider.53 Inasmuch
as Schneider (through its chosen defense counsel) never suspected that a
verdict or judgment might implicate Evanston's policy limits, Truck and
Stonewall could not be liable on Evanston's claims of late notice. The
Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the lower-level insurers' motion for
summary judgment.54
47. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 681 A.2d at 1246 (emphasis added).
48. See id. at 1247.
49. See id. at 1248.
50. See id.
51. 111 F.3d 852 (1lth Cir. 1997).
52. See Evanston Ins. Co., 11 F.3d at 858.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 859-60.
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In summary, the assignment of responsibility for notifying an excess
insurer of a loss as between the insured and a primary insurer is contro-
versial.5 Even if a primary insurer does not technically have a duty to
notify an excess insurer, however, it probably would be wise to do so. A
primary insurer's failure to give an excess insurer timely notice of a loss,
which implicates the excess carrier's policy, risks extra-contractual li-
ability, as Warner-Lambert and other cases illustrate. 6 At the very least,
a primary insurer that believes a loss will exceed its policy limits should
inform the insured of that fact, so that the insured knows to put the ex-
cess carrier on notice.57
2. Timeliness of Notice
The initial problem in determining when notice must be given to an
insurer is ascertaining those facts or circumstances that give life to an
insured's contractual obligation.58 This problem is more acute in the ex-
cess insurance context. There are times when a loss clearly exceeds the
available limits of primary insurance, such that an insured's duty to no-
tify its excess insurer should be obvious.59 In other situations an insured
may not have enough information when it first learns of a loss or when a
suit is first filed to determine whether potential damages exceed its pri-
mary policy limits. Additionally, notice requirements in excess policies
often afford an insured some discretion in determining when notice is
required.6°
Excess policies that require notice to be given "promptly," "as soon
as practicable," or upon "the happening of an occurrence reasonably
likely" to trigger a policy's coverage all include an element of reason-
ableness when it comes to providing timely notice.6 To the extent that an
excess policy includes a reasonableness element, notice to an excess car-
55. See Baldwin & Midkiff, supra note 22, at 2.
56. See, e.g., Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 971 F.2d 1385, 1393-94 (9th Cir.
1992) (applying California law).
57. See Baldwin & Midkiff, supra note 22, at 2.
58. See JERRY, supra note 24, § 81 [cI, at 526.
59. See, e.g., Interstate Power Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 603 N.W.2d 751, 758 (Iowa 1999)
(noting "gross disparity" between the amount of environmental remediation costs and available
insurance coverage).
60. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 800, 829-30 (E.D. Mich.
1998); Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 684 N.E.2d 600, 606 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1997).
61. See, e.g., Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 725 N.E.2d 646,
655 (Chio 2000) (stating that an excess insurance policy provision "requiring notice to the insurer
'as soon as practicable' requires notice within a reasonable time in light of the surrounding facts and
circumstances"); See also Helman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 664 N.E.2d 991, 995 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995) (stating in a case involving an excess policy that "[a] policy provision requiring prompt or




rier may not need to be given as soon as notice to a primary carrier.62 A
primary insurer has pressures to investigate a loss and to defend the in-
sured that an excess insurer arguably does not feel.63 An excess carrier
that wants immediate notice of a loss should word its policy accordingly.
Even in the reasonableness continuum, a policy that requires the insured
to give notice "promptly" is more demanding than one that requires no-
tice to be given "as soon as practicable." ''
In Reynolds Metal Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,65 the insured
sued its primary and excess insurers during policy years 1959-86 seeking
coverage for three environmental actions brought by federal and state
authorities, and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe. Reynolds had received a
"Potentially Responsible Party" or "PRP" letter from New York's De-
partment of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The trial court con-
cluded that Reynolds knew of "events occurring prior to December 1986
from which it should have reasonably concluded that it was likely to in-
cur remediation costs," such that it was then required to notify its insur-
ers. 66 Reynolds did not notify its insurers of its potential environmental
liability until 1988.67
The implicated insurance policies typically contained notice of oc-
currence provisions that required notice by the insured "as soon as prac-
ticable, 68 and notice of claim provisions that required the insured to
"immediately forward" relevant pleadings or similar documents if a
claim was made or suit was brought.69 The trial court held that Reynolds
failed to give its insurers timely notice of claims and occurrences, and
granted the insurers' summary judgment motions.7"
On appeal, Reynolds argued that its good faith belief that its policies
did not provide coverage and its similar good faith belief that it was not
liable excused its late notice.7 As to its believed lack of coverage, Rey-
nolds' s risk manager testified below that his reading of the "owned prop-
erty" exclusions in the insurance policies deprived the insured of cover-
age. As for non-liability, the DEC's PRP letter did not identify a possible
contamination site, and a later letter suggested that the contamination
62. See Gen. Cas. Co. v. Juhl, 669 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (I11. App. Ct. 1996).
63. See Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Container Freight, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 783
(Ct. App. 1997). In denying review, the California Supreme Court ordered the opinion not to be
officially published, removing precedent value. See id. at 776 n.* (citing California Supreme Court
Rules).
64. See Juhl, 669 N.E.2d at 1214.
65. 696 N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 1999).
66. Reynolds Metal Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d at 565-66.
67. See id. at 569.
68. Id. at 566 n.I.
69. Id. at 568 n.3.
70. See id. at 569.
71. See Reynolds Metal Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 563, 567 (App. Div.
1999).
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might not warrant immediate action because it did not present an imme-
diate threat to public health or the environment.
2
Under New York law, an insured's good faith belief that it is not li-
able or that a loss is not covered excuse late notice, so long as those be-
liefs are reasonable under the circumstances. 73 The reasonableness of the
insured's belief ordinarily is a question of fact.4 In the Reynolds Metal
court's view, the insured had presented sufficient evidence below to raise
a material question as to the reasonableness of its beliefs bearing on no-
tice, such that the trial court should not have entered summary judgment
for the insurers.75
The insurers ineffectively argued that the insured's reasonable belief
regarding non-coverage and non-liability only excused its late notice of
an occurrence. Thus, the late notice of claim provisions in the policies
still operated to preclude coverage.76 The Reynolds Metal court rejected
this argument, seeing no reason to differentiate between the two notice
provisions. The court thought it "illogical that insureds should be re-
quired to promptly notify insurers of every claim no matter how remote
the possibility of liability or coverage but be excused from doing so if a
reasonable evaluation of an occurrence yields the same conclusion. 77
Finally, with respect to the excess insurers, Reynolds' notice to them
in the summer of 1988 was not late as a matter of law because until that
time it may not have known that their policies were implicated. Reynolds
did not receive actual estimates for cleanup costs before it notified its
excess carriers. 78 There was not sufficient evidence in the record to dem-
onstrate that Reynolds knew that cleanup costs would exhaust its primary
coverage, which only then would have required it to give notice to the
excess insurers.79
3. Late Notice as a Coverage Defense: The "Notice-Prejudice Rule"
and Excess Insurance
Insurers routinely argue that an insured's late notice of an occur-
rence, claim, or suit operates as a complete coverage defense; that is, by
not giving timely notice, the insured has failed to satisfy a condition
precedent to coverage. In some jurisdictions, an insured's unexcused
delay in providing notice will relieve the insurer of its obligations under
its policy without regard for whether the insurer has been prejudiced by
72. See Reynolds Metal Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d. at 567.
73. See id. (citing numerous cases).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 567-68.
76. See id. at 568.
77. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 563, 568 (App. Div. 1999).
78. See Reynolds Metal Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
79. See id. at 569-70.
[Vol. 78:1
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
the delay."0 In the significant majority of jurisdictions, however, an in-
surer must prove that its rights have been prejudiced by the insured's
delay in giving notice in order successfully to deny coverage. 8' The re-
quirement that an insurer be able to demonstrate prejudice attributable to
the insured's late notice in order to avoid its potential defense and in-
demnity obligations has become known as the "notice-prejudice rule."82
Some courts do not require a primary insurer to prove prejudice to
successfully raise late notice as a coverage defense; the clear minority
position has nonetheless adopted the notice-prejudice rule where excess
insurance is concerned.83 As the Alabama Supreme Court explained in
Midwest Employers Casualty Co. v. East Alabama Health Care, excess
insurers do not have the same duties and responsibilities that form the
basis for the minority view that no prejudice is required to void
coverage.' An excess insurer that disclaims any duty to defend, investi-
gate, or settle claims against its insured, should not be allowed to avoid
its obligations by claiming that the insured's late notice deprived it of the
opportunity to do these very things. Of course, an excess insurer that
actually is interested in investigating an occurrence or claim, or involv-
ing itself in settlement discussions (because its policy is implicated), can
attempt to prove that its insured's failure to give it timely notice materi-
80. See Midwest Employers Cas. Co. v. E. Ala. Health Care, 695 So. 2d 1169, 1172 (Ala.
1997); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nikitow, 924 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995); Greycoat
Hanover F Street Ltd. P'ship v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 657 A.2d 764, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1995); S.E.
Express Sys. Inc. v. S. Guar. Ins. Co., 482 S.E.2d 433, 436 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Am. Home Assur.
Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 14, 17-18 (N.Y. 1997); Whaley v. Underwood, 922 S.W.2d 110,
112-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
81. See Midwest Employers, 695 So. 2d at 1172 & n.6; See also Hosp. Underwriting Group,
Inc. v. Summit Health Ltd., 63 F.3d 486, 493 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe majority trend is for courts to
require a showing of prejudice ....").
82. The notice-prejudice rule only applies where the policy at issue is an "occurrence" based
policy. There are, of course, two kinds of liability insurance policies. An "occurrence" policy pro-
vides coverage if the event insured against takes place within the policy period, regardless of the
date of discovery, or when the injured or damaged party sues the insured. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Fleekop, 682 So. 2d 620, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Titan Indem. Co. v. Williams, 743 So. 2d
1020, 1024 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Landmark, 547 N.W.2d 527,
531 (N.D. 1996). A "claims made" policy provides coverage only if the third-party's claim against
the insured is made during the policy period. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. St. Louis Univ., 88 F.3d 632,
633-34 (8th Cir. 1996); Landmark, 547 N.W.2d at 531. Though both types of policies include notice
requirements, with a claims made policy the notice requirement "defines the limit of the insurer's
obligation." Lexington, 88 F.3d at 634. Because the notice requirement defines the "scope of cover-
age under a claims made policy, to excuse a delay in notice beyond the policy period would alter a
basic term of the insurance contract." Ins. Placements, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 917 S.W.2d 592,
597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). Accordingly, an insurer that issued a claims made policy does not have to
prove prejudice attributable to the insured's failure to give notice during the policy period in order to
deny coverage. See id. "Claims-made policies necessarily include a presumption that the insurer
suffers prejudice when [it] does not receive timely notice of [a] claim during the policy period,
preventing the insured from Seeking coverage under subsequent policies." Bianco Prof'I Ass'n v.
Home Ins. Co., 740 A.2d 1051, 1057 (N.H. 1999).
83. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 595
N.E.2d 1311, 1316 (II1. App. Ct. 1992); See also Midwest Employers, 695 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. 1997).
84. Midwest Employers, 695 So.2d at 1173.
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ally prejudiced its ability to do so.85 That is exactly what the notice-
prejudice rule contemplates.
New York courts, which champion the minority view that prejudice
is not required to deny coverage, adhere to this position even where ex-
cess insurance is involved. In American Home Assurance Co. v. Interna-
tional Insurance Co.,86 lower level excess insurer American delayed
some four months in giving several upper-level excess carriers notice of
a significant lawsuit.87 The case ultimately settled, but three of the upper-
level excess insurers refused to contribute to the settlement because of
American's late notice.8 American then sued the disclaiming carriers.8 9
The upper-level carriers prevailed at summary judgment and
American appealed.9" A lower appellate court reversed the trial court,
based on what it perceived to be differences in primary and excess insur-
ers' roles.91
[We] perceive the role of an excess level insurance carrier as being
functionally more akin to that of a reinsurer and significantly differ-
ent from that of a primary insurance carrier, which typically under-
takes the defense and direction of the underlying litigation against the
insured. It follows, therefore, that the reasons behind the "no preju-
dice" exception carved out of the general rules of contract for primary
insurers are inapplicable to the claim brought here by an excess insur-
ance carrier against another excess insurance carrier.
92
The upper-level excess carriers then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
the state's highest court.93
The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by the lower appellate
court's attempt to analogize excess insurers to reinsurers. The lower
court's comparative analysis overlooked the importance of prompt notice
to an excess carrier.94 Timely notice affords an excess insurer the oppor-
tunity to participate in settlement discussions at a time when its input is
most likely to be meaningful.95 Even if the upper-level excess insurers
had opted not to conduct independent investigations, they surely would
have insisted on a role in the settlement discussions that triggered their
85. See id.
86. 684 N.E.2d 14 (N.Y. 1997).
87. See Am. Home Assur. Co., 684 N.E.2d at 15.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 241, 241 (App. Div. 1996),
rev'd, 684 N.E.2d 14 (N.Y. 1997).
91. See Am. Home Assur. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d. at 245-46.
92. Id. at 242.
93. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 14, 17 (N.Y. 1997).




policy obligations.96 Even if American had the greatest exposure, and
thus the greatest motivation to negotiate a favorable settlement, the ex-
clusion of the upper-level carriers at the outset left the court with no way
of knowing what the outcome would have been had the upper-level car-
riers' voices been heard early in the decision-making process.9 7 Accord-
ingly, the late notice problem was not mitigated by American's notice to
the other excess insurers after it failed to settle the lawsuit for the com-
bined limits of the primary policy and its own excess policy.98
After considering the contractual rights and obligations of reinsurers
and excess insurers, the American Home court concluded that they have
little in common.99 In fact, excess insurers have the same interests that
make prompt notice to primary insurers a condition precedent to cover-
age.' 0 Apart from the fact that their coverage attaches only after primary
coverage is exhausted, excess insurers have most of the rights and duties
of primary insurers.'0 ' Excess insurers have the right to investigate
claims, to participate in settlement negotiations, and to make their own
settlement decisions." 2 Excess policies do not contain the "follow the
fortunes" clauses found in reinsurance contracts that leave reinsurers
with little ability to challenge their reinsureds' conduct in a given case.0 3
As a result, "all of the salient factors point to the conclusion that excess
carriers have the same vital interest in prompt notice as do primary insur-
ers."'
104
The American Home court held that the upper-level excess insurers
were entitled to assert a late notice defense, even if they could not dem-
onstrate that they were prejudiced by American's delay.0 5 The Court of
Appeals therefore reversed the lower appellate court and reinstated the
trial court's summary judgment order.0 6
4. Conclusion
An excess insurer should not be forced to rely on its insured or a
primary insurer to protect its interests when timely notice would allow
the excess insurer to conduct its own investigation or otherwise assess a
situation. 7 Notice requirements in excess policies are a valid condition
96. See id.
97. See id. at 17-18.
98. See id. at 18.
99. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 14, 18 (N.Y. 1997).





105. See Am, Home Assur. Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co.. 684 N.E,2d 14, 18 (N.Y. 1997).
106. See Am. Home Assur. Co., 684 N.E.2d at 18.
107. See Kerr v. I1. Cent. R.R. Co., 670 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Herman Bros.,
Inc. v. Great W. Cas. Co., 582 N.W.2d 328, 335-36 (Neb. 1998).
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precedent to coverage; they are not just fluff that an insured can ignore or
act on at its convenience. °8 An excess insurer often has a huge financial
stake in litigation. It may want to involve itself in the insured's defense,
even if it is not obligated to do so. Timely notice allows an excess insurer
to inject itself into settlement negotiations at a point when its contribu-
tions, whether strategic or strictly financial, can be most meaningful.' °9
Furthermore, an excess insurer has a right to insist on timely notice from
the insured, rather than relying on a primary insurer to which the insured
has abdicated its responsibility." 0 An excess insurer's contract is with its
insured-an excess carrier has no direct relationship with underlying
insurers.
In summary, courts and commentators who suggest that excess in-
surers do not need timely notice of occurrences or suits potentially impli-
cating their policies are plain wrong. Insureds should always notify their
excess insurers of losses with any potential to exceed the limits of their
primary coverage, even if slight, as soon as it is possible to do so.
B. Excess Insurers' Defense Obligations
Generally, it is a primary insurer's responsibility to defend an in-
sured against a potentially covered claim or suit. An excess insurer typi-
cally has no duty to defend its insured until the limits of underlying cov-
erage are exhausted, i l ' or until the insured's SIR is exhausted.'12 How-
ever, an excess insurer may elect to participate in its insured's defense
where its policy limits are implicated. This right is contractual. For ex-
ample, an excess policy may provide:
WE shall not be called upon to assume charge of the investigation,
settlement or defense of any claim made or suit brought against you,
but WE shall have the right and be given the opportunity to be associ-
ated in the defense and trial of any claims or suits relative to any oc-
108. See Kerr, 670 N.E.2d at 765.
109. See id. at 767 (observing that if the excess insurers had been given the opportunity to
participate in settlement negotiations, such that the case settled earlier, they might have saved $2.8
million in prejudgment interest).
110. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 14, 18 (N.Y. 1997).
Ill. See Grace v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 944 P.2d 460, 466 (Alaska 1997); Philadelphia Indem.
Ins. Co. v. Barerra, 998 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Montogomery Ward & Co. v. Impe-
rial Cas. & Indem. Co., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 56 (Ct. App. 2000); City of Oxnard v. Twin City Fire
Ins. Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 179 (Ct. App. 1995); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wau-
sau, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 368, 373 (Ct. App. 1995); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold
Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 81 (Kan. 1997); Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 879,
881 (Mich. 1995); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co., 14 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000).
112. See Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 325 (Ct. App. 1996).
But see Montgomery Ward & Co., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55-57 (holding that insurer had duty to defend
without exhausting SIR, based on language of particular policies at issue).
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currence which, in OUR opinion, may create liability on the part of
US under the terms of this policy.
If WE assume such right and opportunity, WE shall not be obligated
to defend any suit after the applicable limits of this policy have been
exhausted by the payment of the ULTIMATE NET LOSS." 3
Excess insurers need an option to defend in order to protect them-
selves in cases where the insured's exposure exceeds its primary policy
limits and the primary insurer is not mounting a strong defense. Most
courts hold that even where an excess policy gives the insurer the right
and option to defend, such language does not create a duty to defend." 4
The intent of policy provisions granting an excess insurer a right and
option to participate in its insured's defense is to protect the insurer, not
the insured. The majority position also makes sense because an insurer's
duty to defend is expressly contractual, and if there is no policy language
requiring an insurer to defend, there can be no duty to do so." 5
The fact that an excess insurer seldom has any defense obligations to
its insured does not mean that there are not related controversies. The
most common of these are discussed below.
1. Excess to Primary: You're Not Exhausted, You're Just Tired
There are cases in which potential damages clearly exceed the limits
of the insured's primary coverage. In such cases, the primary insurer may
tender its policy limits almost immediately in the hope of avoiding sig-
nificant defense costs. Of course, the plaintiff will not accept a settlement
offer of primary policy limits where there is excess coverage, and an
excess insurer will not accept the primary carrier's tender because it
wants the primary insurer to fund the insured's defense."16 The primary
insurer's duty to defend the insured continues until the lawsuit is con-
cluded, until its policy limits are exhausted, or until there is otherwise no
potential for coverage under its policy." 7 In order to exhaust its policy
113. TIG Insurance Co.. Excess Liability Policy, at 1 (1992) (on file with the author).
114. See, e.g., Inst. of London Underwriters v. First Horizon Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 125, 126 (5th
Cir. 1992) (applying Louisiana law); Schwinn Cycling & Fitness, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & In-
dem. Co., 863 F. Supp. 784, 787 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying Illinois law); Grace, 944 P.2d at 466;
FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Cos., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 508- 10 (Ct. App. 1998).
115. See Fireman's Fund, 14 S.W.3d at 232.
116. See Brian L. Blakely, The Current Status of Excess v. Primary Bad Faith Litigation, in
EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 119, 132 (Def. Research Inst. 1999) ("The primary carrier may
tender its limits almost immediately but, of course, find no one willing to take them.").
117. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 34-36 (Ct.
App. 1994); See also Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 959 P.2d 265, 273 (Cal. 1998)
(stating that an insurer's duty to defend continues until a case is concluded or until the insurer shows
that there is no potential for coverage); Dairy Rd. Partners v. Island Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 93, 118-19
(Haw. 2000) (holding that insurer's duty to defend continues until potential indemnity obligation is
extinguished); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Luppino, 723 A.2d 14, 18 (Md. 1999) ("[T]he duty to defend, by
its very nature, is a continuing one that extends throughout the tort suit by the third party against the
insured."); Home Sav. Ass'n v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 854 P.2d 851, 855 (Nev. 1993) (stating that
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limits, a primary insurer must actually pay them in settlement in ex-
change for its insured's release, or in full or partial satisfaction of a
judgment against its insured. 118 A primary insurer cannot simply tender
its policy limits to an excess insurer and wash its hands of its duty to
defend their common insured." 9 A primary insurer cannot, in other
words, "dump its limits" or "pay and walk," as National Union Fire In-
surance Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co. illustrates. 2 '
In National Union, a resort owner, Palm-Aire, was insured under
two liability policies: a primary policy with $1 million limits issued by
Travelers and an excess policy issued by National Union.' 2 ' A child,
Ryan Smith, was injured when he fell from a balcony at the resort. 22 His
parents sued Palm-Aire and its franchiser, Choice Hotels, in a Florida
state court. 23 Choice Hotels cross-claimed against Palm-Aire for contri-
bution and indemnity.1
24
Travelers defended Palm-Aire against all the claims in the Florida
state court litigation. 125  Travelers realized, however, that the plaintiffs'
damages would exceed its policy limits. 126 With settlement discussions
under way, Travelers tendered its $1 million policy limits to National
Union, who was participating in the negotiations.
2 7
While the Florida state court litigation was still pending, Choice
Hotels amended a complaint it had previously filed against Palm-Aire in
a Maryland federal court regarding a franchise fee dispute to include an
indemnity claim for any damages awarded in the Florida state court liti-
an insurer's duty to defend "continues throughout the course of litigation against the insured");
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ply Gem Indus., Inc., 712 A.2d 717, 721 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997)
("The insurer must defend ... until it can show that there is no potential liability remaining in issue
in the case."); Conrad R. Sump & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 701 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (App. Div. 1999)
("The insurance carrier may be relieved of its duty to defend only if it can establish as a matter of
law that there is no possible factual or legal basis on which it might eventually be obligated to in-
demnify its insured, or by proving that the claim falls within a policy exclusion."); Stevens Painton
Corp. v. First State Ins. Co., 746 A.2d 649, 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (stating that it is the insurer's
duty "to defend a claim that would support recovery until such time as it is determined that the claim
is not covered under the policy").
118. See California Cas. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 505, 508-10
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Burr, 706 A.2d 499, 500-01 (Del. 1998).
119. See Yonkers Contracting Co. v. Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 365, 371
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Underwriting Members of Lloyds, 836 F. Supp.
398, 409-10 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
120. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 1269 (11 th Cir. 2000).





126. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11 th Cir. 2000).
127. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 214 F.3d at 1271.
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gation.'28 Palm-Aire asked Travelers to defend it against the new indem-
nity claim in the Maryland litigation, but Travelers refused.1 29 Travelers
explained to Palm-Aire that it was no longer obligated to defend it be-
cause it had already tendered its primary policy limits to National Union
in the first case. 3' The Maryland court then entered a default order
against Palm-Aire. 3' The Florida state court litigation settled eighteen
months later for $5 million, including Travelers' $1 million policy
limits. 32 Thereafter, the Maryland court entered a $1.7 million default
judgment against Palm-Aire.'3 3 National Union paid $1.4 million of the
Maryland default judgment, that being the amount of Choice Hotels'
recovery on its indemnification claim.'34
National Union sued Travelers in a Florida federal court in an effort
to recover the amount of the default judgment and its attorneys' fees and
costs. National Union alleged that Travelers had a duty to defend Palm-
Aire in the Maryland litigation and that its breach of this duty precipi-
tated the default judgment.'35 National Union moved for partial summary
judgment to preclude Travelers from arguing at trial that National Union
had a concurrent duty to defend Palm-Aire in the Florida state court liti-
gation.'36 The district court ruled that under Florida law National Union
had a duty to "drop down" and assist Travelers in Palm-Aire's defense
when it learned that the primary policy would likely be exhausted before
the Florida state court litigation was concluded.'3 7 National Union took
an interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.'38
Importantly, the district court rejected Travelers' argument that ten-
dering its $1 million policy limits to National Union was tantamount to
paying them, thereby exhausting its coverage and terminating its duty to
defend. 3 9 The district court found that Travelers was obligated to defend
Palm-Aire in both the Florida and the Maryland litigation until it paid its
policy limits in satisfaction of an actual judgment or settlement." Trav-





132. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.. 214 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11 th Cir. 2000).





138. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 1269, 1272(11th Cir. 2000).
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cuit focused exclusively on the district court's further holding that Na-
tional Union had a concurrent duty to defend Palm-Aire.'42
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by looking at the language
of the National Union excess policy. Within a section entitled "Defense"
the policy stated:
The provisions of this section apply solely to occurrences covered
under this policy but not covered by any underlying policies ... or
any other underlying insurance providing coverage to the Insured.
This section shall also apply to occurrences not covered by any un-
derlying insurance due to exhaustion of any aggregate limits due to
any losses paid there under.
143
This language obviously manifested National Union's intent that its pol-
icy only applied after the complete exhaustion of coverage under all un-
derlying policies. National Union's duty to defend was consecutive to,
rather than concurrent with, any primary insurer's duty to defend.'44 The
National Union court held that because Travelers was still obligated to
defend Palm-Aire at the time Choice Hotels amended its complaint in the
Maryland litigation, 145 National Union's duty to defend had not yet been
triggered. 1
46
The National Union court also rejected the district court's conclu-
sion that National Union had a duty to drop down and assume Palm-
Aire's defense once it learned that potential damages in the Florida state
court litigation would exceed the limits of the Travelers primary
policy.'47 Such a duty could flow only from specific language in the Na-
tional Union policy. 48 The court finally rejected Travelers' argument that
National Union had assumed a duty to defend by participating in settle-
ment negotiations in the Florida suit.149 The court reasoned that (1) Na-
tional Union's duty to indemnify Palm-Aire was distinct from its duty to
defend, and it was its duty to indemnify that drove its participation in the
settlement negotiations; and (2) National Union's voluntary participation
142. See id.
143. Id. (quoting the National Union policy).
144. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (1 th
Cir. 2000).
145. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 214 F.3d at 1273. As explained in the text accompanying supra
note 140, the district court had held that Travelers was obligated to continue Palm-Aire's defense
until it actually paid its policy limits in settlement or in satisfaction of a judgment. See id. at 1272. In
other words, the district court did not absolve Travelers of its duty to defend (although Travelers
argued that the mere tender of its policy limits extinguished all of its duties). Rather, the district
court held that National Union and Travelers had a concurrent duty to defend Palm-Aire on the
facts. See id.
146. See id. at 1273.
147. See id. at 1273.




in settlement negotiations did not relieve Travelers of its contractual duty
to defend Palm-Aire, nor could it create for National Union a duty to
defend a separate, albeit related, lawsuit (the Maryland litigation). 5 °
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the
case. '5 In doing so, it left open the questions of whether National Union
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in not settling the Florida
state court litigation, and whether such a breach would defeat its indem-
nification claim.
52
An excess insurer should have no duty to defend its insured even if
the primary insurer wrongfully refuses to defend. 3 A primary insurer's
refusal to defend does not mean that its policy limits are exhausted. So
long as the primary insurer's policy limits are "payable," i.e., they are not
actually paid, the excess insurer's defense obligations lie dormant.'54 If
an excess insurer assumes its insured's defense because the primary in-
surer fails to do so, it should be entitled to recoup its defense costs from
the primary carrier.155
2. Reservation of Rights
At the outset of a case, coverage issues are commonly unresolved or
are the subject of unanswered questions. In order to avoid claims that it
has waived coverage defenses or should be estopped from asserting
them, a primary insurer that undertakes its insured's defense in a case of
questionable coverage typically does so under a reservation of rights. 56
An insurer's reservation of rights letter is simply a unilateral declaration
that it may later deny coverage notwithstanding its initial decision to
defend.'57
Because an excess insurer has no duty to defend its insured, it can-
not later be estopped from raising coverage defenses, or be said to have
waived those defenses, if it fails to reserve its rights when notified of a
150. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 1269, 1274 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
151. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 214 F.3d at 1274.
152. See id. at 1274 n.10.
153. Whether a primary insurer's wrongful refusal to defend obligates an excess insurer to
drop down and defend the insured in the primary insurer's place may turn on the language of the
subject excess policy. Compare Hocker v. N.H. Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 1476, 1481-83 (10th Cir. 1991)
(applying Wyoming law and holding that excess insurer had duty to drop down and defend), with
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 368, 374 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that excess insurer was not obligated to drop down and defend).
154. See Nat'l Union, 214 F.3d at 1272-73; Ticor Title, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374.
155. See, e.g., Kitchnefsky v. Nat'l Rent-A-Fence of Am., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 360, 370-71 &
n. 16 (D.N.J. 2000) (applying New Jersey law).
156. See Douglas R. Richmond, Reimbursing Insurers' Defense Costs: Restitution and Mixed
Actions, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 457, 469-70 (1998).
157. See id. at 469.
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claim or suit potentially implicating its coverage.'58 It is, after all, an in-
surer's duty to defend which compels it to reserve its rights, and without
a duty to defend, an excess insurer has no obligation to issue a reserva-
tion of rights letter.'59 An excess insurer is of course free to issue a reser-
vation of rights letter, and it may wish to do so out of an abundance of
caution when it engages in settlement negotiations.'
6
Excess and primary insurers have no duty to reserve their rights
against one another, 61 as National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Ameri-
can Motorists Insurance Co.1 62 illustrates. In American Motorists, the
excess insurer National Union accepted the primary insurer's tender of
its insured's defense. The primary insurer American Motorists had issued
two policies that applied to the loss. National Union settled the underly-
ing litigation and then sued American Motorists to recover a portion of
the settlement under one of the American Motorists policies that had not
been exhausted. American Motorists contended that National Union had
waived its right to recover or should be estopped from asserting its right
because it failed to reserve its rights to deny coverage when American
Motorists tendered the defense.163 The Georgia Court of Appeals sided
with American Motorists and National Union appealed to the Georgia
Supreme Court.
As an initial matter, the supreme court stated that American Motor-
ists' attempt to label National Union's actions below as a denial of cov-
erage was a mischaracterization.' 6 Regardless of the label attached to
the claim, the fact that National Union was attempting to recoup its out-
lay did not mean that it was denying coverage. 165  National Union ac-
cepted American Motorists' tender of their insured's defense, assumed
the defense, and settled the lawsuit. Because National Union did not at-
tempt to deny coverage, it was not required to reserve its rights to do
SO. 166
The court further reasoned that even if National Union were deny-
ing coverage, its failure to reserve its rights would not bar its recovery
158. See Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland, 899 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D. Or.
1995), aff'd sub nom. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 139 F.3d 1234
(9th Cir. 1998); Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Barrera, 998 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999);
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Jioras, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 844 (Ct. App. 1994); Int'l Ins. Co. v.
Sargent & Lundy, 609 N.E.2d 842, 855 (1I1. App. Ct. 1993).
159. See Sargent & Lundy, 609 N.E.2d at 855.
160. See, e.g., Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 139 F.3d at 1237-38 (9th Cir. 1998) (deciding case
under Oregon law).
161. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 78 F.3d 202, 207-08 (5th Cir.
1996) (applying Texas law).
162. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d 673 (Ga. 1998).






from American Motorists.'67 National Union had a contract only with its
insured. Accordingly, only the insured could complain about the excess
carrier's failure to reserve its rights.1
68
Finally, the American Motorists court considered whether public
policy considerations might require an excess insurer to reserve its rights
vis-A-vis a primary insurer in the absence of a contract between them.
The court concluded that there was no public policy basis for imposing
such a requirement on excess insurers.
The public policy interest in situations where insurance companies
are arguing over which insurer should cover a claim rests with neither
insurer, but with the insured. By requiring an excess insurer to inves-
tigate and notify a primary carrier of any claim for subrogation, we
would be placing the insurer's interest ahead of the insured because
the excess insurer would be required to delay action until it completed
an investigation. We conclude that the better policy is to encourage
insurers to promptly protect their insureds' interests and to hold dis-
putes among themselves in abeyance. Therefore, we decline to im-
pose a notice requirement.'
69
The supreme court thus reversed the appellate court.
It does not matter for reservation of rights purposes whether excess
insurance is provided by way of a true excess policy or whether it is af-
forded under an umbrella policy. 7° So long as the primary coverage is
not exhausted, an insurer providing excess coverage by way of an um-
brella policy can have no defense obligations.'' An umbrella carrier that
has no duty to defend has no obligation to issue a reservation of rights
letter in the event it later wants to disclaim coverage.'72
3. The Duty to Reimburse Defense Costs
A few excess policies provide that in certain circumstances the in-
surer may be obligated to reimburse the insured for its defense costs.' 73
The duty to reimburse defense costs and the duty to defend are not
equivalent.'74 An excess insurer may incur a duty to reimburse defense
167. See id.
168. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d 673, 675 (Ga. 1998).
169. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d 675.
170. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Jioras, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 844 (Ct. App. 1994).
171. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844 ("[An umbrella policy has no
duty of defense until the primary policy is exhausted.").
172. See id.
173. See Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 20, at 663.
174. See Am. Cas. Co. of Reading v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 492, 504 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (quoting
case for the proposition that duty to defend clauses and reimbursement clauses are two different
things); See also Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp. 597, 603
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that an insurer's obligation to reimburse defense costs is not determinative
of its duty to defend).
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costs without assuming a duty to defend.'75 Indeed, a policy provision
granting an excess insurer the explicit option to participate in its in-
sured's defense clearly contradicts any possible duty to do so.'76 From a
broader perspective, an excess insurer's duty to reimburse its insured's
defense costs is more akin to its duty to indemnify than it is to a primary
insurer's duty to defend. This is because an excess insurer's duty to re-
imburse does not arise until coverage is established.1
7
4. The Equitable Allocation of Defense Costs to Excess Insurers
As noted previously, there are cases in which the insured's potential
exposure clearly exceeds the primary insurer's policy limits, but the pri-
mary carrier cannot avoid what will surely be an expensive defense be-
cause the plaintiff will not settle and the excess carrier will not accept the
primary carrier's tender of the defense.'7 8 In such cases, the primary in-
surer is forced to defend for the excess insurer's benefit. Should not the
excess carrier be required to bear some portion of the defense costs on
equitable grounds? The answer to this question may depend on the lan-
guage of the excess policy at issue. If the excess policy at issue is a fol-
lowing form policy, or includes language that arguably suggests a duty to
defend, the excess insurer may be required to share in the defense costs
on some pro rata basis.
79
The forced sharing of defense costs by an excess insurer absent ex-
haustion of the primary insurer's policy limits is a minority position, 8 ° as
it should be. Here the doctrine of equitable contribution does not apply to
disputes between primary and excess insurers over defense costs.' A
true excess insurance policy is specifically intended to come into play
only when the limits of underlying primary coverage are exhausted.'82
This principle or purpose is in no way altered by the fact that an excess
policy follows form. Excess insurance is priced on the assumption that
175. See Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 20, at 664.
176. See Save Mart Supermarkets, 843 F. Supp. at 603.
177. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir.
1995), modified on denial of reh'g on other grounds, 85 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Celotex Corp.,
152 B.R. 661, 666 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); accord In re Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. 59, 64 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (discussing similar language in a D&O liability policy).
178. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Am. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 99-3869, 2000 WL
92097, at **3-5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2000); Builders Transp., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 25 F. Supp. 2d
739, 741-42, 44-47 (E.D. Tex. 1998); Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 825
F. Supp. 705, 707-11 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
180. See Tex. Employers Ins. Co. v. Underwriting Members of Lloyds, 836 F. Supp. 398, 405
(S.D. Tex. 1993) (quoting 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 51:36, at 446 (2d ed. 1982)).
181. See Home Indem. Co. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 572 N.E.2d 962, 963 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991).
182. See Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 981 F.2d 1108, 1109 (9th Cir. 1992)




the duty to defend rests with the primary insurer no matter how a par-
ticular excess policy is written. More importantly, a primary insurer's
duty to defend, once triggered, exists without regard for the value or eco-
nomic magnitude of the claims made against the insured.'83
Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Underwriting Members of
Lloyds'84 reflects the better-reasoned majority approach. Texas Employ-
ers grew out of a wrongful death action against Monsanto. Texas Em-
ployers Insurance Association (TEIA) insured Monsanto under a $1 mil-
lion primary policy, which included standard duty to defend language.8 5
Monsanto also had two layers of excess coverage written by Lloyds of
London, with the first policy providing $5 million in coverage and the
second policy providing an additional $10 million in coverage. The
Lloyds policies provided that they would pay Monsanto's ultimate net
loss, that being either the excess of the limits of the underlying insurance,
or $100,000 per occurrence not covered by the underlying insurance. The
excess policies further provided that Lloyds "shall not be called upon" to
assume Monsanto's defense, though Lloyds had the right to associate in
Monsanto's defense.' 86 Finally, the excess policies provided that Lloyds'
liability did not attach until the underlying policies were exhausted by
the payment of their policy limits.'87
TEIA defended the wrongful death action, which ultimately settled
for $7.25 million. TEIA paid its $1 million policy limits toward the set-
tlement, the first level excess policy paid its full $5 million limits, and
the second level excess policy paid $1.25 million. TEIA then demanded
that Lloyds reimburse it for its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in Mon-
santo's defense, which exceeded $4 million. Lloyds refused' and TEIA
sued for contribution. 1
88
The Texas Employers court found no ambiguities in the Lloyds ex-
cess policies that would support imposing a duty to defend on the excess
carriers,'89 and noted the majority rule that "excess or umbrella carriers
are responsible for defense costs only after exhaustion of the primary
policy limits."'90 TEIA argued that prorating the defense costs attribut-
able to the wrongful death action was "more equitable" and that the ex-
cess insurers would be unjustly enriched if they were not required to
183. See Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 20 S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tex. 2000)
(stating that a primary insurer's duty to defend "extends to covered claims without regard to their
amount"); See also ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 411, at 195 (3d ed.
1995 & Supp. 1999).
184. 836 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Tex 1993).
185. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 836 F. Supp. at 401.
186. Id. at 402.
187. See id. at 402-03.
188. See id. at 403.
189. See id. at 406-07.
190. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Underwriting Members of Lloyds, 836 F. Supp. 398, 407
(S.D. Tex 1993).
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share the cost of defense. 19' The court, however, found no equitable prin-
ciples supporting any departure from the express contractual obligations
embodied in the primary and excess policies.
Where, as in this case, an insured purchases one policy specifically as
primary coverage and another as excess coverage, to require the ex-
cess insurer to reimburse a primary carrier for amounts that were paid
before exhaustion of the underlying policy limits would overturn the
reasonable expectations of the parties.'
92
It was irrelevant that the exhaustion of the primary limits and the
settlement of the wrongful death action occurred simultaneously, inas-
much as the defense costs at issue were incurred before the settlement,
and the timing of TEIA's exhaustion did not change the language of the
respective insurance policies.' 93 To equitably apportion defense costs
between the primary and excess policies would fly in the face of their
unambiguous language. The coverage provided by the excess policies
began only where coverage under the primary policy ended. As the pri-
mary insurer, it was TEIA's responsibility to defend Monsanto.' 94
Finally, none of the policies provided any guidance as to how de-
fense costs should be apportioned. The court reasoned that the absence of
related language was further evidence that apportionment was never
contemplated.'95 The Texas Employers court therefore awarded the ex-
cess insurers summary judgment. 96
An excess insurer may be compelled in equity to incur defense costs
paid by a primary insurer where the excess carrier wrongfully refuses to
defend the insured after the primary carrier's limits are exhausted, and the
primary carrier continues to defend until it can obtain a declaration that
its duty to defend has been fulfilled.' 97 Because a primary insurer gener-
ally cannot withdraw its defense until it proves its entitlement to do so,
an excess carrier that "shirks its duty to defend" between the time of ex-
haustion and the primary carrier's proof thereof potentially profits from
its wrongful conduct.198 Such behavior by excess insurers should be dis-
couraged, which courts seek to do by holding that "principles of equity
compel the excess carrier to reimburse the primary carrier for the excess
191. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 836 F. Supp. at 407.
192. Id. (citing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cont'l Nat'l Am. Ins. Cos., 861 F.2d 1184,
1187 (9th Cir. 1989) and Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 981 F.2d 1108, 1109 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
193. See id. at 407-08.
194. See id. at 408.
195. See id. at 409.
196. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Underwriting Members of Lloyds, 836 F. Supp. 398,
410-11 (S.D. Tex 1993).
197. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 34-35 (Ct. App.
1994).
198. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35.
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carrier's share of defense costs.""' The primary carrier's duty to defend is
only a contingent duty in the interim period after an exhaustion dispute
arises .20o
5. Umbrella Carriers' Duty to Defend Suits Not Covered by Pri-
mary Insurance
Unlike true excess policies, umbrella policies typically provide that
the umbrella policy will afford primary coverage for certain claims or
occurrences that are not within the ambit of the insured's primary
policy.2"' With primary coverage comes a primary insurer's duty. Thus,
an umbrella insurer may have a duty to defend its insured where a true
excess carrier would not.2"2 Of course, there must be a potential for cov-
erage under the umbrella policy in order for the umbrella carrier to have
a duty to defend.2"3
There is nothing remarkable about umbrella carriers' occasional
duty to defend suits that primary policies do not cover. The point is that
excess and umbrella policies are different, and the two types of carriers
might have different obligations requiring case-specific scrutiny.
III. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
An insured may sue an excess insurer that breaches an express duty
to the insured for breach of contract.2" However, an excess insurer's du-
ties to its insured go beyond those that are expressly stated in its policy.
It is well settled that insurance policies contain an implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing. °5 The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
199. Id.
200. See id. at 36.
201. See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 628 A.2d 880, 886-88 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(explaining that an umbrella carrier includes primary coverage in addition to claims not included in
the insured's basic general liability coverage).
202. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Glenview Park Dist., 594 N.E.2d 1300, 1306-08 (I11. App.
Ct. 1992) (implying that umbrella policies are subject to broader exposure than excess policies), affd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 632 N.E.2d 1039 (111. 1994).
203. See, e.g., Super. Equip. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 986 S.W.2d 477, 483-85 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998); Am. States Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 887 (applying standard duty to defend analysis to umbrella
policy).
204. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 1192, 1195 (I11.
App. Ct. 1995).
205. See Mora v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co., 996 P.2d 116, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); PPG
Indus. v. Transam. Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999); Clausen v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co.,
730 A.2d 133, 140 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); Best Place, Inc. v. Penn. Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 337-
38 (Haw. 1996); Simper v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 974 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Idaho 1999);
Greenvall v. Me. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 715 A.2d 949, 955 (Me. 1998); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Herman,
954 P.2d 56, 60 (N.M. 1997); Smith v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 697 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. 1998);
Peterson v. West Am. Ins. Co., 518 S.E.2d 608, 614 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999); Harter v. Plains Ins. Co.,
579 N.W.2d 625, 631 (S.D. 1998); Levine v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 462 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Va.
1995); Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 641 (Wash. 1998); Elmore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
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essentially requires that neither party to a contract do anything to impair
or injure the other's right to receive the benefits of their agreement. °6 An
insurer that breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing to its insured
breaches its contract, and also may be said to be guilty of the tort of "bad
faith. 2°7 The prototypical bad faith claim in the liability insurance con-
text is a situation in which a primary insurer with exclusive control over
the settlement of a claim against its insured fails or refuses to settle
within its policy limits because it places its financial self-interest ahead
of its insured's interests. 8 In other words, the insurer is seen as gambling
with the insured's money.
An insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing, like all contractual
duties, has limits. Most fundamentally, an insurer's duty runs only to its
insured.2°9 Only the insurer and the insured are parties to the contract in
which the duty is implied. 20 An insurer's duty of good faith and fair
dealing does not extend to every person arguably entitled to payment
from policy proceeds.2 '
504 S.E.2d 893, 899 (W. Va. 1998); Long v. Great W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823, 829
(Wyo. 1998).
206. See Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 813 P.2d 710, 720 (Ariz. 1991); PPG Indus., 975
P.2d at 655; Habetz v. Condon, 618 A.2d 501, 505 (Conn. 1992); Best Place, 920 P.2d at 337-38;
Bourgeous v. Horizon Health Care Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 856 (N.M. 1994); Harter, 579 N.W.2d at
631 (quoting Helmbolt v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d 55, 57 (S.D. 1987)); Carmichael v.
Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp., 635 A.2d 1211, 1216 (Vt. 1993); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 825 (Wyo. 1994).
207. "Bad faith" defies uniform definition or description. The majority rule appears to be that
there must be some level of intentional wrongdoing by the insurer in order to support a bad faith
claim. The insurer must do more than simply breach its contract with its insured. The Arkansas
Supreme Court observed in State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Swaim, 991 S.W.2d
555 (Ark. 1999) that "[ain insurance company commits the tort of bad faith when it affirmatively
engages in dishonest, malicious or oppressive conduct in order to avoid a just obligation to its in-
sured." Id. at 559. "Mere negligence or bad judgment is insufficient so long as the insurer is acting in
good faith." Id. This sort of high standard is not universal, however. Some states allow bad faith
recovery for an insurer's mere negligence. See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad
Faith Law and Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 98 (1994). "While it appears to be the major-
ity rule that there must be some level of intentional wrongdoing by an insurer in order to support a
bad faith claim, a significant minority of states apply a negligence standard." Richmond, 25 SETON
HALL L. REV. at 98.
208. See Yonkers Contracting Co. v. Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 365, 371
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
209. See Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381, 383 (Utah 1999).
210. See Sperry, 990 P.2d at 383.
211. For example, a liability insurer generally does not owe a third-party claimant a duty of
good faith. See Hand v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 264 (Ct. App. 1994); Dunn v. Nat'l
Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 631 So. 2d 1103, 1106-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Owens v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 455 S.E.2d 368, 369 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Dvorak v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d
329, 331 (N.D. 1993); McWhirter v. Fire Ins. Exch., 878 P.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Okla. 1994); Johnson
v. Beane, 664 A.2d 96, 99 n.3 (Pa. 1995); Kleckley v. N.W. Nat'l Cas. Co., 526 S.E.2d 218, 219-20
(S.C. 2000); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 279-80 (Tex. 1995); Larocque v. State




While it generally makes perfect sense to limit an insurer's duty of
good faith to its insured, excess insurance presents a special need. A pri-
mary insurer may decline to settle a claim within its policy limits secure
in the knowledge that it cannot be held liable for bad faith to its insured
because any verdict or judgment that exceeds its limits will be paid by
the excess carrier. Here the primary insurer is gambling with the excess
insurer's money instead of the insured's. Moreover, because the excess
insurer does not have any contractual relationship with the primary in-
surer it has no apparent contractual protections, whether express or im-
plied.
The unusual relationship between primary and excess insurers, and
the attending potential for strain and abuse, has long drawn judicial at-
tention. As the Third Circuit observed in Puritan Insurance Co. v. Cana-
dian Universal Insurance Co. :212
The relationship between the primary and excess carrier is an unusual
one; each has a separate contract with the insured, but they have none
with each other. Conflicts of interest invariably arise when the un-
derlying tort injury is of such severity that a recovery over the limits
of the primary policy is possible. In that circumstance, the excess car-
ier wishes the primary insurer to dispose of the case within its limits
and is not unduly impressed with the primary insurer's desire to save
some or all of its policy limits by a favorable verdict at trial. Con-
versely, the primary carrier is unlikely to have such paternalistic
feelings as will induce it to concede its limits when there is some
chance of obtaining a favorable verdict. In each instance, one carrier
is to some extent gambling with the other's money.213
Understanding bad faith when excess insurance is involved may
require different lines of analysis. First, what implied duties does an ex-
cess insurer owe its insured? Second, what duties flow between primary
and excess insurers, if any, and how are those duties enforced in the ab-
sence of a direct contractual relationship? Insureds' obligations must be
considered in both analyses, both because the duty of good faith and fair
dealing is a two-way street and because a self-insured entity might as-
sume a primary insurer's duties.
A. Excess Insurers' Duty of Good Faith to Their Insureds
Excess insurance policies, including those that provide only for in-
demnity, impose a duty of good faith on the insurer.24 An insured there-
fore may sue its excess carrier for bad faith. Among the more complex
212. 775 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1985).
213. Puritan Ins. Co., 775 F.2d at 78.
214. See N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 So. 2d 1325, 1330-31 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 692 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1997); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v.
Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 93 (Kan. 1997); Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970, 983-
84 (N.M. 1997).
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and interesting cases challenging an excess carrier's good faith is Associ-
ated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp.215
Americold arose out of a prolonged fire in a massive underground
warehouse built inside a former limestone mine.216 The fire began in
December 1991 and burned until March 1992.217 Smoke spread through-
out the facility, invading space leased by customers and allegedly con-
taminating the tenants' stored food products with toxic residue.21 8
Americold Corporation and its subsidiary, which owned and managed
the warehouse, were insured under a $1 million primary liability policy
issued by National Union, a $25 million excess policy issued by North-
west Pacific Indemnity (NPIC), and a top-layer $15 million excess policy
issued by TIG Insurance. 219 Americold's customers (or their subrogated
property insurers) sued for the contamination of their property by smoke
from the fire.220 These cases were filed in both federal and state court.
221
National Union assumed Americold's defense as it was obligated to do
under its policy, albeit under a reservation of rights.222
The fire litigation proceeded at an intense pace throughout 1992 and
1993.223 By June 1993, the NPIC claims professional responsible for the
many cases, David Bissell, concluded that the absolute pollution exclu-
sion in the NPIC policy probably foreclosed coverage for claims attribut-
able to smoke damage to property stored in the Americold facility.224
Relying on the advice of counsel, however, Bissell resolved that he was
not obligated to reveal NPIC's coverage position to Americold unless
NPIC took control of the defense.225
In January 1994, TIG, whose following form policy was excess to
NPIC's policy, demanded a coverage position from NPIC.226 In response,
NPIC's coverage counsel, Paul Hasty, told TIG that its request for a cov-
erage position was premature.227 Hasty based his reply on the fact that
215. Americold, 934 P.2d at 65.
216. See id. at 70, 71.
217. See id. at 71.
218. See id
219. See id. at 70-71.
220. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 72 (Kan. 1997).
221. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 72.
222. See id. at 70.
223. See id. at 73.
224. See id My firm having been engaged as defense counsel by National Union, I defended
Americold in the underlying fire litigation. I did not participate in the negotiations leading to the
consent judgments. I have previously has criticized insurers' attempts to invoke pollution exclusions
to deny coverage where the pollutant is smoke from a hostile fire. This position was forged in part
by the Americold fire litigation. See Douglas R. Richmond, Where There's Smoke, There's Fire: The
Absolute Pollution Exclusion and Hostile Fires, 45 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 157 (1995).
225. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 73.
226. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 74 (Kan. 1997).
227. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 74.
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National Union was still defending Americold, as well as the fact that
because the primary policy limits had not been exhausted, NPIC's duties
under its policy had not been triggered.228
The many plaintiffs claimed damages in the fire litigation exceeding
all of Americold's available liability insurance coverage, both primary
and excess.229 On February 7, 1994, the district judge handling the fed-
eral cases announced that trial would be bifurcated, trying liability before
damages. 230 The liability phase of the trial was scheduled to start April
12, 1994.23 On February 10, 1994, Americold's personal counsel, Paul
Niewald, demanded that National Union, NPIC, and TIG settle the many
plaintiffs' claims within their combined policy limits. 232 Then, for the first
time, NPIC stated its coverage position. 233 Hasty wrote Niewald telling
him, among other things, that the absolute pollution exclusion in the
NPIC excess policy barred coverage, that underlying coverage had to be
exhausted before liability would attach under the NPIC policy, and that
Americold's potential breach of the NPIC policy by not seeking coverage
under its tenants' liability policies might excuse coverage.2' Hasty's let-
ter did not expressly state that NPIC was denying coverage.235
Niewald responded by informing Bissell that if NPIC denied cover-
age, Americold would seek indemnification from NPIC for any judgment
against Americold.236 Niewald also sent Bissell a copy of a brief ad-
dressing the absolute pollution exclusion in the NPIC policy.237 "The
brief emphasized that [the] exclusion was never intended to apply to
smoke damage from a hostile fire. 238
Court-ordered settlement conferences were held a little more than a
month before the federal trial was to start. 23 9 The settlement conferences
lasted five days, ending on March 8, 1994.40 All plaintiffs offered to
settle within Americold's total policy limits. 241 On March 9, National





232. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 74 (Kan. 1997).
233. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 74-75.
234. See id. More particularly, NPIC claimed that because Americold may have waived com-
pulsory counterclaims for coverage under some of its customers' liability policies on which it would
be an additional insured, that waiver could constitute a breach of the NPIC policy. See id.
235. See id. at 75.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 75 (Kan. 1997).
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TIG offered any settlement amount. 43 On March 10, Americold repeated
its demand that its insurers settle the cases within their policy limits.2"
NPIC then acknowledged that National Union's policy limits had been
exhausted, but it would neither admit nor deny coverage.24 5 "NPIC of-
fered to defend Americold under a reservation of rights (although no
reservation of rights letter had yet been issued), which Americold de-
clined. 24 6 Niewald advised NPIC and TIG that he intended to negotiate a
global settlement with the plaintiffs without NPIC's or TIG's involve-
ment.247 Americold and the plaintiffs then began negotiating outside of
NPIC's and TIG's presence, and settled the plaintiffs' claims for consent
judgments totaling $58,754,574.248 As part of the settlement, Americold
assigned its breach of contract and bad faith claims against NPIC and
TIG to the plaintiffs in exchange for a covenant not to execute against
Americold.24 9 That settlement was completed in the summer of 1994.25°
On March 15, 1994, NPIC filed a declaratory judgment against the
plaintiffs and Americold in a Kansas state court. On April 11, 1994
(one day before the federal trial had been scheduled to start), NPIC
"formally offered to defend [Americold] under a lengthy reservation of
rights. 252 In September 1994, after registering their consent judgments,
the plaintiffs instituted garnishment proceedings against NPIC and
TIG. 253 The garnishment proceedings were consolidated with NPIC's
declaratory judgment action. All parties moved for summary judgment.
254
The trial court denied the excess insurers' motions and granted the
plaintiffs' summary judgment motions. The court entered judgment
against NPIC for its $25 million policy limits. The court further held
NPIC and TIG jointly and severally liable for the remaining amount of
the consent judgments, that being just over $33.6 million, plus interest.5
TIG settled with the plaintiffs for its $15 million policy limits. NPIC
appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court. 6
The Americold court easily rejected NPIC's arguments that the ab-
solute pollution exclusion barred coverage,2 57 and that some of Ameri-
243. See id.
244. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 75 (Kan. 1997).





250. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 75 (Kan. 1997).
251. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 75.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 75-76.
254. See id. at 76.
255. See id.
256. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 76 (Kan. 1997).
257. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 76-79.
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cold's insurance policies were underlying insurance that had to be ex-
hausted before implicating NPIC's policy. 28 The issue then became the
enforceability of Americold's consent judgments.259
Viewing "the impact of the Americold settlement agreement on
NPIC through the procedural lens of summary judgment," the court con-
cluded that material issues of fact remained "concerning the reasonable-
ness and good faith of the agreement."26 In reaching this early conclu-
sion, the court noted excess insurers' duties of good faith in the settle-
ment context:
Before National Union tendered its policy limits, NPIC was not obli-
gated to defend Americold or to take charge of settlement efforts on
behalf of Americold. National Union had assumed Americold's de-
fense. However, an excess insurer owes an implied good faith obliga-
tion regarding settlement negotiations ... Even when [the excess in-
surer] has not assumed the defense or control of settlement negotia-
tions, [it] has the right under the policy to consent to any settlement
reaching its coverage level. The excess insurer has an implied obliga-
tion to exercise that right in good faith.26'
The court then went on to examine several aspects of the challenged set-
tlement agreement that supported its conclusion that genuine issues of
material fact remained to be resolved.262
The Americold court first addressed NPIC's argument that its refusal
to consent to the allegedly collusive settlements released it from
liability.2 63 The court observed "[a]n insured does not lose fights against
the insurer by entering into a settlement after the insurer's bad faith de-
nial of coverage and refusal of a reasonable settlement offer within pol-
icy limits. ' '2 4 NPIC's denial of coverage was wrongful and, if its refusal
to settle were the product of either bad faith or negligence, then its lack
of consent to the settlement would be no bar to its enforceability against
it.
2 61 Of course, the settlement amount would have to be reasonable
6.2
NPIC tried to distinguish its implied duty to settle from that of a
primary insurer, arguing that it did not have time to evaluate its potential
settlement obligation.2 67 This argument failed as a matter of fact. Al-
though less than a day passed between National Union's March 9, 1994
tender of its policy limits and Americold's settlement with the plaintiffs,
258. See id. at 80.
259. See id. at 80-8 1.
260. Id. at 80-81.
261. Id. at 81 (citation omitted).
262. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 82 (Kan. 1997).
263. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 82.
264. See id. at 82-83.
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NPIC had known of the plaintiffs' policy limits settlement offer since
November 1993.268 Americold gave NPIC an opportunity to reconsider
its position before settling with the plaintiffs. 269 NPIC "never suggested
that it needed more time" to consider the plaintiffs' settlement offer.70
NPIC also claimed that Americold breached its duty to cooperate by
entering into the consent judgments.27 NPIC claimed that it was preju-
diced by the settlement because it was precluded from defending the
case.27 2 The Americold court was not persuaded.
NPIC was not obligated to assume the defense until the primary in-
surance was exhausted. When exhaustion occurred, the litigation had
been pending for some 18 months, discovery had taken place, trial on
the liability issues was a month away in federal court, and the parties
had been involved in court-ordered settlement discussions over the
previous 3 weeks. All during this time, NPIC had the right to partici-
pate in the investigation and litigation. NPIC's claim of prejudice in
being foreclosed from defending Americold, in view of its refusal to
offer any settlement amount, is questionable.273
Moving on, the court asked: "[w]hat effect should Americold's re-
fusal of NPIC's offer to defend subject to a reservation of rights have on
the enforceability of the settlement against NPIC?" 274 The court was not
surprised by Americold's rejection of NPIC's defense under reservation
in light of NPIC's wrongful denial of coverage and refusal to participate
in settlement. 275 Accepting NPIC's defense under reservation would have
exposed Americold to a ruinous jury verdict and additional litigation
with NPIC over coverage. 6
The Court found that NPIC's offer to defend under an oral reserva-
tion of rights did not cure its wrongful denial of coverage. While its offer
of a defense under reservation did not absolve it of liability, it was rele-
vant to its good faith and negligence surrounding the settlement of the
fire litigation. 77
The court next discussed NPIC's challenge to the reasonableness of
the plaintiffs' policy limits settlement offer and, ultimately, to the reason-
ableness of the consent judgment amounts.278 NPIC argued that the set-
268. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 83 (Kan. 1997).
269. Americold, 934 P.2d at 83.
270. Id.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 84.
273. Id.
274. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 84 (Kan. 1997).
275. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 84-85.





tlement was collusive because Americold negotiated it in secret.27 9
Again, Americold's reluctance to share its thoughts and settlement strate-
gies with NPIC was unremarkable.
NPIC chose not to be involved in the settlement discussions by re-
fusing to contribute anything toward settlement. Once NPIC denied
coverage and offered nothing toward settlement, the relationship with
Americold became adversarial. NPIC knew the negotiations were
taking place. Under those circumstances, Americold's efforts to keep
the final settlement negotiations and agreement confidential from
280NPIC may or may not raise concerns of collusion.
The court did conclude, however, that the trial court erred by not
independently evaluating the reasonableness of the settlement amount.28'
On remand the plaintiffs would be required to substantiate their damages
and, in doing so, provide the trial court with a basis to evaluate the rea-
sonableness of the settlement. 82
The crucial and final issue decided by the court was NPIC's liability
for damages in excess of its policy limits. 283 The Americold court ob-
served that because an insured's cause of action against an insurer for
breach of its implied duty of good faith in settlement is contractual, "the
term 'extra-contractual damages' is a misnomer.' '28  The damages
awarded should place the insured in the same position it would have en-
joyed had the insurance company's breach never occurred.285
Kansas does not recognize the tort of bad faith, holding instead that
in defending and settling claims a liability insurer owes the insured a
"duty to act in good faith and without negligence."2 86 The Americold
court acknowledged that the distinction between the Kansas "bad faith"
and "negligence" standards is blurry, and that the insurer's duty to act in
good faith and without negligence arises out of the policy.2 87 The duty to
act in good faith without negligence also encompasses a liability in-
surer's coverage decision when used as the reason for rejecting a reason-
able settlement offer within policy limits. 288 An insurer is not required to
settle a claim when there is a good faith question as to whether there is
coverage under its policy. 289 The court was thus required to decide
279. See id. at 86.
280. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 86-87 (Kan. 1997).
281. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 87.
282. See id. at 87, 94.
283. See id. at 87.
284. Id. at 88.
285. Id.
286. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 89 (Kan. 1997).
287. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 89-90.
288. See id. at 90.
289. See id. (citing Snodgrass v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 804 P.2d 1012 (Kan. Ct. App.
1991)).
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whether material issues of fact remained concerning NPIC's bad faith in
declining to settle because it believed that its absolute pollution exclusion
barred coverage.29°
The Americold court concluded that material issues of fact remained
to be resolved for several reasons.29' First, NPIC offered to defend under
a reservation of rights shortly after National Union's tender.292 NPIC's
obligations, if any, were not triggered until Americold's primary cover-
age was exhausted, 93 and National Union's coverage position was un-
clear (by virtue of its reservation of rights) until it tendered its policy
limits at the March 1994 settlement conference.29" Second, NPIC's
brinksmanship may or may not have prejudiced Americold.295 Although
NPIC may not have had an express contractual obligation to reveal its
coverage position before National Union's tender of its policy limits, its
implied good faith obligation could have required a more prompt disclo-
sure of its coverage position after the initial policy limits settlement of-
fer.296 Third, NPIC's claim that tenant policies provided coverage pri-
mary to NPIC's "lacked substance. 297 Fourth, NPIC did not take some
steps necessary to perfect its exhaustion argument until two years after it
first became aware of facts suggesting the possibility of this coverage
defense.298 Fifth, "NPIC made no effort to settle.
299
The Kansas Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a
factual determination as to whether NPIC denied coverage in bad faith.3"
If the district court were to find that NPIC did not act in bad faith, the
insurer's liability would be fixed at $25 million, that being its policy
limit.3 ' If NPIC were found on remand to have acted in bad faith and the
consent judgments were found to be reasonable, then NPIC would be
liable for the full value of those judgments.0 2
Americold is a complex and confusing case, and the opinion is not a
model of clarity. The case does illustrate the predicament in which an
excess insurer can find itself when it slumbers on its rights and arguably
plays coy with its insured. NPIC's entire policy limits clearly were at risk
and, accordingly, it could have demanded that National Union tender its
290. See id.
291. See id. at 90-91.
292. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 90 (Kan. 1997).
293. See Americold, 934 P.2d at 90.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 91.
296. See id.
297. Id.
298. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 91 (Kan. 1997).
299. Americold, 934 P.2d at 91.
300. See id.




policy limits months earlier so that it could take control of the defense. It
did not. It could have announced its coverage position as soon as it knew
that it would be relying on its absolute pollution exclusion. It instead
concealed its coverage position from its insured and from TIG, the ex-
cess carrier above. It could have filed a declaratory judgment action to
determine the applicability of its exclusion long before it did. There was
no apparent reason for that delay. Whether NPIC will ultimately bear the
$33 million in bad faith liability remains to be seen.
In Rocor International, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance
Co.,3"3 an excess insurer, National Union, assumed control of settlement
negotiations in a high-exposure case that clearly implicated its policy
limits." Although National Union ultimately settled the case within its
policy limits, it delayed in doing so. 311 Shortly after National Union took
control of settlement negotiations, the case could have been settled for
$6.3 million.3" National Union finally settled the case almost a year later
for $6.4 million.3"7 In the meantime, Rocor, which was self-insured up to
$1 million, had to continue to prepare for trial in the event the case did
not settle.3"8 Rocor thus sued National Union to recover its defense costs
incurred because of National Union's delay. 3 9
Rocor alleged that National Union violated the Texas Insurance
Code by not attempting in good faith to settle on fair terms once Rocor's
liability was reasonably clear. 31° The Texas Court of Appeals agreed that
Rocor had pleaded a cause of action under the applicable statute, stating
that:
While Rocor had no fight to expect that [National Union] would settle
blindly, it certainly had a right to expect that, once all parties agreed
on liability and damages, settlement would follow with reasonable
promptness, and thus Rocor's financial interests would be protected.
This is especially true in this case, because National Union took over
settlement negotiations and negotiated with Rocor's funds and those
311of Rocor's primary carier.
Rocor also alleged National Union's negligence in handling the set-
tlement. National Union argued in response that it had no duty to defend
Rocor, and that absent a duty to defend it owed Rocor no duty to settle
within policy limits. 3 2 The Rocor court rejected National Union's argu-
303. 995 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
304. See Rocor Int'l, Inc., 995 S.W. 2d at 807.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 808.
308. See id. at 807-808.
309. See Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 995 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex. App. 1999).
310. See Rocor Int'l, Inc., 995 S.W. 2d at 808.
311. Id. at 809.
312. See id. at 812.
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ments.3 13 While National Union clearly had no duty to defend Rocor un-
der the express terms of its policy, it "assumed a duty to fairly settle the
underlying tort litigation when it took over settlement negotiations, espe-
cially negotiations involving funds that it did not control" (Rocor's SIR
and its primary policy limits).314 The court reasoned that National Union
could not have it both ways: "it [could not] take exclusive control of the
handling of claims against its insured" and then claim that it could not be
liable for related missteps because it had no contractual duty to defend." 5
National Union's assumption of exclusive control over settlement nego-
tiations gave rise to a special relationship upon which liability could be
premised." 6
The court acknowledged that National Union did settle the case,
such that Rocor was not exposed to excess liability.3 7 Nevertheless, the
fact that this was not a typical third-party bad faith case did not mean that
National Union should escape responsibility; National Union owed Ro-
cor a duty to handle claims in such a way as to minimize Rocor's finan-
cial hardship.318 The Rocor court reasoned that National Union should
not be allowed to drag out settlement free from a duty to defend while
Rocor paid what were essentially unnecessary defense costs.319
Rocor teaches that excess insurers, just like primary insurers, can
assume duties to their insureds that would not otherwise exist. The opin-
ion should not be extended beyond its facts, however. The case is un-
usual in that the plaintiffs' attorneys, Rocor's defense counsel and Na-
tional Union's attorneys all evaluated the case as having nearly the same
settlement value.32 ° Had there not been that harmony, such that National
Union's delay in settlement was the product of hard negotiations required
to close a significant gap between the plaintiffs' initial offer and the true
value of the case, no one reasonably could have accused the insurer of
unfair business practices or negligence. That being the situation, Rocor's
defense costs would simply have been the price of self-insuring rather
than being cast as damages.
B. The Insured's Obligation to the Excess Insurer
Liability insurers regularly complain of insureds' collusive and even
fraudulent behavior in connection with allegedly unreasonable settle-
313. See id.
314. Id.
315. See Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 995 S.W.2d 804, 812 (Tex. App. 1999).
316. See Rocor Int'l, Inc., 995 S.W. 2d at 812.
317. See id. at 813.
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. See id. at 808.
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ments and consent judgments. Excess insurers also are targets of
schemes by insureds to manipulate claims to the carrier's detriment.
The London underwriter serving as an excess insurer in Andrade v.
Jennings,"' Jennings, issued a policy to the owner of a fishing boat. The
boat's owner, Jorge Fishing, also purchased a $1 million primary policy
from American Maritime.322 Unfortunately, when Jorge's employee An-
drade was injured in a shipboard accident, American Maritime was in-
solvent.323 Thus, Wells Fargo Bank, the vessel's largest lien holder, en-
gaged the law firm of Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye (Gray Cary) to defend
Jorge against Andrade's lawsuit.3 24 Another lien holder, PCA, also joined
Jorge's defense.325
Gray Cary wrote counsel for Jorge's broker to enlist his aid in noti-
fying Jennings that Jorge required a defense in light of American Ma-
rine's insolvency.326 One thing led to another, and Jennings retained the
law firm of Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft (Hancock) to represent his
syndicate's interests.327 Gray Cary informed Hancock that Andrade's
claim had a settlement value of $200,000.328 Hancock asked to be pro-
vided with any information indicating that Andrade's claim might exceed
$1 million, thereby implicating Jennings' coverage.329
Andrade's lawyer later made a $950,000 settlement offer which Gray
Cary did not report to Hancock.330 PCA asked Gray Cary to quickly re-
solve Andrade's claim.33' PCA also told Gray Cary to structure the set-
tlement such that Andrade would not record a lien against the vessel.332
Gray Cary then asked Andrade's lawyer to present an "'immediate de-
mand' and new settlement proposal." '333 The lawyers met to design a set-
tlement.334 Immediately after that meeting, Andrade's lawyer filed with
the court an offer to compromise for a $1.5 million stipulated
judgment.335 Gray Cary did not report either the settlement discussions
or the $1.5 million settlement demand.336
321. 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787 (Ct. App. 1997).
322. See Andrade, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.




327. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 791 (Ct. App. 1997).





333. Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 791 (Ct. App. 1997).
334. See Andrade, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 792.
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Settlement negotiations continued for months.337 Gray Cary con-
cealed these negotiations from Hancock.338 Hancock eventually learned
of the settlement negotiations and warned Gray Cary that such conduct
was a breach of Jorge's duty to cooperate, thus voiding void coverage
under Jennings' policy.3 39 Hancock further warned Gray Cary against
attempting to manufacture a claim in the excess layer where none would
otherwise exist.340 Gray Cary responded by telling Hancock that An-
drade's attorney intended to seek court approval of a settlement ranging
between $1.5 million and $2 million, and giving Hancock the date of the
settlement hearing. 41 The Hancock attorney handling the case declined
to attend the settlement hearing.342
The hearing went forward in Hancock and Jennings' absence. 43
Gray Cary appeared at the hearing for Jorge.344 Andrade testified without
objection and without being cross-examined. 345 "[Gray Cary] did not
contest Jorge's liability or Andrade's damages. ' '346 The federal magistrate
conducting the "prove-up hearing" entered a $1,586,840.53 judgment for
Andrade.37
Andrade settled with Jorge's insurance broker, who procured the
worthless American Maritime primary policy, for somewhere between
$150,000 and $175,000.4 8 Jennings refused to pay Andrade that portion
of the judgment within the excess policy's limits. 349 A trial court eventu-
ally entered a $586,840.57 judgment against Jennings on claims brought
by Andrade for breach of contract and declaratory relief.35 After an ap-
peal and remand, Jennings' collusion defense was tried to a jury.351 The
jury returned a verdict for Jennings and Andrade appealed.352
On appeal, Andrade argued that Jennings should be barred from at-
tacking his judgment as collusive because he knew of his potential li-
ability as an excess insurer and the prove-up hearing, but did nothing
until after the hearing. 53 The Andrade court rejected this argument.
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 793 (Ct. App. 1997).





345. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 793 (Ct. App. 1997).
346. Andrade, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 794 n. 7.
349. See id. at 794.
350. See id.
351. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 795 (Ct. App. 1997).
352. See Andrade, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
353. See id. at 796.
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Jennings' decision not to participate in the prove-up hearing had been but
one factor considered by the jury in adjudicating his collusion defense.355
Andrade next attacked the verdict for Jennings as lacking substantial
evidentiary support.356 The court also rejected this argument. 5 7 "As the
insured, Jorge owed its excess insurer Jennings the duty of good faith
and fair dealing." '358 The court further stated that "[a]n insured may not
manipulate claims to an excess carrier's detriment."35 9 There was abun-
dant evidence of Jorge's bad faith. Gray Cary violated the assistance and
cooperation clauses in the excess policy "and thus committed a fraud on
Jennings" by not providing him with a copy of Andrade's original
$950,000 settlement offer; by not conveying Andrade's $1.5 million set-
tlement offer; by concealing other evidence of Andrade's damages (an
economist's report that Andrade's lost income approached $1.2 million);
by entering into the settlement agreement; and by not mounting a defense
at the prove-up hearing.3 60 Further, three witnesses who testified in the
collusion case pegged the value of Andrade's claim at between $150,000
and $250,000, and one of the Gray Cary attorneys had twice told Han-
cock that Andrade's claim had a settlement value of $200,000.361 At the
time of the settlement, there had been no local settlement or judgment
exceeding $1 million in a similar maritime case; the highest settlement
had not exceeded $350,000.362 The largest prior jury verdict obtained by
Andrade's attorney's law firm in a maritime case was $900,000.363 Fi-
nally, the court found that the jury could also "reasonably conclude" that
defenses available to Jorge that were not raised at the prove-up hearing
could have reduced Andrade's provable damages to below $1 million.
364
After reasoning that the settlement was unreasonable and the judg-
ment was collusive, the Andrade court turned to the reasonableness of
Jennings' absence at the prove-up hearing.365 In light of Jorge's admission
of liability in settlement documents, Jennings' appearance at the hearing
would have been pointless.366 Moreover, Hancock satisfied all duties of
inquiry that Jennings might owe.3 67 The Hancock attorney handling the
matter (Booth) knew that Gray Cary was defending Jorge and had no
354. See id. 796-97.
355. See id. at 797.
356. See id.
357. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 797 (Ct. App. 1997).
358. Andrade, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798.
359. Id.
360. See id. at 798-99.
361. See id. at 799-800.
362. See id. at 800. "
363. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 800 (Ct. App. 1997).
364. See Andrade, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.
365. See id.
366. See id. at 802.
367. See id.
2000]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
reason to believe that it would cease its defense at any foreseeable
368Noditime. Nor did Booth have any reason to believe that Gray Cary was
withholding information.3 69 According to expert witnesses who testified
at the trial of the collusion case, Booth was entitled to believe that the
Gray Cary attorneys were truthful, and that they were providing com-
plete and accurate information about the status of Andrade's case.37
Andrade also argued that even if Andrade did collude with Gray
Cary and Jorge, Jennings was not damaged because Jennings had all the
information needed to defend himself in the case in which the consent
judgment was taken.371 Again, the Andrade court rejected the plaintiffs
argument.37 Jennings' exposure arose when "he knew or should have
known [that] the limits of Jorge's primary coverage would .. .become
exhausted." '373 Gray Cary effectively concealed all such information from
Jennings.374 The settlement agreement with its unopposed judgment
harmed Jennings because the liability issue was a "done deal" once Jorge
agreed to give up all defenses it might assert against Andrade.375
Jennings thus lacked "any meaningful opportunity to present a proper
defense of the case, particularly with respect to issues of liability. 376
Finally, Andrade argued that even if the court were to uphold the
jury verdict of collusion, he should be entitled to pursue a direct claim
against Jennings.377 He reasoned that any collusion "voided only the set-
tlement agreement and did not relieve Jennings of his contractual obliga-
tion to provide coverage for [his] injuries." '378 Jennings countered by ar-
guing that, as Jorge's assignee, Andrade possessed only those remedies
that Jorge had and he was subject to any defenses Jennings had against
Jorge.379 Thus, the jury's finding of collusion barred any direct claim by
Andrade against Jennings.380
The Andrade court dodged this issue altogether.381 The issue was not
presented to the trial court, and accordingly, it could not be raised for the
first time on appeal.382
368. See id.
369. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 802 (Ct. App. 1997).




374. See id. at 803.
375. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 803 (Ct. App. 1997).





381. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787, 803 (Ct. App. 1997).
382. See Andrade, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
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While an excess carrier may be able to sue a primary insurer for bad
faith if it fails to settle a case within its policy limits, a subject discussed
in detail in the next section,383 it does not necessarily follow that an ex-
cess carrier may sue a self-insured policyholder for bad faith in failing to
settle a lawsuit for an amount within its SIR.384 As the court observed in
Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc. :38
The simple fact of the matter is that policyholders, even partially self-
insured policyholders, are not primary carriers. Policyholders pay
premiums to excess carriers in order to have protection against the
risk of litigation (which risks include that of guessing wrong in set-
tlement negotiations); primary carriers do not, and therefore must be
careful as to how they balance their own interests with the competing
interests of the excess carriers in any given claim instance. We have
found no basis in the law, nor have we been pointed to any, for con-
cluding that, apart from the premiums it pays, an insured also as-
sumes a fiduciary duty of care toward its insurer in the context of set-
tlements.386
Thus, an excess insurer believing that its insured wrongly refused to
settle a case within its SIR must raise policy defenses to coverage for the
resulting judgment. A court might enforce a duty in contract for which
the insured has bargained, even though the court might hesitate to en-
force the duty in tort.
38 7
C. Disputes Between Excess and Primary Insurers
Disputes between primary and excess insurers often grow out of a
primary carrier's failure to settle a case within its policy limits.388 A pri-
mary insurer's failure to settle a case within its policy limits for which the
facts should require it to do so, thereby exposing its insured to personal
liability, is the essence of the third-party bad faith tort. A primary in-
surer's wrongful or unreasonable failure to settle a case within its policy
limits is no less offensive when an excess insurer must bear liability for
the resulting judgment above the primary carrier's limits. The issue then
becomes how the excess carrier can call the primary insurer to account.
389
383. See infra notes 388-431.
384. See, e.g., Int'l Ins. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 841 S.W.2d 437, 444-45 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that insured had no common law duty to accept settlement offer that would avoid
exposing excess insurer to liability).
385. 871 F. Supp. 657, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (predicting New Jersey law).
386. Employers Mut., 871 F. Supp. at 666.
387. See id.
388. See, e.g., Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. 908, 918 (N.D. I11.
1996); Galen Health Care v. Am. Cas. Co., 913 F. Supp. 1525, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
389. Allowing excess insurers a right of action against primary insurers for bad faith (whether
direct or via equitable subrogation) encourages reasonable settlements, prevents primary insurers
from obstructing settlement, prevents the unfair distribution of losses among primary and excess
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A few courts hold that a primary insurer owes an excess insurer a di-
rect duty of good faith and fair dealing.39° These courts reason that when
a primary insurer refuses to settle in bad faith, the excess insurer is in the
same position as an insured.39' Fairness dictates the imposition of a direct
duty on the primary insurer, inasmuch as the excess carrier relies on the
primary carrier to discharge any claims handling and defense
obligations.3 92 An excess insurer is entitled to rely on a primary insurer to
not elevate its interests ahead of the excess insurer's interests, just as an
insured can expect that a primary insurer will not subordinate the in-
sured's interests to its own. 93 By treating an excess insurer and an in-
sured as identical, direct duty jurisdictions avoid stumbling over the in-
tellectual block posed by the absence of a contractual relationship be-
tween a primary and an excess insurer.39
Most courts reject the direct duty theory.3 95 Under the majority rule,
the duty to settle that a primary insurer owes an excess insurer derives
from the primary insurer's duty to the insured, such that an aggrieved
excess insurer may sue on an equitable subrogation theory.396 In order for
an excess insurer to sue a non-settling primary insurer via equitable sub-
rogation the excess insurer must prove that the primary insurer failed to
fulfill a duty owed to the insured,397 and it must pay some portion of the
insurers, and reduces the cost of excess insurance. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Century Indem. Co., 887
P.2d 455, 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
390. See, e.g., RLI Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 691 So. 2d 1095, 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 879, 881 n.6 (Mich. 1995); Baen
v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 723 A.2d 636, 639 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
391. See RLI, 691 So. 2d at 1096; Baen, 723 A.2d at 639.
392. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 681 A.2d 1241, 1246 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1995).
393. See Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 727 A.2d 1050, 1054 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
394. The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing clearly is a contract law principle. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
395. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1178-1179 (7th Cir.
1994); Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(applying Pennsylvania law), affd, 85 F.3d 1088 (3d Cir. 1996).
396. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 183 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 1999)
(interpreting Illinois law); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co., Il l F.3d 852, 858-
59 (11 th Cir. 1997) (applying Georgia and Wisconsin law); Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. N. River
Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1088, 1095 (3d Cir. 1996) (deciding case under Pennsylvania law); Hocker v. N.H.
Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 1476, 1485 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying Wyoming law); Cal. Cas. Ins. Co. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 505, 510 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Pruyn v. Agric. Ins. Co., 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 295, 307 (Ct. App. 1995); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
762, 772 (Ct. App. 1994); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 17 n.7
(Mass. 1994); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 692 N.E.2d 1028, 1035-36 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex. 1992); First State Ins.
Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 971 P.2d 953, 957 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 989 P.2d 1136
(Wash. 1999).
397. See Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Vesta Fire Ins. Corp., 173 F.3d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1999)
(applying Texas law).
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verdict or judgment at issue.398 Generally, the measure of damages in an
equitable subrogation action is the difference between the amount the
excess insurer would have contributed to the settlement that the primary
insurer unreasonably refused, if anything, and the amount the excess
insurer ultimately paid to satisfy the judgment.3
The equitable subrogation approach represents better contract law
and insurance law than does the direct duty theory."0 Though direct duty
proponents may argue that their way avoids equitable defenses (such as
estoppel) that might operate to deny an excess carrier redress, that simply
is not so; equitable defenses work on legal claims as well as those in eq-
uity."° A primary insurer in a direct duty jurisdiction also may have per-
fectly valid defenses to an excess insurer's bad faith claim that do not
sound in equity. For example, a primary insurer's implied duty to settle is
excused where an excess insurer denies coverage.4 2
There are two situations, however, in which the recognition of a di-
rect duty makes some sense, contract law hurdles aside. First, consider
the situation in which the plaintiff is willing to settle only for an amount
that exceeds the primary insurer's policy limits. An insurer generally
does not owe an insured the implied duty to settle where no offer is made
within its limits.40 3 Under equitable subrogation theory, the absence of a
policy limits settlement offer allows the primary insurer to try the case
unencumbered by potential bad faith liability even though it is gambling
with the excess insurer's money. The excess insurer can have rights
against the primary carrier no greater than those enjoyed by the insured,
which would be none.' Second, consider the situation where the insured
insists on trying the case notwithstanding the risk of a verdict greater
than the limits of its primary policy. Perhaps the insured is concerned
about its reputation or about business interests that might be harmed by a
decision in the case at bar. If the excess insurer's right to sue the primary
carrier for bad faith or negligence is derivative, any claim the excess
398. See Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. 908, 923 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
399. See Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 20, at 703 (citing Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co.,
268 Cal. Rptr. 193, 198 (Ct. App. 1990)).
400. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1179-81 (7th Cir.
1994).
401. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d at 1179.
402. See Baen v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 723 A.2d 636, 639 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999).
403. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 566-67 (Ct. App.
1994); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, 996 S.w.2d 437, 453 (Ky. 1997); Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v.
Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 314-15 (Tex. 1994).
404. See M & B Apts., Inc. v. Teltser, 745 A.2d 586, 591 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(observing that "[i]f the duty owed by a primary insurer to an excess insurer is identical to that owed
to an insured, it follows that the rights of an excess insurer can rise no greater than those enjoyed by
the assured").
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insurer might have will be "barred by the insured's decision to roll thedie, ,405
Even these two scenarios, however, do not justify the recognition of
a direct duty. As for the first, why should an excess insurer possess rights
greater than those of an insured? There is no evidence of such a need.
Moreover, the excess insurer bargained for this risk. The insurance in-
dustry maxim "there are no bad risks, only bad premiums," finds appli-
cation here. As for the second scenario, an initial observation is that it
will rarely happen. Standard primary liability insurance policies grant the
insurer the right to settle as it deems expedient. Such provisions trump
the insured's desire for vindication by a jury.4 °' Additionally, if the in-
sured irresponsibly insists on a trial, an excess insurer may avoid liability
by asserting the insured's breach of its duty of good faith and fair
dealing." 7 The excess carrier does not need to be able to sue the primary
insurer in light of the defense the insured's conduct affords. 8
Bad faith cases are often fact specific, but California Union Insur-
ance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.49 illustrates the burdens pri-
mary insurers may bear when trying to resolve a case short of an excess
carrier's coverage. In California Union, a telephone company's (CTI)
second-level excess insurer, California Union, sued its underlying in-
surer, Liberty Mutual, for negligence in bad faith in failing to settle a
case within Liberty Mutual's policy limits. Liberty Mutual had issued
CTI a $1 million primary policy and a $1 million first-level excess pol-
icy. California Union had issued a $4 million excess policy immediately
above the Liberty Mutual excess policy.41°
The plaintiff in the underlying case, Hauck, suffered catastrophic
injury while inspecting a roof. He retained the renowned Chicago plain-
tiffs' firm of Corboy & Demetrio to pursue his claims against several
defendants.4 1' Liberty Mutual provided CTI with a defense to Hauck's
suit.
Hauck initially demanded $37.5 million to settle.412 Despite her be-
lief that CTI's liability clearly exceeded the limits of Liberty Mutual's
coverage, the Liberty Mutual claims handler primarily responsible for the
405. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d at 1180.
406. See, e.g., W. Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78, 85 (Ct. App.
1995); Shuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians' Prof. Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 So. 2d 174, 176-77
(Fla. 1992); Miller v. Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, 978 P.2d 922, 928-29 (Kan.
1999).
407. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir. 1994).
408. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d at 1180.
409. 920 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1996).





case refused to offer the company's $2 million policy limits toward set-
tlement.413 California Union reserved its entire $4 million policy limits
shortly thereafter based on the advice of the attorney it hired to monitor
the defense of Hauck's case.
As discovery proceeded, the case got worse from the defendants' per-
spective. Nonetheless, Hauck reduced his settlement demand to $16 mil-
lion. Liberty Mutual's defense counsel asked for authority to settle the
case and California Union formally demanded that Liberty Mutual do so.
California Union was prepared to contribute to a settlement but would
not do so until Liberty Mutual exhausted its $2 million policy limits. At a
meeting of all concerned on the defense side, Liberty Mutual advised that
it had no plans to contribute to any settlement.4" 4
Ultimately, all of the defendants except CTI settled for a combined
$4.4 million. Despite the fact that Liberty Mutual's defense counsel ad-
vised it to offer its $2 million policy limits in settlement and another ex-
cess carrier above California Union urged Liberty Mutual to move
quickly toward settlement, Liberty Mutual refused to offer more than
$400,000.4' Liberty Mutual finally upped its offer to $800,000. This
offer was rejected. Even when it became apparent that Liberty Mutual
could settle the case for $1.6 million it refused to offer more than
$800,000.416
California Union ultimately became so concerned about the potential
for a big verdict that it offered a "high-low agreement" governing the
trial. The low was $500,000 and the high was $4 million, with the $4
million divided equally between Liberty Mutual and California Union.
While the parties still would have to try the case, the high-low agreement
limited the risk of a bad verdict from either side's perspective.417 Califor-
nia Union reserved its right to sue Liberty Mutual for bad faith in refus-
ing to settle notwithstanding its participation in the high-low strategy.418
Hauck's lawyer Demetrio rejected the high-low agreement. Demetrio
tried the case solely against CTI, which he called "the most culpable
party. '4 9 The jury returned a $16,038,737 verdict for Hauck, reduced by
40 percent for Hauck's comparative fault. One month after the verdict,
California Union and Liberty Mutual settled with Hauck for $5,723,242,
with Liberty Mutual paying its $2 million policy limits and California
413. See id. at 914.
414. See id. at 915.
415. See Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. 908, 916 (N.D. 111.
1996).
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Union contributing $3,723,242.420 California Union then sued Liberty
Mutual for bad faith in failing to settle the Hauck case.
Both carriers moved for summary judgment in the bad faith action,
and the case was decided on their cross motions. Liberty Mutual first
argued that California Union was equitably estopped from pursuing its
claims. Liberty Mutual asserted that the presence of California Union's
monitoring counsel at the settlement conferences in the Hauck case "'al-
tered the negotiating landscape' because it signaled Hauck's attorney that
the excess carrier was concerned by the case, and therefore that more
money might be forthcoming."42' The California Union court quickly
dispatched this argument.
An excess insurer can be estopped from recovery if its own actions
induced the defendant to try the case .... Likewise, if an excess in-
surance. carrier participates in settlement negotiations and approves
the settlement amount, it may have waived its right to challenge the
settlement later .... Neither of those situations exists here, and the
mere hiring of monitoring counsel does not create equitable
estoppel.422
Liberty Mutual next asserted that California Union had suffered no
harm because it had reserved its entire $4 million policy limits. This un-
supported argument failed easily. "Under Illinois law, if a primary in-
surer breaches its duty to its insured or an excess insurer, the excess ver-
dict itself constitutes damages. 423
Liberty Mutual did not dispute that it owed CTI (and thus California
Union) a "general duty to use due care to avoid an excess judgment." 424
Liberty Mutual instead contended that it had no duty to initiate settle-
ment negotiations. The California Union court cautiously observed that
an insurer occasionally may have a duty to initiate settlement negotia-
tions, though that is not the general rule and such a duty should be im-
posed sparingly, such as where potential excess liability is "glaring. ' 42
The court then made clear that so rare a duty was not directly implicated
in this case.
The duty to initiate settlement does not directly apply here. Instead,
this case involves the related duty to continue ongoing settlement dis-
cussions .... Here, Hauck's attorney began the negotiating process
and demonstrated receptiveness to counter-offers. Although Hauck's
demands were high, he never indicated that he was not prepared to
420 See id.
421. See Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. 908, 919 (N.D. I11.
1996).
422. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. at 919 (citations omitted).
423, See id.
424. See id. at 920.
425. Id. at 920-21.
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reduce them in order to settle; in fact, Hauck's demands became lower
over time, a clear signal that he was willing to settle. In this situation,
Liberty Mutual's duty was not to initiate settlement but merely to act
reasonably in continuing the negotiations, including making reason-
able offers up to the limits of its policy if that was necessary and pru-
dent.
4 6
After examining many factors bearing on the reasonableness of Lib-
erty Mutual's conduct, the California Union court concluded that no rea-
sonable trier of fact could find that Liberty Mutual's actions in pursuing
settlement in the Hauck case were reasonable.427 There was virtually no
evidence that Liberty Mutual met its duty of care to CTI and, by way of
- equitable subrogation, its duty to California Union.428 The court thus en-
tered summary judgment for California Union, awarding the excess in-
surer $3,723,242 (its portion of the settlement) plus interest and CoStS.
429
Of course, there may be cases in which the primary insurer alleg-
edly mishandles settlement negotiations or seriously misjudges the value
of the case, but the primary insurer's blunders are meaningless because
the plaintiffs damages are so great that the case could never be settled
within the primary policy limits. 43 In such a case, an excess insurer that
pays all or part of its policy limits will not be able to prevail on a bad
faith claim against the primary insurer. This is because the primary in-
surer's failures or errors are not the cause of the excess insurer's claimed
damages.431 Indeed, the excess insurer has no damages. It paid under its
policy not because of the primary insurer's bad faith, but because it real-
ized the risk it insured.
IV. SPREADING THE RISK AND SHARING THE PAIN: EXHAUSTION OF
COVERAGE AND Loss ALLOCATION ISSUES
Generally, for an excess insurer to have any obligation to its in-
sured, the primary insurer must pay its policy limits toward the satisfac-
tion or settlement of the claim or judgment against the insured. A pri-
mary insurer that properly pays its policy limits is said to have "ex-
hausted" its limits. Similarly, an excess insurance policyholder that self-
insures instead of purchasing a primary policy must exhaust its SIR be-
fore the excess insurer is required to respond to a loss.
43 2
426. Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
427. See Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. 908, 921-23 (N.D. I11.
1996).
428. See Cal. Union Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. at 923.
429. See id at 924.
430. See, e.g., RLI Ins. Co. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 997 F. Supp. 140 (D. Mass. 1998) (ap-
plying Massachusetts law).
431. See RLI Ins. Co., 997 F. Supp. at 150.
432. See, e.g., City of Oxnard v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 180 (Ct. App.
1995) (discussing duty to defend); Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 801, 808-81 (Il. App.
Ct. 1997) (discussing duty to indemnify).
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Problems arise in cases involving continuous or progressive injuries
or losses spanning several policy periods. Asbestosis claims, silicosis
claims, environmental or pollution claims, and cases involving construc-
tion defects and earth movement, are just a few examples of continuous
losses that burden courts and insurers. Standard insurance policy provi-
sions do not neatly fit the complex factual scenarios presented by losses
that span years or even decades.433
A loss that spans years may "trigger" multiple insurance policies.
Insurance polices do not contain the term "trigger," which is simply a
term of convenience.4 34 "Triggering" occurs when a loss implicates a
policy's coverage, subject to the policy's terms and exclusions, and any
other coverage defenses the insurer may raise.435 Most courts now em- -
ploy the so-called "continuous trigger" or "triple trigger. 436 Under this
approach, any policy on the risk at any time during the continuing loss is
triggered, meaning that the issuing insurer must be prepared to defend or
pay up to its policy limits as the case may be.437
One of the most hotly contested issues in continuous loss cases,
often referred to by insurers as "long-tail claims," is whether an insured
is obligated to exhaust its liability coverage "vertically" or "horizon-
tally." This issue arises when several primary policies or lower level ex-
cess policies are triggered, and a court must determine whether the limits
of the underlying policies for one year (vertical exhaustion) or all years
(horizontal exhaustion) must be exhausted before a particular excess
policy must pay.438 Special problems may arise when an underlying in-
surer becomes insolvent, or an excess insurer is otherwise required to
433. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 939 (Colo. 1999).
434. See Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 699 (Ct.
App. 1996) (citing Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1995)); Ruben-
stein v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 694 N.E.2d 381, 387 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998), affd, 708 N.E.2d
639 (Mass. 1999).
435. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 937 n.I 1.
436. Courts can pick from several coverage triggers. Applying an "exposure" trigger, CGL
coverage triggers each time a person is exposed to a harmful condition during a policy period. Re-
gardless of when the injury actually occurs, courts deem the injury to have occurred at the time of
exposure. The "actual injury" or "injury-in-fact" trigger implicates those policies in effect when the
subject injury or damage actually occurs, even if it is not discovered during that policy period. Those
courts employing the "manifestation" trigger hold that bodily injury or property damage occurs when
a latent disease or defect manifests itself. The policy (or policies) that is in effect when the injury or
damage is discovered, or reasonably should have been discovered, is thus triggered. The application
of a "continuous" trigger or "triple trigger" affords the broadest coverage. The continuous trigger
theory implicates all policies from the date of first exposure through manifestation. It is sometimes
called the "triple trigger" because it embraces the three other possible triggers. See Douglas R.
Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22
PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1430-32 (1995).
437. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 938 n.12; Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of
Haw., 875 P.2d 894, 915 (Haw. 1994).
438. See Mary K. Gogoel & Mitchell A. Orpett, Allocation and Excess Insurance, in
UNDERSTANDING ALLOCATION 135, 138-39 (Def. Research Inst. 1999).
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"drop down" to provide a level of coverage lower than that for which it
bargained.
Long-tail claims are the bane of liability insurers. 9 They are horri-
bly expensive, consuming untold insurance company dollars in defense
costs, indemnity payments, and coverage litigation costs. Accordingly,
disputes involving the allocation of losses between insurers and their
insureds, and between insurers, are regular sights on the insurance litiga-
tion landscape. Should multiple insurers bear that portion of a loss attrib-
utable to their "time on the risk"? Are policyholders bound to pay "or-
phan shares" attributable to gaps in coverage, or must the other insurers
on the risk bear that responsibility as well? Allocation disputes are often
confusing, at least in part because insurance policies themselves are si-
lent on the issue."0
A. Exhaustion of Primary Insurance
1. Vertical Versus Horizontal Exhaustion
"Vertical exhaustion" allows an insured to select policy periods
triggered by a continuous loss." Under vertical exhaustion theory, "the
first-in-time primary and excess policies will be exhausted before the
next-in-time primary and excess policies will be tapped.""' Vertical ex-
haustion benefits the insured because it allows the insured to select the
policy periods in which it has the most available coverage to respond to a
loss, thereby maximizing indemnity dollars." 3 It also benefits the insured
because it preserves coverage under successive primary policies, thereby
ensuring the insured of a continued defense.' 4
"Horizontal exhaustion" means that the primary insurance must be
exhausted across all of the triggered policy periods before the next layer
of coverage, whether excess or umbrella, must respond to a continuous
loss." 5 In other words, every primary policy triggered by a continuous
loss must be exhausted before any excess insurer can be required to
pay." 6 Horizontal exhaustion best comports with the continuous trigger
theories favored in many jurisdictions.
439. See Michael F. Aylward, Sharing the Blame? Issues Arising Out of the Allocation of
Indemnity in Long Tail Coverage Disputes, in UNDERSTANDING ALLOCATION 221, 221 (Def. Re-
search Inst. 1999).
440. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 990 (N.J. 1994).
441. See Donald C. Erickson, Emerging Primary and Excess Coverage Issues in Continuous
Trigger Regimes, THE BRIEF, Summer 1999, at 18, 19.
442. Gogoel & Orpett, supra note 438, at 138.
443. See id
444. See id.
445. See Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 801, 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
446. See, Gen. Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 89-7924, 1994 WL 246274
(E.D. Pa. June 8, 1994); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D.
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[I]f "occurrences" are continuously occurring throughout a period of
time, all of the primary policies in force during that period of time
cover these occurrences, and all of them are primary to each of the
excess policies; and if the limits of liability of each of these primary
policies is adequate in the aggregate to cover the liability of the in-
sured, there is no "excess" loss for the excess policies to cover.
44 7
Horizontal exhaustion benefits excess insurers by increasing the insula-
tion from loss that underlying insurance provides.
Whether a court will apply vertical or horizontal exhaustion princi-
ples in a continuing-loss case is a question that is sometimes answered by
looking at the language of the excess policy (or policies) at issue. A court
will typically require vertical exhaustion when the limits of a specifically
scheduled primary policy are exhausted and the excess policy provides
that it shall be excess only to that specific underlying policy.44 8 Where
excess policies are not so specific, horizontal exhaustion is preferred.
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. 9 is a representative case.
In Community Redevelopment, developer Carley purchased two
successive $1 million primary policies from United Pacific Insurance
(United).4 10 A third $1 million primary policy issued by United insured
both Carley and another developer, Cal Coast.45 ' Additionally, Cal Coast
purchased its own primary policy from State Farm with $1 million
limits.45 2 Finally, Cal Coast also purchased a $5 million umbrella policy
from Scottsdale Insurance that was specifically (but not exclusively)
excess to the State Farm policy. 53 The Scottsdale umbrella policy pro-
vided in relevant part:
UNDERLYING LIMIT-RETAINED LIMIT
The Company shall be liable only for the ULTIMATE NET
LOSS in excess of the greater of the INSURED'S: (A) Under-
lying Limit--An amount equal to the limits of liability indicated
beside the underlying insurance listed in the Schedule of Un-
Ill. 1991); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Ct. App. 1996);
United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
447. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199.
448. See Cmty. Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755,
761 (Ct. App. 1996).
449. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 755.
450. See id. at 757.
451. See id.




derlying Insurance (Schedule A)... plus the applicable limits of
any other underlying insurance collectible by the INSURED;
4 54
The policy's Schedule A listed State Farm's $1 million policy as the un-
derlying insurance.455
The Scottsdale policy also included a provision headed "Limits of
Liability," a section providing for defense and supplementary payments,
and an "Other Insurance" clause.456 The limits of liability provision
stated:
In the event of reduction or exhaustion of the aggregate limits of li-
ability under said underlying insurance by reason of the payment of
damages .... which occur during each policy period, this policy,
subject to the above limitations, shall:
(A) in the event of reduction pay in excess of the reduced un-
derlying limits, or
(B) in the event of exhaustion continue in force as underlying
insurance subject to all the terms and conditions of such under-
lying insurances.457
The policy's "Supplementary Payments" provision stated:
DEFENSE, SETTLEMENT AND SUPPLEMENTARY
PAYMENTS
The company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit
against the INSURED seeking damages which are payable un-
der the above insuring Agreement, even if the allegations of the
suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent, provided, however, that
no other insurance affording a defense or indemnity against such
a suit is available to the INSURED.458
The "Other Insurance" clause provided: "OTHER INSURANCE: the
insurance afforded by this policy shall be excess insurance over any
other valid and collectible insurance available to the INSURED, whether
or not described in the Schedule of Underlying Insurance. 459
Carley and Cal Coast designed and built a number of residential
developments in the hills around Los Angeles in the late 1970s and early
1980s.460 Unfortunately, their developments were built on unsuitable
454. Cmty. Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 758
(Ct. App. 1996) (quoting the Scottsdale policy).
455. See Cmry. Redev. Agency of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758 n.4.
456. See id.
457. Id. (quoting Scottsdale's policy).
458. Id. (quoting Scottsdale's policy).
459. Id. (quoting Scottsdale's policy).
460. See Cmty. Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755,
757 (Ct. App. 1996).
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soils, resulting in continuing damage to many properties over a number
of years."6 Not surprisingly, affected homeowners and homeowners as-
sociations filed a number of lawsuits against Carley, Cal Coast and the
CRA, a city agency that had promoted the developments. 62
In 1988, State Farm settled many of the lawsuits, contributing its $1
million policy limits to the settlement.4 63 The remaining lawsuits were
settled in 1990, with United serving as the primary insurer and defending
Carley, Cal Coast and the CRA until those cases were settled.464 A de-
claratory relief action followed."6 The insureds and insurers all disputed
how to share the settlement and defense costs. 4 66 United argued that
Scottsdale had a duty to provide primary coverage in State Farm's place
as soon as State Farm paid its policy limits as part of the earlier settle-
ment.467 Such a duty, if it existed, would obligate Scottsdale to equitably
share the considerable expense that United incurred defending Carley,
Cal Coast and the CRA
4 6 8
The trial court entered judgment for Scottsdale, holding in part that
it had no duty to share in the defense costs because not all of the primary
policies on the risk were exhausted. 69 In other words, it was not enough
that the State Farm policy was exhausted; Scottsdale had duty until the
United policies also were exhausted and they never were. United ap-
pealed.7
The Community Redevelopment court readily acknowledged that the
Scottsdale policy was purchased as excess insurance above the State
Farm policy; however, the Scottsdale policy further provided that it was
excess to the applicable limits of any other collectible underlying insur-
ance.47 ' This express description of the scope of Scottsdale's excess cov-
erage was entirely consistent with, and was reinforced by, other policy
language addressing Scottsdale's duty to defend and the effect of other
insurance.472
461. See Cmty. Redev. Agency of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757.
462. See id. at 756-58.
463. See id. at 758.
464. See id. 756 n.l.
465. See id.
466. See Cmty. Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755,
756 & n.1 (Ct. App. 1996).
467. See Cmty. Redev. Agency of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-59.
468. See id. at 759.
469. See id. (emphasis added).
470. See id at 756.
471. See id. at 760.
472. See Cmty. Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755,
760 (Ct. App. 1996).
[Vol. 78:1
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
California courts generally favor "horizontal exhaustion. '473 As the
Community Redevelopment court explained:
[P]rimary policies may have defense and coverage obligations which
make them underlying insurance to excess policies which were effec-
tive in entirely different periods and which may not have expressly
described such primary policies as underlying insurance. Absent a
provision in the excess policy specifically describing and limiting the
underlying insurance, a horizontal exhaustion rule should be applied
in continuous loss cases ... In other words, all of the primary policies
in force during the period of continuous loss will be deemed primary
policies to each of the excess policies covering that same period. Un-
der the principle of horizontal exhaustion, all of the primary policies
must exhaust before any excess [policy] will have coverage
exposure.474
Given the general California rule and the language of its policy,
Scottsdale could have no duty to defend until all primary policies-in-
cluding the United policies-were exhausted. Although State Farm's
policy limits were exhausted, United's policy limits clearly were not, and
therefore, Scottsdale's duty was never triggered.475
United argued that because Scottsdale's policy specifically provided
that it was excess to the State Farm policy, its duty to participate in the
defense arose as soon as State Farm's limits were exhausted.476 The
Community Redevelopment court rejected United's argument, stating:
First, as we have quoted above, the 'drop down' provisions of the
Scottsdale policy are contained in the 'Limits of Liability' section.
The relevant provision requires 'exhaustion' before the drop down
obligation will arise. United's reliance on this language is misplaced.
Indeed, United's argument necessarily begs the very question on
which our resolution of this matter depends: has exhaustion occurred
or not? What is required for exhaustion to occur is clearly set out in
other portions of the Scottsdale policy's insuring clauses. Those other
provisions do not limit the coverage of the Scottsdale policy to only
the 'excess' over the State Farm limits, but expressly extends it to
'the applicable limits of any other underlying insurance collectible by
the [insureds].' The only reasonable interpretation of this policy lan-
guage is that the term 'underlying insurance' must be read to include
all available primary insurance, not just the policy expressly listed on
the Schedule of Underlying Insurance. This conclusion is confirmed
and reinforced by the 'Defense' and 'Other Insurance' sections of the
Scottsdale policy, which contain additional and consistent provisions
that compel rejection of United's contention. The coverage provided
by United clearly was 'other underlying insurance' within the mean-
473. See Cmty. Redev. Agency of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761.
474. Id. (emphasis added).
475. See id.
476. See id. at 758-59.
20001
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ing of Scottsdale's policy .... In other words, an excess insurer can
require in its policy that all primary insurance be first exhausted.
Consistent with the horizontal exhaustion rule, that is what Scottsdale
effectively did in this case. Because exhaustion of all available pri-
mary (or underlying) insurance never occurred, Scottsdale's duty, un-
der the terms of the policy, to 'drop down' and provide a defense
never arose.
47 7
The Community Redevelopment court thus affirmed the trial court's
judgment for Scottsdale.
2. Special Exhaustion Problems
Exhaustion is not just an issue in connection with long-tail claims.
There may be cases in which a primary insurer wants its policy limits to
be deemed exhausted so that an excess insurer will take over the in-
sured's defense. Of course, an excess insurer wants the primary insurer to
actually exhaust its policy limits so that the excess carrier can avoid de-
fense costs as well as minimize its indemnity obligations. These com-
peting interests sometimes give rise to unusual exhaustion disputes, as in
County of Santa Clara v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.4 7 8
In County of Santa Clara, the county's primary insurer, USF&G,
escrowed its policy limits for use by the county in executing a state or-
dered remediation plan.479 The district court then ordered the county's
excess insurer, Employers Reinsurance Corporation (ERC), to assume
the county's defense.48° ERC appealed.48'
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, noting, "there was
nothing in the record to indicate that the [c]ounty had actually incurred
expenses on account of claims made against it that would not reimbursed
by others.482 The district court "failed to appreciate that actual, as op-
posed to anticipatory, exhaustion is required before a primary insurer's
duty to defend is extinguished .. . .""' Because USF&G's full policy
limits remained available to indemnify the county, even if the company
held them in escrow, they were not exhausted and ERC could not be
compelled to take over the county's defense.
Because its duty to defend (if any) and duty to indemnify are not
triggered until underlying coverage is properly exhausted, an excess in-
surer may need to discover into settlements within the limits of underly-
ing coverage or within an insured's SIR in order to evaluate its potential
477. Id. at 762.
478. No. 97-16759, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7623 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 1999).
479. See County of Santa Clara, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7623 at *2, 3.
480. See id. at *3 n.3.
481. See id.
482. Id. at *3.
483. Id. at *4 (McKeown, C.J., concurring).
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obligations. At least one court had held, however, that a non-settling ex-
cess insurer has no right to know the terms of a settlement between a
plaintiff and a primary insurer.4" The court in UMC/Stamford, Inc. v.
Allianz Underwriters Insurance Co.485 reasoned that an excess insurer
was not entitled to discover the amount of settlements within the under-
lying primary coverage because that information was irrelevant to the
excess insurer's obligations.486
As long as the underlying liability exceeds the primary limits in a
vertical exhaustion, it does not matter how much the primary [insurer]
paid plaintiffs. If there is any dollar difference between the primary
layer of coverage and the amount of the settlement, plaintiffs will
have to pay that difference before expecting to obtain any reim-
bursement from excess insurance companies since plaintiffs do not
contend that these are 'drop down' policies. It is therefore irrelevant
what the exact dollar figure was in the settlement.
487
The better reasoned position holds that an excess insurer is entitled
to discover the amounts of settlements below its limits and, in the cases
of continuing losses or multiple occurrences, to have those amounts cor-
rectly allocated among policy periods.488 This is a right the carrier needs
to determine whether coverage obligations have been triggered.489 An
excess insurer certainly should be allowed to determine if and when un-
derlying primary insurance is properly exhausted. Any reasons that an
insured might have for attempting to conceal such information ought to
be subordinate to "the parties' contractual rights to pay and be paid only
on the terms and conditions to which they agreed.
49 °
Insureds sometimes purchase liability policies variously described
as "defense within limits" policies, "self-liquidating" policies, or "erod-
ing limits" policies. Under these policies, defense costs reduce the limits
of liability. In other words, every dollar spent on defense is one less dol-
lar available to indemnify the insured.
A key issue is whether payment of defense costs exhausts a self-
liquidating primary policy for excess insurance purposes. Though there
are few cases on point, the answer appears to be "it depends." Where an
umbrella policy or a following form excess policy, provide the excess
coverage, the payment of defense costs may exhaust the primary policy
484. See UMC/Stamford, Inc. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., 647 A.2d 182, 191 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law. Div. 1994).
485. 647 A.2d 182 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994).
486. See id. at 190-91.
487. Id. at 190 (quoting plaintiffs brief).
488. See Home Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 295 (Ct. App. 1996).
489. See Home Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295.
490. Id. at 296.
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and accelerate the excess insurer's potential obligations.49" ' Where a true
excess policy that stands alone is involved, the payment of defense costs
does not occur until the first, i.e., "primary" policy's full sum has been
paid out.
4 92
As a matter of principle, defense costs paid under a self-liquidating
primary policy should not count toward exhaustion unless the excess
carrier knew that its underlying primary policy provided for defense
costs within limits at the time the excess carrier accepted the risk. This is
because self-liquidating policies are a rare exception rather than the
rule.493 An excess carrier that is not specifically told by the insured or its
broker that the underlying primary coverage is self-liquidating rightly
assumes that defense costs will be paid in addition to the primary policy
limits as is industry custom, and prices its policy accordingly.494 Contrary
to some courts' belief,495 an excess insurer may not always be able to
review the actual primary policy before accepting the risk and calculating
its premium. The insured wants seamless primary and excess coverage.
Were an excess insurer to take the time to study a primary policy before
issuing its own policy, the insured would face a coverage gap. A loss
exceeding the insured's primary coverage and occurring before the ex-
cess policy was bound could be devastating; it certainly would defeat the
insured's purpose for purchasing excess coverage.
3. Requiring An Excess Carrier to "Drop Down" in the Face of An
Underlying Insurer's or Self-Insured's Insolvency
It is common for a primary policy to cover a loss fully, such that
excess coverage is never triggered. Similarly, a loss might consume the
insured's primary coverage and even trigger a first layer of excess cover-
age, but not encroach on upper layers of excess coverage. But what if a
primary insurer or an intermediate excess insurer is insolvent? May an
excess carrier be forced to "drop down" and fill the coverage gap created
by the underlying insurer's insolvency?
491. See Coleman Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 960 F.2d 1529, 1530-37 (10th Cir. 1992)
(applying Kansas law).
492. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 974, 974-77 (7th Cir. 1991) (inter-
preting Wisconsin law).
493. See Coleman Co., 960 F.2d at 1536. This point is lost in those jurisdictions that consider
the excess insurer's subjective intent to be irrelevant. See id.
494. Of course, this argument has no force where the same insurance company writes both the
primary and excess policies. There the insurer ought to know the terms of its respective policies.
Additionally, an insurer that bears all of the risk (both primary and excess) ought not to fight itself
over what must be its obligation in any event.
495. See Coleman Co., 960 F.2d at 1536-37.
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The answers to "drop down" questions may be answered by the
terms of the subject excess policy. 96 Unfortunately, many excess policies
do not address whether they drop down to the next lowest level of liabil-
ity when underlying insurers become insolvent.4 97 The focus then shifts
to potentially related policy language, and courts and litigants often find
themselves searching for ambiguities that might require an excess insurer
to drop down.498 It is apparently the majority rule that absent obligatory
policy language, an excess insurer is not required to drop down and
cover that portion of a loss once within an insolvent primary insurer's
coverage,499 nor must it drop down to provide the defense that an insol-
vent primary insurer was obligated to fund."°
The insured in Hoffman Construction Co. v. Fred S. James & Co.5"'
had three layers of coverage: a $50,000 Seaboard Surety primary policy,
a $450,000 intermediate layer of excess coverage provided by Holland-
America, and an umbrella liability policy with Century Insurance. °2 The
plaintiffs suffered a covered loss of $375,000.03 Seaboard paid the first
$50,000, but Holland-America became insolvent and could not pay the
496. See Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Kinder-Care, Inc., 551 So. 2d 286, 287 (Ala. 1989); Denny's
Inc. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 286 Cal. Rptr. 507, 510 (Ct. App. 1991); Domingue v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
619 So.2d 1220, 1223 (La. Ct. App. 1993). See, e.g., Atkinson Dredging Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 836 F. Supp. 341, 347 (E.D. Va. 1993).
497. See, e.g., Newton v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 391 S.E.2d 837, 839-40 (N.C. Ct. App.
1990); See Metro. Leasing, Inc. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 633 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994). Insurers have recognized the problem, such that many policies now include provisions pre-
cluding drop-down coverage. See, e.g., Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630
So. 2d 759, 769 n. 18 (La. 1994) (stating "[tihe current policies now often expressly include anti-drop
down provisions") (citation omitted).
498. See Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Magic City Trucking Serv. Inc., 547 So. 2d 849, 853-56 (Ala.
1989); Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 439, 441-43 (Mass. 1992).
499. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 12 F.3d 92, 95, 97 (7th Cir.
1993); Revco D.S., Inc. v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 791 F. Supp. 1254, 1265 (N.D. Ohio 1991),
affd, 984 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1992); Alaska Elec. Rural Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. INSCO Ltd., 785 P.2d
1193, 1193-94 (Alaska 1990); Maricopa County v. Fed. Ins. Co., 757 P.2d 112, 113 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988); Wells Fargo Bank v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 538 (Ct. App. 1995);
Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d 1074, 1074 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992); S.E. Atl. Cargo
Operators, Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 398 S.E.2d 264, 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Hendrix v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Vickodil v. Lexington Ins. Co., 587
N.E.2d 777, 779 (Mass. 1992); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Employers' of Wausau, 454 N.W.2d
462, 467 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 829
S.W.2d 589, 590-91, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Cent. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 437
N.W.2d 496, 498-500 (Neb. 1989); Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 188, 189
(N.J. 1988); Ambassador Assocs. v. Corcoran, 562 N.Y.S.2d 507 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), affd, 589
N.E.2d 1258 (N.Y. 1992); N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Century Indem. Co., 444 S.E.2d 464, 467, 471
(N.C. Ct. App. 1994); J. Kinderman & Sons, Inc. v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991), affd, 619 A.2d 1058 (Pa. 1993); Rapid City Reg'I Hosp., Inc. v. S.D. Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 436 N.W.2d 565, 567 (S.D. 1989); Emscor, Inc. v. Alliance Ins. Group, 804 S.W.2d 195, 198-
99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
500. See Emscor Mfg., Inc. v. Alliance Ins. Group, 879 S.W.2d 894, 903 (Tex. App. 1994).
501. 836 P.2d 703 (Or. 1992).
502. See Hoffman Constr. Co., 836 P.2d at 704.
503. See id.
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next $325,000.5o4 The plaintiffs then demanded that Century pay the
$325,000 that could not be recovered from Holland-America. °5
The Century excess policy provided that the company would only
be liable for the ultimate net loss of "the amount recoverable under the
underlying insurances" specifically declared.0 6 The plaintiffs argued that
the phrase "amount recoverable under the underlying insurances" re-
quired the umbrella carrier to pay that portion of the loss not recoverable
from insolvent Holland-America."' Century argued that the phrase
meant that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover only for any portion of
the net loss exceeding the limits of the underlying policies." 8 The plain-
tiffs argued essentially that "amount recoverable" meant the amount
"able to be recovered," while the insurer argued that the phrase meant the
"amount capable of recovery."5"
The Hoffman court embraced the insurer's urged interpretation." 0
The court drew support from the "Limit of Liability" section in the Cen-
tury umbrella policy, which specified the circumstances under which the
umbrella policy would drop down.5 1' The policy provided for drop down
coverage where there was reduced primary coverage because of the
payment of claims." 2 By holding that Holland-America's insolvency did
not create drop down coverage, the court was able to give effect to both
provisions, consistent with basic rules of contract interpretation.
5 13
The court next rejected the plaintiffs' interpretation based on the
"Loss Payable" provision in the Century policy." 4 The Loss Payable
provision stated that "[1]iability under this policy with respect to any
occurrence shall not attach unless and until the Insured, or the Insured's
underlying insurer, shall have paid the amount of the underlying limits
on account of such occurrence. 5 5 Again, to accept the plaintiffs' insol-
vency argument would render this provision meaningless and redundant.






507. See Hoffman Constr. Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 836 P.2d 704, 705 (Or. 1992).
508. See Hoffman Constr. Co., 836 P.2d at 705.
509. Id. at 706.
510. See id. at 709.
511. See id. at 707.
512. See id.
513. See Hoffman Constr. Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 836 P.2d 704, 707 (Or. 1992).
514. See. Hoffman Constr. Co., 836 P.2d at 708.
515. Id. at 707-08.
516. See id. at 708.
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Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that the language in the Century pol-
icy's "other insurance" clause required drop down coverage." 7 Like most
"other insurance" clauses, the Century policy provided that it would be
excess over other "valid and collectible" insurance.5"8 That condition, the
plaintiffs argued, demonstrated the insurer's intent to cover all losses
except where other valid and collectible insurance is available to the in-
sured." 9 The court rejected this argument, as well.52°
The problem with the plaintiffs' argument was that the use of the
word "collectible" demonstrated that the parties were aware of that con-
sideration-that concurrent insurance was collectible-and chose not to
separately connect it with the phrase "amount recoverable under the un-
derlying insurances."52' The Hoffman court reasoned that the omission
was designed. 22 The "amount recoverable" provision was expressly in-
tended to recognize the underlying policies specifically stated in the
declarations, while the "other insurance" clause was intended to limit the
umbrella carrier's liability in the event other insurance was available.2 3
A slightly different situation was present in Playtex FP, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Casualty Co. 524 In Playtex, Mission National Insurance, one of
several excess carriers, became insolvent.525 All of the excess insurers
employed following form policies.526
Like the Hoffman plaintiffs, the Playtex plaintiffs argued that
"amount recoverable" meant "real money. 5 27 Because Mission was in-
solvent, the coverage purportedly provided by the Mission policy was
not an amount recoverable.5 28 The excess carriers, on the other hand,
argued that the terms "amount recoverable" and "limits of liability" were
synonymous.2 9 As did the Hoffman court, the Playtex court concluded
that "amount recoverable" referred to specifically scheduled underlying
insurance. The Mission policy did not meet this definition.530
The plaintiffs next turned their attention to the "Maintenance of
Underlying Insurances" requirement in the Mission policy.53' This provi-
517. See id.
518. See id. (emphasis in original).
519. See Hoffman Constr. Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 836 P.2d 704, 708 (Or. 1992).
520. See Hoffman Constr. Co., 836 P.2d at 708.
521. Id.
522. See id.
523. See id. (emphasis added).
524. 622 A.2d 1074 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).
525. See Playtex FP, 622 A.2d at 1075-76.
526. See supra notes 11-13 (explaining that "following form" excess policies are subject to all
agreements, conditions, exclusions and limitations in the underlying policies).
527. See Playtex FP, Inc., 622 A.2d at 1081.
528. See id.
529. See id.
530. See Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d 1074, 1083 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).
531. See Playtex FP, Inc., 622 A.2d at 1083.
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sion required the insured to maintain the scheduled underlying policies in
full force and effect for the duration of the excess policies, except for any
reduction in applicable limits or the aggregate limit.532 If the insured
failed to maintain the underlying policies, Mission agreed to be bound
only to the extent of its obligation were the underlying policies kept in
force.533
The plaintiffs contended that Mission's insolvency caused a reduc-
tion in the underlying limits beyond the insured's control or which was
not the insured's fault."3 Because the excess carriers' policy followed
Mission's form, the excess carriers were obligated to drop down.535 The
insurers contended that any reduction had to be by way of payment of
claims.536 Were that not so, the insurers argued, the condition's purpose
would be eliminated.537 The Playtex court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment.538 The condition in the Mission policy requiring the insured to
maintain its underlying insurance was simply that; it was "clear that the
provision [was] not intended to expand the insured's coverage and force
the excess insurers to drop down." '539
The positions taken by the Hoffman and Playtex courts make sense.
Excess insurance and umbrella policies are relatively inexpensive be-
cause excess insurers are only obligated to pay claims to the extent they
exceed primary coverage.5" Insureds' expectations that excess carriers
drop down in the event of a primary insurer's insolvency are objectively
unreasonable. Insofar as liability insurance is concerned, the purpose of
an excess policy is to protect against third-party claims, not to insure the
solvency of a primary carrier.54 1 An underlying primary insurer's insol-
vency is not an "occurrence." 2 Additionally, because the insured pre-
sumably selected the primary carrier, it is fair to ask the insured to bear
the risk of insolvency. Excess insurers should not bear the risk of the
insolvency of primary insurers they do not select.543 Finally, the term
"collectible," when used in an "other insurance" clause, should never be
held to create an ambiguity as to an excess insurer's coverage in the case
532. See id.
533. See id.
534. See id. at 1085.
535. See id.
536. See Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d 1074, 1085 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).
537. See Playtex FP, Inc., 622 A.2d at 1085.
538. See id.
539. Id.
540. See Alaska Rural Elec. Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. INSCO Ltd., 785 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Alaska
1990); Rivere v. Heroman, 688 So. 2d 1293, 1295 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
541. See Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 748, 750-51 (Alaska
1996).
542. See Zurich-Am. Ins. Co. v. Mead Reinsurance Corp., 555 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334 (App. Div.
1990).
543. See Alaska Rural, 785 P.2d at 1195.
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of a primary insurer's insolvency. In the excess insurance context, an
"other insurance" clause serves to limit the company's liability in the
event insurance other than the scheduled underlying insurance is avail-
able. Where a primary insurer is insolvent there is no "other insurance,"
and the clause never comes into play.'
While Hoffman and Playtex reflect the majority position, Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of San Diego v. Columbia Casualty Co.5" reflects the other
side of the insolvency coin. Coca Cola Bottling also involved the Mis-
sion insolvency and following form policies. As did Playtex, the case
hinged on the "Maintenance of Underlying Insurances" provision in
Section III of the Mission policy.
Columbia argued that because it was excess of the Mission policy,
and therefore was not scheduled as underlying insurance in the Mission
policy, Section III of the Mission policy could not define the coverage
provided by the Columbia policy. 6 The court succinctly disposed of this
argument:
The fundamental difficulty with Columbia's argument is that it re-
quires that Mission bear risks without imposing similar risks on in-
surers whose coverage is in excess of Mission's coverage. Such a dis-
parate risk allocation between primary and excess carriers is incon-
sistent with the "followed form" nature of the insurance Columbia
provided. 'An excess policy generally follows the form of the under-
lying primary coverage and is called >following form' excess cover-
age, i.e., the excess had the same scope of coverage as the primary
policy.'
547
The court next looked to Columbia's policy definition of its lower
limits. 548 The policy provided coverage "where applicable excess of pri-
maries. '549 Because the Columbia policy did not fully define the lower
limits of its coverage, the court returned to the underlying Mission pol-
icy.5 Of course, the Mission policy provided that the lower limit of cov-
erage was the "amount recoverable, 55 a phrase previously determined
by California courts to be ambiguous. 5 2 The Coca Cola Bottling court
thus concluded that Columbia was obligated to drop down. 3
544. See id at 1196.
545. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643 (Ct. App. 1992).
546. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of San Diego, 14 Cal. Rptr, 2d at 645-46.
547. Id. at 646-47 (citation omitted).
548. See id. at 647.
549. See id.
550. See id.
551. See Coca Cola Bottling Co. of San Diego v. Columbia Cas. Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 647
(Ct. App. 1992).
552. See Coca Cola Bottling Co. of San Diego, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645-46.
553. See id. at 647.
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In Rummel v. Lexington Insurance Co, 5 5 4 one of the issues was
whether an excess carrier, Lexington, was obligated to indemnify a bank-
rupt self-insured entity, Circle K, which claimed that it had satisfied its
$250,000 SIR by granting a plaintiff a $500,000 unsecured claim in its
Chapter 11 reorganization. 55 The Lexington policy provided that the
company's liability did not attach "unless and until the Insured's Under-
lying Insurance has been paid or has been held liable to pay the total ap-
plicable underlying limits. '556 The policy further provided that Lexington
would indemnify Circle K against "loss" exceeding the total limits of all
underlying insurance, defining "loss" to include the amounts owed by the
underlying insurance "whether recoverable or not." '557
Lexington contended that its coverage was not triggered until Circle
K paid the limit of its SIR in cash.558 The Rummel court disagreed. The
language in the excess policy providing that Lexington's obligation
kicked in where an underlying policy "has been held liable to pay" re-
futed any claim that an actual cash payment was required to implicate
Lexington's coverage.5 9 Indeed, to interpret the Lexington excess policy
to require actual cash payment in light of the "has been held liable to
pay" language in its insuring agreement would be "absurd."
'5 6
The Rummel court also looked to the policy definition of "loss" in
rejecting Lexington's argument. Again, the policy defined "loss" to in-
clude amounts owed by underlying insurance "whether recoverable or
not."'5 6' This phrase "would most logically be construed by the reasona-
bly intelligent layperson as acknowledging the possibility that recovery
from the underlying insurers may never happen. '562 The same reasoning
applied with equal force to Circle K's SIR.
The court noted that other courts might disagree with its holding,
but reasoned that:
[Plublic policy supported this construction of Lexington's policy. The
debtor in need of financial relief receives the protections granted by
the bankruptcy process. Such benefits were never intended to absolve
third parties of debts they share in common with the debtor. To con-
clude otherwise would be to grant insurers a windfall.563
554. 945 P.2d 970 (N.M. 1997).
555. Rummel, 945 P.2d at 974.
556. See id. at 977.
557. See id. at 978.
558. See id. at 976.
559. See id. at 977.
560. See Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970, 978 (N.M. 1997).






When a loss triggers multiple policies, allocating responsibility for
the loss is important for obvious financial reasons. Allocation disputes
can involve concurrent insurers, consecutive insurers, insurers and in-
sureds, and tortured combinations of them all. Insurers contend that allo-
cation is mandated by the terms of their policies, which specify coverage
periods (typically one year). Thus, in the case of a continuing loss, an
insurer should be allowed to limit its indemnity obligation to damage
occurring during its policy period.5" Insureds argue strenuously against
allocation, fearing that their obligations under SIRs and other gaps in
coverage will leave them responsible for portions of a continuing loss
(so-called "orphan shares").
Insureds generally make two arguments against allocation. The first
involves the standard language in most primary policies by which the
insurer promises to pay "all sums [the insured] should become obligated
to pay [as damages] by reason of specified liabilities, ' 65 or "those sums
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages. "566 In-
sureds argue that because standard policies do not specify that they will
pay "all sums" or "those sums" attributable to damage caused during the
policy period, if any portion of a continuing loss is covered the insurer
must pay the entire loss up to the limits of its coverage. As the Wash-
ington Supreme Court explained in American National Fire Insurance
Co. v. B&L Trucking and Construction Co.567
[Ojnce a policy is triggered, the policy language requires that the in-
surer to pay all sums for which the insured becomes legally obligated,
up to the policy limits. Once coverage is triggered in one or more
policy periods, those policies provide full coverage for all continuing
damage, without any allocation between insurer and insured.568
The "all sums" approach makes an insurer liable for damages and
defense costs attributable to harm outside its policy period.569 "Under any
given policy, the insurer contracted to pay all sums which the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay, not merely some pro rata portion
564. See Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 801, 805-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); See also
Aylward, supra note 439, at 223.
565. See FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Cos., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 475, 497 (Ct. App. 1998);
Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 731 (Minn. 1997); Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v.
B&L Trucking and Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 253 (Wash. 1998).
566. See Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 951 P.2d at 253; 1 MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 1, at
409.
567. 951 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1998).
568. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 951 P.2d at 256.
569. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 919 (Cal. 1997); Arco
Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 61, 69-70 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal granted, 603
N.W.2d 780 (Mich. 1999).
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thereof. 5 7' Each insurer on the risk during a continuing loss thus be-
comes a primary insurer, and the insured is free to select the policy pe-
riod under which it is to be indemnified.17 ' The "all sums" approach is
justified, some courts reason, because the allocation of a loss among in-
surers is irrelevant to each individual insurer's obligation to the insured
under the terms of its policy, 572 and because insurers surely negotiate
their premiums with the possibility of such expansive liability in mind.573
Policyholders' second argument against allocation is cloaked in
terms of joint and several liability. This argument has two variations.
First, an insured may argue that because each of several consecutive in-
surers provides coverage at relevant times, each has an independent obli-
gation to insure the entire lOSS.5 74 Second, an insured may argue that be-
cause it faces joint and several tort liability for the loss for which cover-
age is sought (as in environmental cases), its insurer's liability is also
joint and several. 5  This second approach is unsupported by any ration-
ale.
576
Though the "all sums" and "joint and several" approaches have
been commonly applied,577 they make little sense. Among other things,
they require an incorrect presumption that all damage occurred in one
policy period.578 Insurers are wrongly held liable for damages occurring
outside their policy periods, while insureds, who purposely reduce their
insurance costs at different times by way of SIRs and varying limits,
receive coverage for which they did not bargain.
1. Allocation Formulas or Methods
Because of the scientific complexities that characterize many con-
tinuing losses, as well as the extended period of time that damages may
go undiscovered and the many parties potentially involved, it often is
impractical to allocate damages "as proven," i.e., to hold each insurer
responsible only for those damages occurring during its policy period.579
570. J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993).
571. See J.H. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 508.
572. See FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Cos., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 499-500 (Ct. App. 1998).
573. See FMC Corp., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
574. See Aylward, supra note 439, at 223.
575. See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 750 (Il1. App.
Ct. 1996).
576. See Outboard Marine Corp., 670 N.E.2d at 750 ("We can find no rationale to support the
imposition of joint and several liability upon the insurers simply because [the insured's] liability
arose under CERCLA.").
577. See Monsanto Co. v. C.E. Health Comp. & Liab. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 30, 35 n.6 (Del.
1994) (citing cases).
578. See Hercules Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Nos. 92C-10-105, 90C-FE-195-1-CV, 1998
WL 962089, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 1998).




Some courts therefore allocate losses based on insurers' "time on the
risk." Under the time on the risk method of allocation, a loss is allocated
in proportion to the amount of time that an insurer's policies were in ef-
fect (the numerator) as a percentage of the total years during which the
loss occurred (the denominator).5 80 Allocation according to an insurer's
time on the risk is relatively simple, as the Minnesota Supreme Court
explained in Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. :581
If, for example, contamination occurred over a period of 10 years,
1/10th of the damage would be allocable to the period of time that a
policy in force for 1 year was on the risk and 3/10ths of the damage
would be allocable to the period of time a 3-year policy was in
force."'
Factoring in the triggered insurer's policy limits sometimes modi-
fies the time on the risk method.583 Prorating insurer's indemnity obliga-
tions on the basis of policy limits multiplied by years of coverage is best
understood by way of example: Assume a loss spanning nine years and
$27 million in available insurance and self-insurance. The policies in
effect for years one to three have $2 million limits; the policies in effect
for years four to six have $3 million limits; and in years seven to nine,
the insured has a $4 million SIR. In the case of a loss spanning those nine
years, carriers during the first three years would bear 6/27ths of the loss,
the carriers insuring the next three years would bear 9/27ths of the loss,
and the insured would bear 12/27ths of the loss." Allocating the unin-
sured portion of the loss to the policyholder is fair because the insurers
only agreed to indemnify the policyholder during their respective policy
periods, and an entity that chooses to self-insure or "go bare" ought to
share responsibility for a loss rather than shift responsibility for its
choice to the insurers.8 5
2. Allocation and Excess Insurance
An excess policy typically provides that the insurance company
"will indemnify the insured for the ultimate net loss in excess of the ap-
plicable underlying limit which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages. 586 An excess policy usually defines "ultimate
net loss" as "the sum actually paid" to settle a claim or suit, or to satisfy
580. Courts may allocate liability based on the months insurers were on the risk, rather than
years. See, e.g., Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d 894, 919 (Haw. 1994).
581. See N. States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 657.
582. Id. at 664.
583. See, e.g., Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690,
707-10 (Ct. App. 1996); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 993-94 (N.J. 1994);
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997).
584. See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 994.
585. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 748-49 (Il. App.
Ct. 1996).
586. 1 MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 1, at 623.
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a judgment.587 In these ways excess insurers' indemnity obligations are
different from those of primary insurers. But differences in the language
of an excess policy's insuring agreement from that found in a standard
primary policy do not significantly alter courts' approaches to allocation.
Courts prefer to allocate liability to excess insurers according to their
time on the risk and the relative degree of risk assumed,5 88 although allo-
cation methods may vary.
The New Jersey Supreme Court examined allocation involving ex-
cess insurance policies in Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance
Co.589 In Carter-Wallace, the court expanded on the time on the
risk/relative degree of risk method involving primary insurance it
adopted some four years earlier in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insur-
ance Co.,590 using the same example it employed in Owens-Illinois to
explain its holding.59' That example assumed a nine-year continuous
trigger and $27 million in available indemnity dollars.5 92 The insurers in
years 1-3 provided $2 million in annual coverage, the insurers in years 4-
6 provided annual coverage of $3 million, and in each of the last three
years the policyholder was self-insured up to $4 million.59 3 Carriers in
the first three years would thus bear 6/27ths of the burden (2/27ths per
year), the carriers in the next three years would bear 9/27ths of the bur-
den (3/27ths per year), and the insured would bear 12/27ths of the burden
(4/27ths per year.' 94
The Carter-Wallace court's approach to excess allocation added a
vertical exhaustion component to the time on the risk allocation method
exemplified in Owens-Illinois. That is, after using the time on the risk
method illustrated above to reach a figure for each year, the Carter-
Wallace court embraced the idea of vertically allocating each policy in
effect for a given year, beginning with the primary policy and proceeding
upward through each succeeding excess layer.5 95 The court again ex-
plained its holding by way of example:
Assume that primary coverage for one year was $100,000, first-level
excess insurance totaled $200,000, and second-level excess coverage
was $450,000. If the loss allocated to that specific year was $325,000,
587. Id. at 626.
588. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1999); Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740 (111. App. Ct. 1996), appea, denied, 675
N.E.2d 634 (II1. 1996); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116 (N.J. 1998).
589. 712 A.2d 1116 (N.J. 1998).
590. 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).




595. See id. at 1123-24 (citing Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978
F. Sup. 589, 606 (D.N.J. 1997)).
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the primary insurer would pay $100,000, the first-level excess policy
would be responsible for $200,000, and the second-level excess pol-
icy would pay $25,000.596
The court believed that its approach to allocation involving excess
insurance was appropriate for several reasons. First, it efficiently used
available resources because it neither minimized nor maximized the li-
ability of either primary or excess insurance, thereby promoting cost
efficiency by spreading costs.5 97 Second, it promoted "simple justice" by
differentiating between primary and excess insurance while not permit-
ting excess insurers to avoid their obligations in continuous losses.598
Third, it introduced "a degree of certainty and predictability into the
complex world" of continuous trigger cases. 599
The Colorado Supreme Court recently took up allocation in the ex-
cess insurance context in Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Wallis &
Cos.6° In Public Service, the insured, PSC, sued a London market in-
surer, Wallis, to recover its costs associated with environmental cleanup
of a scrap yard and a landfill.6I The issue ultimately became the alloca-
tion of liability across policy years. 62 PSC's insurance structure spanning
the forty-five years at issue was complex.60 3 All of the Wallis policies at
issue were excess policies; however, for 22 years PSC did not carry pri-
mary insurance, such that the Wallis policies were excess to SIRs.
6°4
PSC also had several different layers of excess coverage. Thus, some
Wallis policies were excess to other Wallis policies. 5 Finally, some
years PSC had more than one excess policy insuring the same layer of
risk, such that in any given year Wallis and another excess insurer issued
concurrent policies at the same level.6°6 The proportion of the risk borne
by each concurrent insurer was expressed as a percentage in the
policies.6 7
The Public Service court employed a continuous trigger, " leaving
PSC and Wallis to argue over the method of allocation. PSC argued that
it should be allowed to "pick and choose" which of its many triggered
policies may be held liable for the entire cost of remediation of the envi-
ronmental damage at a particular site, reasoning that such an approach
596. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116, 1124 (N.J. 1998).
597. See Carter-Wallace, Inc., 712 A.2d at 1124.
598. See iid. (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994)).
599. See id.
600. 986 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1999).
601. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 927-28.
602. See id. at 930.
603. See id. at 935.
604. See id.
605. See id.
606. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 935 (Colo. 1999).
607. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 935-36.
608. See id. at 939.
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was required by Wallis' promise in its policies to pay "any and all sums"
that PSC was obligated to pay as damages.6" PSC also argued that be-
cause the "all sums" or "pick and choose" approach implicates only one
policy period, it could only be required to exhaust one SIR.61°
Wallis argued that the "all sums" approach was inadequate because
it would make it liable for harm occurring outside its policy periods,
contrary to the language of its policies.61' Wallis urged the court to adopt
a time on the risk method of calculation, whereby the ultimate net loss
for each site would be allocated across all years from the onset of envi-
ronmental damage until its discovery.6 2 Once the amount of liability was
determined for each year, the applicable SIR would be deducted.613
Wallis would bear any remaining liability up to its policy limit.614 Where
both Wallis and another insurer issued concurrent excess policies to PSC
at the same layer or level, they would share the liability attributable to
that level of risk in proportion to the degree of risk that each accepted.6 5
The Public Service court rejected the "all sums" approached urged
by PSC because it "creates a false equivalence between an insured that
has purchased insurance coverage continuously for many years and an
insured that has purchased only one year of insurance coverage. '61 6 In
contrast, time on the risk allocation treats such hypothetical insureds
differently, in accordance with the vastly different insurance protection
they purchased.617 The court further rejected PSC's argument that the "all
sums" approach was appropriate because the Wallis policies were am-
biguous, because the "all sums" or "pick and choose" approach did not
represent a reasonable interpretation of the policies. 61 8 A policy can only
be ambiguous when both the competing interpretations are reasonable.
Finally, the court rejected PSC's argument that applications of the "all
sums" or "pick and choose" approach was necessary to protect its rea-
sonable expectations under its polices.
At the time PSC purchased each individual insurance policy, we
doubt that PSC could have had a reasonable expectation that each
single policy would indemnify PSC for liability related to property
damage occurring due to events taking palace years before and years
after the term of each ... [T]here is no logic to support the notion one
single insurance policy among 20 or 30 years worth of policies could
609. See id. at 937.
610. See id.
611. See id.
612. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 937 (Colo. 1999).
613. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 937.
614. See id.
615. See id.
616. See id. at 939-40.
617. See id. at 940.
618. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 940 (Colo. 1999).
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be expected to be held liable for the entire time period. Nor is it rea-
sonable to expect that a single-year policy would be liable, for exam-
ple, if the insured carried no insurance at all for the other years cov-
ered by the occurrence.
619
The Public Service court thus held that:
[W]here property damage is gradual, long-term, and indivisible, [a]
trial court should make a reasonable estimate of the... "occurrence"
that is fairly attributable to each year by dividing the total amount of
liability by the number of years at issue. The court should then allo-
cate liability to each policy year, taking into account primary and ex-
cess coverage, SIRs, policy limits, and other insurance on the risk...
620
Because it was remanding the case for retrial, the Public Service
Court did not apply time on the risk allocation to the jury verdicts below.
Rather, it presented some general guidelines for the trial court to follow,
emphasizing that they were flexible standards that the trial court had the
discretion to adapt and modify depending on the circumstances of a par-
ticular case.62'
In the court's view, the most equitable method of time on the risk
allocation also takes into account the degree of risk that insurers
assume.622 Thus, where damages cannot be precisely attributed to succes-
sive insurance polices:
[T]he total amount of damages should be divided by the total number
of years to yield the amount of damage that is fairly attributable to
each year. For example, if an insured's liability for a decade of pollu-
tion is one million dollars, then one tenth of the total liability, or
$100,000, is attributable to each policy-year.
Within each policy-year, the allocation of that $100,000 of li-
ability depends on the structure of the insurance. Primary insurance,
or alternatively, any SIRs, must first be exhausted. If liability remains
after that, then policies in the first layer of excess for that year are re-
quired to respond, then policies in the second layer of excess, and so
on.
6 23
When there are two or more policies within the same layer of ex-
cess, the Public Service court reasoned, the carriers should share the loss
according to the degree of risk they assumed.624 Returning to its ten year,
$1 million loss example, the court again illustrated its approach.
619. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 940 (citation omitted).
620. Id.
621. See id. at 941.
622. See id.
623. Id.
624. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 941 (Colo. 1999).
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[S]uppose the insured in the above example has an SIR of $20,000
and then two excess insurance policies from different insurers in the
first layer of excess. Each of these excess policies indemnifies the in-
sured for losses in excess of $20,000 and up to a $50,000 limit of to-
tal loss, with one insurer assuming 70% of the risk in that excess
layer and the other insurer assuming 30% of the risk. Under these cir-
cumstances, the insured would absorb the first $20,000 of the total
$100,000 liability. Of the remaining $80,000, only $30,000 would be
covered by the two insurers in this first layer of excess. The insurer
who had assumed 70% of the risk would pay $21,000, while the in-
surer who had assumed 30% of the risk would pay $9,000. The re-
maining $50,000 of liability would be allocated to the subsequent
layers of excess, or would be absorbed by the insured if the insured
were only insured up to a total loss of $50,000 for that year.
625
In allocating liability between concurrent excess insurers as it did,
the court held that the carriers were required to indemnify the insured for
their policy limits minus the insured's SIR, based upon the ultimate net-
loss language in the Wallis policies.626
In offering the example it did, the court did not mean that the degree
of risk should not be taken into account when successive policies have
different liability limits, as some courts have done.627 Rather, the amount
of liability that is initially attributed to each year is independent of the
policy limits that may be in effect for any given year.628 Once the policy
limits are reached in any given year, the insured must bear the remaining
loss in accordance with its business decision to purchase that particular
amount of coverage.629
C. Applying "Other Insurance" Principles to Allocation Disputes
"Other insurance" refers only to two or more policies insuring the
same risk and the same interest, for the benefit of the same person, dur-
ing the same period.63 ° "Other insurance" clauses in policies only operate
when there is concurrent coverage.63' Such clauses are not intended to
625. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 941-42.
626. See id. at 942 n. 19.




630. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 643 So. 2d 551, 561 (Ala. 1994); Nolt v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 617 A.2d 578, 579-84 (Md. 1993); Merch. & Bus. Men's Mut. Ins. v.
Savemart, Inc., 624 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (App. Div. 1995); Harstead v. Diamond State Ins. Co., 723
A.2d 179, 182 (Pa. 1999); S.C. Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 489 S.E.2d 200, 202
(S.C. 1997); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Griffin, 888 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
631. See Richmond, supra note 436, at 1376.
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allocate liability among successive insurers.632 Consecutive policies can-
not constitute "other insurance" because while they may, insure the same
type of risk, they do not insure the same risk.633 Moreover, to enforce
"other insurance" clauses among consecutive policies would unfairly
make insurers liable for damages occurring outside their policy
periods.63
Concurrent policies insuring a person for the same risk and interest
can be the product of design or coincidence. For example, a business
may insist that it be named as an additional insured on a contractor's
CGL policy. It is therefore covered under its own policy and under the
contractor's policy. A general contractor typically requires a subcontrac-
tor to make it an additional insured on the subcontractor's liability policy,
thereby making at least two insurers potentially responsible for a loss.
635
A health care professional may carry malpractice coverage and at the
same time be insured under a hospital's liability policy. 63 6 A person who
is involved in an accident while driving the automobile of another is cov-
ered as a named insured under a personal automobile policy, as well as
being insured under the policy of the owner.637 Of course, concurrent
coverage can exist at both primary and excess levels.
638
When two or more concurrent insurers cover the same interest and
the same risk, and one insurer is compelled to pay an entire loss, the
paying insurer may be entitled to recover some portion of its expenditure
from the other insurers. 611 "Each insurer has an individual right to recov-
ery."'  An insurer's right to recover from another carrier on the same risk
cannot be contractual, because there is no contractual relationship be-
tween them.64 "Other insurance" clauses in concurrent policies do not
create a contractual right allowing insurers to recover from one
632. See Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 61,70 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998), appeal granted, 603 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. 1999); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650
A.2d 974, 991 (N.J. 1994).
633. See Richmond, supra note 436, at 1376 (emphasis added).
634. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 750 (I11. App. Ct.
1996); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 859 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
635. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 677 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div.
1998), affd, 717 N.E.2d 1077 (N.Y. 1999).
636. See, e.g., Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Am. Cas. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 560 (Ct. App. 1999); Am.
Cas. Co. v. PHICO Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 91 (Pa. 1994).
637. See, e.g., Ryan v. Knoller, 695 A.2d 990 (R.I. 1997).
638. See, e.g., Bosco v. Bauermeister, 571 N.W.2d 509 (Mich. 1997).
639. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. James J. Benes & Assocs., Inc., 593 N.E.2d 1087, 1090 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992). It logically follows that if the insured interests and risks are not identical, there is no
right to contribution. See Hall v. Country Cas. Ins. Co., 562 N.E.2d 640, 644 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
640. Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Am. Cas. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 560, 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(discussing contribution).
641. See N. Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1992); Gould, Inc.
v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 585 A.2d 16, 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 509
N.W.2d 274, 275-76 (S.D. 1993).
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another.42 Courts apportioning a loss among or between concurrent in-
surers therefore rely on the equitable principle that "[o]ne who pays
money for the benefit of another is entitled to be reimbursed." 3 Some
jurisdictions allow concurrent insurers to recover from one another under
contribution theory, 64 while others apply equitable subrogation. 645  Still
other courts apparently mix contribution and subrogation, or allow re-
covery on either approach. 46
Concurrent insurers' contribution or subrogation rights are not
purely equitable. The specific means by which liability is allocated be-
tween or among concurrent insurers is determined "not by an adjustment
of equities, but by the provisions of the contracts which [the insurers]
made."67 Hence, "other insurance" clauses in liability policies are sig-
nificant.
642. See State Farm Ins. Co. v. At. Mut. Ins. Co., 672 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to
enforce method of sharing contained in one carrier's "other insurance" clause on the other concurrent
insurer).
643. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 408 P.2d 198, 203 (Or. 1965); See also
Fire Ins. Exch. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 141 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting N. Ins.
Co., 955 F.2d at 1360).
644. See MIC Prop. & Cas. Ins. Corp. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 573, 576-77 (10th Cir. 1993)
(applying Oklahoma law); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Am. Fain. Mut. Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 834, 835-36 (8th Cir.
1992) (applying Missouri law); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 643 So. 2d 551, 561-62 (Ala.
1994); Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Am. Cas. Co., 903 P.2d 609, 610-11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 301 (Ct. App. 1998); Colonial Ins. Co. v. Am.
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 796, 801 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); Cincinnati Cos. v. W. Am. Ins.
Co., 701 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ill. 1998) (quoting cases); Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Health Care Ins. Exch.,
588 A.2d 1275, 1277-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609
N.E.2d 506, 513-14 (N.Y. 1993); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 470
S.E.2d 556, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); J. H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d
502, 509 (Pa. 1993); TRW-Title Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 832 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991).
645. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 792 P.2d 749, 752-54
(Ariz. 1990); State v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 879 P.2d 1111, 1114-15 (Idaho 1994); Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 677 N.Y.S.2d 105, 110 (App. Div. 1998), affd, 717 N.E.2d 1077 (N.Y.
1999); N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Century Indem. Co., 444 S.E.2d 464, 472 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
Unisun Ins. Co. v. Hertz Rental Corp., 436 S.E.2d 182, 186 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993); CNA Lloyds of
Tex. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 902 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 137-38 (Utah 1997); Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 614
A.2d 385, 387 (Vt. 1992).
646. See, e.g., Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741, 747-48 (Colo. 1992);
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 586 A.2d 567, 569-70 (Conn. 1991).
647. W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Kan. Ct. App.
1988), affd, 775 P.2d 176 (Kan. 1989); accord Isler v. Federated Guar. Mut. Ins. Co., 567 So. 2d
1264, 1265 (Ala. 1990); Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prods. Sales & Marketing, Inc., 93 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 364, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 593 N.E.2d
1242, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App.), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 605 N.E.2d 162 (Ind.
1992); State Auto. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 444 S.E.2d 504, 507 (S.C. 1994); Am. Concept
Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 467 N.W.2d 480, 482 (S.D. 1991).
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1. Excess Insurance Versus Primary Policies with Excess "Other
Insurance" Clauses
Liability insurance policies may contain any one of several "other
648insurance" clauses, one of which is an "excess clause." An excess
"other insurance" clause provides that the insurer's liability is limited to
the amount of the loss exceeding all other valid and collectible
insurance,649 up to the insurer's policy limits. A typical excess clause
reads: "This insurance is excess over any other valid and collectible in-
surance, except insurance written specifically to cover as excess over the
limits of liability that apply in this policy. '650 When two policies both
contain an excess "other insurance" clause, most courts treat the excess
clauses as mutually repugnant and prorate the loss between the compet-
ing insurers.65 1
Excess policies clearly differ in purpose from primary policies con-
taining excess "other insurance" clauses, such that a prorated loss be-
tween an excess insurer and a primary insurer seeking excess status by
virtue of its "other insurance" clause is improper.652 The nature or pur-
pose of excess and umbrella policies, and their relationship with primary
policies containing excess "other insurance" clauses, are succinctly de-
scribed in Oelhafen v. Tower Insurance Co. :653
Umbrella carriers are not primary insurers that attempt to limit a por-
tion of their risk by describing it as "excess." Umbrella policies are
not devices for an insurer to escape responsibility...
We also note that the intent of umbrella policies to serve a different
function from primary policies with excess clauses is reflected in the
rate structures of the two types of policies. In general, umbrella policy
premiums are relatively small in relation to the amount of risk "so
that the company cannot be expected to prorate with other excess
coverages; and public policy should not demand that this be done."
654
Excess and umbrella policies are therefore regarded as true excess cover-
age over and above all primary policies, including those with excess
648. See generally Richmond, supra note 436, at 1379-87.
649. See O'Brien v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 669 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Conn. 1996) (dis-
cussing excess clause in context of uninsured motorist coverage).
650. See Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 578 N.W.2d 670, 671 (Iowa 1998)
(quoting Farm Bureau "other insurance" clause).
651. See Richmond, supra note 436, at 1389.
652. See Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 467-68
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 121 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
653. 492 N.W.2d 321 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
654. Oelhafen 492 N.W.2d. at 324 (citations omitted); See also Reliance Nat'l Indem. Co. v.
Gen. Star Indem. Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 639 (Ct. App. 1999).
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"other insurance" clauses. 655  The presence of an excess "other insur-
ance" clause in a primary policy does not transform that policy into an
excess policy vis-A-vis a second carrier providing true excess or umbrella
coverage.656
Although a primary policy with an excess "other insurance" clause
and a true excess policy are not equivalents, and an excess carrier in that
situation should not be required to share in the primary insurer's defense
or indemnity obligations, primary insurers routinely argue for excess
insurers' participation at a primary level for the obvious economic ad-
vantage that comes with sharing a loss pro rata instead of bearing it
alone. If there is a landmark case in this area, it is Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.,657 in which a Texas court
applied basic excess insurance principles to complex facts.
Hillyer involved an automobile accident in which Elizabeth Hillyer
was injured.658 She was a passenger in a jeep driven by Steve Kennedy
and owned by Henry Taub. Liberty Mutual insured Kennedy, with policy
limits of $100,000 per person per accident. 659 Taub had two policies:
American General Insurance Company provided a family automobile
policy with $100,000 limits, and he had a $1,000,000 umbrella policy
with United States Fire.6 ' There was no dispute that the United States
Fire policy was excess over the American General policy. The United
States Fire policy expressly provided that it was excess above a sched-
uled $100,000 automobile policy.66'
655. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 298, 300-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(applying New York law); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 59, 62-64 (W.D.
Okla. 1990) (applying Arkansas law) (citing 8A APPLEMAN, INS. LAW & PRACTICE § 4904.85
(1981)); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.. 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing 8A
APPLEMAN, INS. LAW & PRACTICE § 4904.85 (1981); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 474 S.E.2d 78, 80 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 689
N.E.2d 186, 188-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); N.H. Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 696 N.E.2d 22, 25 (il1.
App. Ct. 1998); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 609 N.W.2d 538, 540-41 (Iowa
2000); Rivere v. Heroman, 688 So. 2d 1293, 1295 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Bosco v. Bauermeister, 571
N.W.2d 509, 519 (Mich. 1997); Smith v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 977 S.W.2d 291, 293-95
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 300, 302-303 (R.I. 1992);
Oelhafen, 492 N.W.2d at 324 (citing 8A APPLEMAN, INS. LAW & PRACTICE § 4904.85 (1981).
656. See LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm & City Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 1992)
("A primary insurance provider cannot hide behind an excess insurance clause in its other insurance'
provision to require an umbrella insurer to cover liability for its insured."); Smith, 977 S.W.2d at 294
("A primary insurer cannot use an other insurance' clause to require an umbrella carrier to share in its
liability.").
657. 590 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App. 1979).
658. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d at 784.
659. See id.
660. See id.
661. See id. at 784-85.
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Hillyer's personal injury claim was settled for $250,000.662 Ameri-
can General and Liberty Mutual each paid .$ 100,000, and United States
Fire paid the remaining $50,000.663 Liberty Mutual then sued United
States Fire to determine their respective obligations.6 " The trial court
held that Liberty Mutual was entitled to recover none of its settlement
expenditure from United States Fire, and Liberty Mutual appealed.665
The Liberty Mutual policy was not declared underlying insurance in
the United States Fire policy schedules.6 66 The only provision in the
United States Fire policy applicable to Liberty Mutual, therefore, was its
"other insurance" clause statement that it was excess over any other valid
and collectible insurance, and would not contribute with such other in-
surance.667 The Liberty Mutual policy, however, contained an "other in-
surance" clause making its coverage excess in the event its insured was
involved in an accident while driving a non-owned automobile. 668 The
subject accident thus fell squarely within Liberty Mutual's excess "other
insurance" clause.669
Liberty Mutual argued that its excess clause and the excess clause in
the United States Fire policy were mutually repugnant.67" Accordingly,
the two policies provided concurrent second-layer coverage and Hillyer's
loss should be prorated based on their respective policy limits. 671 The
court rejected this superficially appealing argument:
It is true that each of the policies has an "other insurance" clause that
apparently limits coverage in the fortuitous circumstance of the pres-
ence of other validly subsisting coverage, but an examination of the
purpose of the policies dictates the resolution of this dispute. Liberty
Mutual's policy generally affords primary coverage; its coverage be-
comes excess only because of the presence of a non-owned vehicle.
United States Fire's policy remains excess in all events. Thus it is ap-
parent that the intent of all parties to the policies is for United States
Fire's policy to remain an umbrella policy, and for Liberty Mutual's
coverage to underlie it ... Had Liberty Mutual issued its policy as it
did, and United States Fire had issued its policy to Kennedy instead
662. See id. at 784.
663. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1979).
664. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d at 784.
665. See id.
666. See id. at 785.
667. See id.
668. See id.
669. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1979).
670. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d at 785.
671. See id.
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of to Taub, there would be no question that Liberty would be liable to
the full extent of its limits.
6 72
The Michigan Supreme Court carefully and correctly resolved a
dispute between concurrent primary and umbrella insurers in Bosco v.
Bauermeister.673 Bosco arose out of a truck-bicycle accident in which
Eric Bosco was killed.674 Defendant Chris Bauermeister was driving a
truck owned by Kenneth Cook while in the course of his employment
with Flint Canvas Company. 675 The Bosco estate's suit resulted in a dam-
age award exceeding $1,000,000.676 That led to a dispute between the
insurers involved.6 77 Four insurers had written five liability policies cov-
ering the various defendants. 67 Those included: (1) a Continental Insur-
ance policy with $500,000 limits issued to Cook; (2) a USAA automobile
policy with $100,000 limits insuring Bauermeister; (3) a $1,000,000
USAA personal umbrella policy insuring Bauermeister; (4) a Franken-
muth Mutual policy with $250,000 limits issued to Flint Canvas; and (5)
an Auto-Owners Insurance executive umbrella policy with $1,000,000
limits issued to Cook.679
The Continental policy issued to Cook was previously determined to
be primary and was not at issue in Bosco.68" Frankenmuth settled with the
plaintiff for $55,000 of its $250,000 policy limits, thereby extinguishing
its potential liability for the remaining $195,000.61 USAA voluntarily
paid the full $100,000 limits of its primary automobile liability policy
insuring Bauermeister.682 The plaintiff then pursued a garnishment ac-
tion against USAA and Auto-Owners with respect to their obligations
under their umbrella policies issued to Bauermeister and Cook, respec-
tively. 683 All parties to the garnishment action moved for summary judg-
ment.6 4
The trial court held that there were three layers of coverage: (1) the
primary coverage afforded by Continental in the amount of $500,000; (2)
excess "other insurance" coverage provided by Frankenmuth ($250,000)
and USAA ($100,000); and (3) the true excess or umbrella policies is-
672. Id. (citation omitted).
673. 571 N.W.2d 509 (Mich. 1997).





679. See Bosco v. Bauermeister, 571 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Mich. 1997).
680. See Bosco, 571 N.W.2d at 511 (citing Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 537







sued by USAA and Auto-Owners (each with $1,000,000 limits). 685 Thus,
there was $850,000 in primary insurance that had to be exhausted before
the indemnity provisions of the umbrella policies were triggered. The
trial court also held that the plaintiff could not recover the $195,000 por-
tion of the Frankenmuth policy that he did not exhaust by agreement.686
The trial court required that the primary coverage be exhausted be-
fore the umbrella policies would be required to contribute to the loss.687 It
then prorated liability between Auto-Owners and USAA under their um-
brella policies for the portion of the judgment exceeding the limits of the
three liability policies.688 A lower appellate court reversed the trial
court.
68 9 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the Frankenmuth
policy, which contained an excess "other insurance" clause, was similar
to the USAA and Auto-Owners umbrella policies, such that the three
policies "were responsible pro rata" for that portion of the loss not paid
under the Continental and USAA primary policies.69" The case then
made its way to the Michigan Supreme Court.
The Bosco court was required to differentiate between the Franken-
muth policy, which was a primary policy with an excess "other insur-
ance" clause, and the concurrent umbrella policies. The court first con-
trasted the Frankenmuth policy with the Auto-Owners umbrella policy.
691
In doing so, it rejected the plaintiffs argument that the Auto-Owners
policy should operate on the same level with the Frankenmuth policy
because the "other insurance" clause in the Auto-Owners policy did not
specifically make its coverage excess over other excess policies.69 2 The
court reasoned that "the fact that a policy is issued as an umbrella policy
at rates reflecting the reduced risk insured indicates the intent that the
policy is excess over other excess policies. ' 693 The Frankenmuth policy
was a primary policy with an excess "other insurance" clause that oper-
ated in limited circumstances.694 The presence of that excess clause did
not change the Frankenmuth policy's nature and function.695
With respect to the USAA umbrella policy, the plaintiff argued that
the Frankenmuth policy should prorate with it because the USAA policy
defined primary insurance as those policies listed in the declarations, and
685 See Bosco v. Bauermeister, 571 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Mich. 1997).
686. See Bosco, 571 N.W.2d at 511.
687. See id.
688. See id. at 512.
689. See id.
690. See id. at 513.
691. See Bosco v. Bauermeister, 571 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Mich. 1997).
692. See Bosco, 571 N.W.2d at 514.
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the only policy listed there was the USAA primary policy.696 The Bosco
court disagreed, again based on the policies' differing nature.
Plaintiffs analysis is inherently flawed because the Frankenmuth
policy is not written as a "true" excess policy. Only the existence of
the Continental policy triggers the Frankenmuth policy "coincidental"
excess coverage clause. Its basic nature (a primary automobile policy)
does not change ... The basic purpose and nature of an insurance
policy does not change, even if its coverage may change under certain
limited circumstances.
697
The court further distinguished between primary policies with excess
"other insurance" insurance clauses (i.e., the Frankenmuth policy), which
it described as "coincidental excess" coverage, and true excess policies
(i.e., the USAA and Auto-Owners umbrella policies).
The Frankenmuth policy excess coverage availability in certain cir-
cumstances does not make it "true" excess coverage like an umbrella
policy because the Frankenmuth policy excess coverage is triggered
only upon the circumstances of the accident, while the umbrella poli-
cies are written to be excess over any underlying coverage. If there
had been no other primary policy, the Frankenmuth policy would
have been primary, regardless of the "coincidental" excess insurance
clause, unlike the USAA and Auto-Owners umbrella policies.
698
The court observed that the "defining character" of a primary policy
even one with an excess "other insurance" clause is that the insurer's
obligation attaches immediately upon the occurrence of an insured
event.699 Under an umbrella policy, on the other hand, liability does not
immediately attach upon an occurrence. Rather, liability under a true
excess or umbrella policy attaches only after the limits of all underlying
primary policies have been exhausted.' 00
The Bosco court next looked at the disparity in the premiums
charged by Frankenmuth, and USAA and Auto-Owners.0 An examina-
tion of the respective insurers' premiums reflected the intent that the um-
brella policies served a different function.7" 2 The premiums charged for
the USAA and Auto-Owners umbrella policies were significantly lower
than the Frankenmuth policy premium.703 While not dispositive, the dis-
696. See id.
697. Bosco v. Bauermeister, 571 N.W.2d 509, 514-15 (Mich. 1997) (citation omitted).
698. Bosco, 571 N.W.2d at 516.
699. See id.
700. See id.
701. See id. at 517.
702. See id.
703. See Bosco v. Bauermeister, 571 N.W.2d 509, 517-18 (Mich. 1997).
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parity in premiums was evidence that the USAA and Auto-Owners um-
brella policies were intended to insure a more remote level of risk.7"
Finally, the court examined the parties' reasonable expectations.
Because the dispute was one between insurers, the court focused on the
insurers' reasonable expectations rather than on the reasonable expecta-
tions of the insureds. 70 5 The Auto-Owners and USAA policies were
written to be excess over any underlying insurance under all circum-
stances.7°6 Moreover, the Frankenmuth policy was not written to be pro-
rated with true excess policies.7 7 Thus, the insurers' reasonable expecta-
tions compelled the conclusion that there should be three tiers of cover-
age: primary, "coincidental" excess and "true" excess.70 8
The Bosco court concluded that a primary policy with an excess
"other insurance" clause must be exhausted before a true excess policy
can be applied to a loss. °9 The Michigan Supreme Court therefore re-
versed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court judgment.71°
2. Allocating Liability Between Concurrent Excess Insurers
Courts must seldom prorate liability between concurrent excess
insurers. Generally, courts should attempt to reconcile competing "other
insurance" clauses in excess and umbrella policies just as though the
policies were primary.71 1 The fact that concurrent policies are excess
rather than primary does not change the fact that they are operating on
the same plane or at the same level.
In Mission Insurance Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.,
712
Mission Insurance issued a $1,000,000 umbrella policy to the lessor of a
vehicle. 713 A lessee's employee wrecked the vehicle.74 The lessee was
insured under a "Commercial Comprehensive Catastrophe Liability Pol-




708. See id. at 519.
709. See Bosco v. Bauermeister, 571 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Mich. 1997).
710. See Bosco, 571 N.W.2d at 519-20.
711. See, e.g., Fire Ins. Exch. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 141 (Ct. App. 1995)
(deeming excess "other insurance" clauses in umbrella policies mutually repugnant and ordering
proration); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 689 N.E.2d 1355, 1358-59 (Mass. App. Ct.
1998) (same); Am. Cas. Co. v. PHICO Ins. Co., 702 A.2d 1050,1053-65 (Pa. 1997) (deeming "other
insurance" clauses in excess policies mutually repugnant and prorating loss by equal shares); United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Underwriters at Interest, No. 14-98-00234-CV, 2000 WL 332718, at *2 (Tex.
Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2000) (holding that excess "other insurance" clauses in umbrella policies were
mutually repugnant).
712 517 N.E.2d 463 (Mass. 1988).
713. See Mission Ins. Co., 517 N.E.2d at 468.
714. Seeid. at 464.
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icy" issued by U.S. Fire with $3,000,000 limits.715 Both policies con-
tained excess "other insurance" clauses which stated that they provided
coverage in excess of all other valid and collectible insurance.716 Neither
company's policy was identified in the other's schedule of underlying
policies.717 There was no dispute that, in the absence of "other insur-
ance," each of the policies covered the loss.
718
Mission and two primary insurers settled a tort claim arising out of
the accident.719 Mission then sued U.S. Fire seeking a declaration that
U.S. Fire had to contribute to the settlement.72° U.S. Fire won summary
judgment, asserting that its coverage was excess to Mission's policy, and
that it need contribute nothing until Mission's policy was exhausted. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed.721
The Mission court determined that both policies created "umbrella-
type excess insurance,, 722 rather than the owner's policy being primary,
as U.S. Fire contended.723 The court then turned to the conflict between
the two competing excess "other insurance" clauses, adopting the major-
ity approach that excess clauses are mutually repugnant.724 The court
required both insurers to prorate the loss by equal shares.725
In reaching this conclusion, the Mission court rejected U.S. Fire's
argument that Mission's failure to state in its limit of liability clause that
its coverage was excess of all other collectible insurance, as it provided
in its "other insurance" clause, created a fatal ambiguity.72 6 The court
reasoned that it would be clear to Mission's insured that the policy pro-
vided excess coverage.727 The only colorable ambiguity resulted from a
comparison of the Mission limit of liability clause with the correspond-
ing clause in the U.S. Fire policy. Creating an "ambiguity" by comparing
Mission's policy with a separate unrelated document (the U.S. Fire pol-
icy) did not justify construing Mission's policy other than as written.728
715. See id. at 468.
716. See id. at 464.
717. See id.
718. See Mission Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 517 N.E.2d 463,464 (Mass. 1988).
719. See Mission Ins. Co., 517 N.E.2d at 464.
720. See id.
721. See id.
722. See id. at 467.
723. See id. at 464-66.
724. See Mission Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 517 N.E.2d 463,467 (Mass. 1988).
725. See Mission Ins. Co., 517 N.E.2d at 468.





V. MALPRACTICE SUITS AGAINST DEFENSE COUSEL
Malpractice claims by insurance companies against defense attor-
neys are on the rise.729 Though primary insurers have for some time been
willing to sue the defense attorneys they hire, and their right to sue de-
fense counsel for malpractice is acknowledged in various jurisdictions,73
excess insurers now are willing to pursue defense counsel when verdicts
exceed primary limits. Excess insurers have sued defense counsel on
both direct duty and equitable subrogation theories.'
Why the rise in malpractice claims by excess insurers against de-
fense counsel? In some ways, such claims make little sense. An excess
insurer has no direct relationship with the defense attorneys it sues; it did
not retain them, nor did it pay for their services.732 An excess insurer
does not share an attorney-client relationship with the defense attorneys
that a primary carrier hires. Yet this very detachment may actually en-
courage malpractice claims, for an aggrieved excess carrier may have no
continuing business relationship with defense counsel, such that loyalty
and the perspective that comes with judging many cases as compared to
one are no bar to litigation. Additionally, as cost-conscious liability in-
surers have seen their litigation expenses rise in recent years, the possi-
bility of recovering some portion of an excess verdict or settlement from
other sources has driven insurers to look to defense counsel in certain
circumstances.733
A. Actions by Excess Carriers Allowed
Courts that allow an excess insurer to sue defense counsel hired by a
primary insurer for malpractice typically hold that the excess insurer is
equitably subrogated to the insured's rights against the attorneys.7" The
729. See Donald L. Myles, Jr. & Kathleen L. Wieneke, Attorney Malpractice in Claims Han-
dling & Settlement Strategy: Avoiding the Road to Liability, 47 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 247,
247 (1997); Shaun M. Baldwin & Lisa C. Breen, Malpractice Claims By Primary and Excess Insur-
ers: Is the Honeymoon Over?, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 18, 18 (1995).
730. See, e.g., Am. Int'l Adjustment Co. v. Galvin, 86 F.3d 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying
Indiana law); Mutuelles Unies v. Kroll & Linstrom, 957 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1992); Bohna v. Hughes,
Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, 828 P.2d 745 (Alaska 1992); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 24 (Ct. App. 1999); Pa. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Sikes, 590 So. 2d 1051
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Mid-Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 587 N.E.2d
81 (111. App. Ct. 1992); Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991).
731. See Myles & Wieneke, supra note 729, at 253-54; Baldwin & Breen, supra note 729, at
18.
732. See Baldwin & Breen, supra note 729, at 22.
733. See id. at 19.
734. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1019-22
(N.D. Il. 1998) (interpreting Illinois law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Am. Transit Ins. Co., 977 F. Supp. 197
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (interpreting New York law); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843
S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1992).
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leading case in this area is American Centennial Insurance Co. v. Canal
Insurance Co.
7 35
In American Centennial, General Rent-A-Car was sued for injuries
and death allegedly attributable to a defective tire on one of its rental
cars.73 6 At the time of the accident, General was insured under three poli-
cies.737 Canal Insurance provided primary coverage up to $100,000.738 A
first level excess insurer, First State, insured General from $100,000 up
to $1,000,000. American Centennial provided an additional $3,000,000
in excess coverage above the First State policy.7 39 Canal defended the
suit and hired counsel for General. Because defense counsel allegedly
mishandled the suit, the insurers were forced to settle for $3,700,000.
First State and American Centennial then sued Canal and its chosen de-
fense counsel on a number of theories, including negligence.74 °
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, hold-
ing that all of the excess carriers' claims were barred by the statute of
limitations, and further finding that defense counsel owed no duty to
First State or American Centennial.741 A lower appellate court affirmed
the trial court's judgment on the malpractice claims based on the attor-
neys' statute of limitations defense.74 2 The Texas Supreme Court granted
review.743
The American Centennial court determined that the excess insurers'
malpractice claims against defense counsel were not time barred, thus
opening inquiry into whether an excess insurer could even bring such an
action. T Under Texas law, attorneys ordinarily cannot be held liable to
non-clients because there is no privity of contract.74 5 Privity as a prereq-
uisite to malpractice liability is the product of judicial reluctance to per-
mit malpractice actions by non-clients because of the potential negative
impact on attorneys' duties to their clients. 746 This concern is heightened
in the insurance defense context, where attorneys must be especially
735. 843 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1992).





741. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. 1992).
742. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d at 482.
743. See id.
744. See id. at 484.
745. See id. (citing Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); First Mun.
Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin & Stewart, 648 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983); Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981)).
746. See id. (citing Supreme Court of Texas, State Bar Rules art. X § 9).
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"sensitive to the varying interests of the insured and the insurer which
produce complex and often conflicting relationships. 747
The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that recognizing an equitable
subrogation action by an excess insurer against defense counsel would
not interfere with the attorney-client relationship, however, nor would it
create additional conflicts of interest.748 Equitable subrogation would
only permit an insurer to enforce defense counsel's existing duties to the
insured.749 Further, the interests of the insured, its primary insurer and its
excess insurer generally overlap when it comes to ensuring that a defense
attorney's malpractice does not prevent the presentation of a meritorious
defense.75° Insureds' and insurers' interests converge in expectations of
competent representation.75'
The American Centennial court observed that those considerations
compelling its recognition of an excess insurer's right to bring an equita-
ble subrogation action against a primary insurer for failing to settle a
claim within policy limits also supported an excess insurer's right to sue
defense counsel hired by a primary insurer.752
No new or additional burdens are imposed on the attorney, who al-
ready has the duty to represent the insured ...Defense counsel
should not be relieved of these obligations merely because the in-
surer, rather than the client, must pay the claim. If the asserted mal-
practice has resulted in the payment of a judgment or settlement
within the excess carrier's policy limits, the insured has little incen-
tive to enforce its right to competent representation. Refusal to permit
the excess carrier to vindicate that right would burden the insurer with
a loss caused by the attorney's negligence while relieving the attorney
from the consequences of legal malpractice. Such an inequitable re-
sult should not arise simply because the insured has contracted for
excess coverage.753
The supreme court thus reversed the court of appeals decision for failing
to allow the excess insurers to pursue their malpractice claims against
defense counsel.5
Courts' embrace of equitable subrogation as a vehicle for excess
insurers' potential recovery from negligent defense attorneys hired by a
primary insurer while declining to impose a direct duty is nicely illus-
trated by National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C.755 In
747. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex. 1992).
748. See An Centennial Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d at 484.
749. See id.
750. See id.
751. See id. (quoting Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Mich. 1991)).
752. See id.
753. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 484-85 (Tex. 1992).
754. See Am Centennial Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d at 485.
755. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (N.D. Il1. 1998).
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Dowd & Dowd, an Illinois federal court was forced to apply Illinois law
in the absence of any guidance from the state's appellate courts.756
Schneider National Carriers hired the law firm of Dowd & Dowd to
defend it and its driver, Henry Howard, in a personal injury action
brought by John Miksis.757 Miksis suffered catastrophic injury when
Howard drove a Schneider tractor-trailer rig into a stationery lift truck on
which Miksis was working.758 At the time of the accident, Schneider was
self-insured up to $3 million with a $5 million National Union excess
policy above its SIR.759
The case went to trial and Miksis recovered a verdict of $8
million.7 ° Schneider paid the first $3 million and National Union paid
the remaining $5 million.76' National Union then sued Dowd & Dowd for
malpractice. 762 Dowd & Dowd moved to dismiss National Union's com-
plaint, arguing that "an excess insurer cannot maintain a legal malprac-
tice claim against the insured's defense attorney. '"763
Dowd & Dowd asserted that National Union could not state a cause
of action for legal malpractice because it could not establish the first pre-
requisite, that being an attorney-client relationship with the law firm.7 "
Illinois law jealously guards the fiduciary relationship between attorney
and client as personal and confidential, and only a client can assert a
malpractice claim against an attorney. 65 National Union argued in re-
sponse that an attorney-client relationship did exist and, alternatively,
that it was equitably subrogated to Schneider's legal malpractice action
against Dowd & Dowd.766 The case was one of first impression under
Illinois law.767
In arguing for a direct claim against Dowd & Dowd, National Union
first asserted that the Illinois Supreme Court would expand the tripartite
relationship that exists between an insured, a primary insurer, and de-
fense counsel to recognize that a defense attorney also owes a fiduciary
duty to an excess insurer.768 Illinois law clearly provides that a defense
756. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.




761. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1015 (N.D. I11.
1998).
762. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 101 5.
763. See id.
764. See id.
765. See id. 1016.
766. See id.
767. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016 (N.D. 111.
1998).
768. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
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attorney hired by a primary insurer owes a fiduciary duty to both the
insured and the insurer, and that either can sue the attorney for malprac-
tice.769 National Union argued that Illinois law would permit a direct ac-
tion because "there is no logical reason to distinguish between a primary
insurer and an excess carrier in determining when an insurer may sue for
malpractice. 77 °
The court rejected National Union's argument because it "com-
pletely ignore[d]" the fact that a primary insurer actually contracts with a
defense attorney to represent the insured.771
Since the primary insurer contracts with the attorney, pays the attor-
ney's legal fees, and directs the litigation or settlement of the claim, it
stands to reason that the primary insurer is one of the attorney's cli-
ents .... Excess insurers, on the other hand, do not have the duty to
defend the insured .... Thus, unlike a primary insurer, an excess in-
surer has no direct relationship with the attorney retained to defend an
action against the insured.772
"Illinois courts' recognition of the tripartite relationship is premised
upon [a] primary insurer's legal duty to retain and pay for an attorney to
defend an action against its insured., 773 Thus, the Dowd & Dowd court
reasoned, the Illinois Supreme Court would be unlikely to enlarge the
tripartite relationship to include an excess insurer.774 National Union ac-
knowledged that it did not retain Dowd & Dowd to defend Schneider and
Howard. Schneider made that decision.775 The insurer's tripartite relation-
ship argument for the existence of an attorney-client relationship had no
basis in fact or law. 776 Dowd & Dowd owed no fiduciary duty to National
Union, and the court dismissed that portion of the insurer's complaint.777
National Union next contended that Schneider retained Dowd &
Dowd for the insurer's direct or primary benefit.778 Accordingly, it was a




770. See id. (quoting National Union's response at 6).
771. See id.
772. Id. at 1017-18 (citations and footnotes omitted).
773. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (N.D. 11.
1998).




778. See id. at 1019.
779. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1019 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
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Under Illinois law, an attorney generally only owes his client a duty
to exercise requisite skill and care in the course of a representation.7 8°
There is an exception, however, for intended third-party beneficiaries. 8
This exception is narrower in cases of an adversarial nature.782 In such
cases, there must be a clear indication that the intent of the attorney's
representation of the client is to directly confer a benefit upon the third
party.
783
The Dowd & Dowd court did not believe that the Illinois Supreme
Court would find that Schneider entered into its relationship with its de-
fense attorneys for National Union's benefit.7 4 Schneider's intent in hir-
ing Dowd & Dowd was to directly benefit itself and Howard.785 Though
National Union also benefited by virtue of its harmonious relationship
with its insureds, its incidental benefit was not sufficient to support a
direct duty of care on the part of defense counsel.786
The court finally reached National Union's equitable subrogation
argument. The court was convinced that the Illinois Supreme Court
would recognize an excess liability insurer's right to be subrogated to its
insured's rights unless the nature of the subrogated claim and public pol-
icy considerations dictated a different conclusion.787
Legal malpractice claims are not assignable in Illinois.788 The policy
considerations that cut against the assignment of legal malpractice claims
arguably apply with equal force in the equitable subrogation context.
Subrogation opponents might argue, for example, that permitting an ex-
cess insurer to sue defense counsel strains the tripartite relationship, a
point that was not lost on the Dowd & Dowd court. 789 Nonetheless, the
court was persuaded to permit an excess insurer's equitable subrogation
to its insured's rights against defense counsel because it does not entail
any additional burdens.790
780. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
781. See id.
782. See id.
783. See id. (quoting Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (I11. 1982)).
784. See id.
785. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1019 (N.D. 111.
1998).
786. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
787. See id. at 1022.
788. See id. at 1023 (citing Kleinwort Benson N. Am., Inc. v. Quantum Fin. Servs., Inc., 692
N.E.2d 269, 271 (Ill. 1998)).
789. See id. ("The court acknowledges that an attorney's independent, legal judgment might be
compromised, consciously or subconsciously, because of concern about being sued by an excess
insurer.").




[Equitable subrogation] merely allows an excess insurer, who pays
for any excess liability, to enforce the duties that the attorney already
owes to the insured, who might have little incentive to sue his attor-
ney since he has excess insurance coverage... Evidently, if the in-
sured had not contracted for excess insurance coverage, the attorney
would have to be similarly concerned about being sued by the insured
for any excess liability ... Malpracticing attorneys should not enjoy a
windfall merely because the insured contracted for excess insurance
coverage ... Further, the social costs of legal malpractice [are] best
borne by the malpracticing attorneys.9
Additionally, in the equitable subrogation context, there is less con-
cern that legal malpractice claims will become a commodity to be ex-
ploited by strangers to the attorney-client relationship.7 92 Basic subroga-
tion principles strictly limit the right to be subrogated to a legal malprac-
tice claim to a non-client who, pursuant to a legal duty, has paid the cli-
ent's debt or loss attributable to the malpractice. 793 Any concern about an
"uncontrollable flow" of baseless malpractice action by excess insurers is
speculation. 794 Finally, the Dowd & Dowd court noted, while excess in-
surers possess the sophistication necessary to protect themselves in many
situations, that ability or capability does not preclude the application of
equitable subrogation doctrine.795
B. Actions by Excess Carriers Not Allowed
A few courts have declined to allow excess insurers to sue defense
counsel for malpractice even on an equitable subrogation theory.796 This
is not surprising, inasmuch as a number of courts have generally rejected
equitable subrogation in the legal malpractice context.797
The leading case favoring defense counsel is Continental Casualty
Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, decided by the Second Cir-
791. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023-24 (N.D. Ill.
1998). (citations omitted).




796. See, e.g., Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1991)
(interpreting Connecticut law); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. AFIA Worldwide Ins. Co., 937 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.
1991) (applying Louisiana law); Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Weber & Rose, P.S.C., 997 S.W.2d 12 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1998).
797. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDonald, Hecht & Solberg, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424
(Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting claim by primary insurer); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Salter, 717 So. 2d
141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (prohibiting subrogation by primary insurer), review denied, 727 So.
2d 908 (Fla. 1999); Bank IV Wichita v. Am, Mullins, Unruh, Kuhn & Wilson, 827 P.2d 758 (Kan.
1992) (rejecting bank's claim against debtor's attorney). But see Chem. Bank of N.J., N.A. v. Bailey,
687 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (permitting subrogation); Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Schoendorf & Sorgi, 549 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. 1996) (permitting subrogation).
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cuit under Connecticut law"798 Pullman arose out of a medical malprac-
tice action against Griffin Hospital. The hospital was insured by Aetna at
the primary level, with Continental Casualty its excess insurer.79 9 Aetna
hired the law firm of Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves to defend the
malpractice action.80° The case went to trial and resulted in a staggering
verdict against the hospital." 1 Continental paid over $10 million under
its excess policy to satisfy the judgment.8 2 The insurer then sued the
Pullman firm for legal malpractice for failing to adequately defend the
underlying tort case.8" 3
Pullman moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Conti-
nental had no standing to sue because it was Aetna that retained the
firm.8 °4 Continental argued that it had standing to sue because (1) it was
an intended and foreseeable beneficiary of the Pullman firm's services for
the hospital, such that it shared an attorney-client relationship with Pull-
man; (2) it was equitably subrogated to Griffin Hospital's right to sue
Pullman; and (3) it shared an "actual attorney-client relationship" with
Pullman.0 5 After Continental unsuccessfully pursued an interlocutory
appe l and amended its complaint, the district court granted a motion to
dismiss by the law flrm.8"6 Continental then appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit, raising the same arguments in support of its claim against Pullman
that it made in the district court below.80 7
The Pullman court first addressed Continental's claim that because it
was an intended and foreseeable beneficiary of Pullman's legal services
for the hospital, Pullman owed, it a duty of care.80 8 The court observed
that under Connecticut law attorneys are not liable to persons other than
their clients except in will cases.8° Only in estate work may a third party
beneficiary sue an attorney for malpractice. The court declined to equate
an attorney's dual representation of an insured and its insurer with that of
a testator and his beneficiary. Moreover, Continental was free to monitor
the defense of the medical malpractice action through its own attorneys
to assure itself that Aetna was living up to responsibilities as the primary
798. 929 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1991).




803. See id. Continental also sued Aetna for bad faith, negligence, and failing to provide an
adequate defense. See id.
804. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d 103, 104 (2d Cir.
1991).
805. See Cont'l Cas. Co., 929 F.2d at 104 (citing Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley
& Reeves, 709 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Conn. 1989)).
806. See id. at 105.
807. See id. at 104-05.
808. See id. at 105.
809. See id. (quoting Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733, 735 (Conn. 1988)).
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insurer.1 ° Under these circumstances, it seemed implausible that the
primary or direct purpose of the transaction at issue (Aetna's engagement
of Pullman to defend Griffin Hospital) was intended to benefit a third-
party (Continental).1
Continental next argued that once it satisfied the judgment against
Griffin Hospital, it was subrogated to its insured's rights, and it could
therefore bring any legal malpractice claims against Pullman that the
hospital should have brought.1 2 The Pullman court gave this argument
short shrift, rejecting it as running contrary to Connecticut public
policy. 3 The court presumably feared that permitting non-clients to sue
attorneys via equitable subrogation world potentially interfere with attor-
neys' ethical obligations to their clients.14
Continental's final argument for a direct duty owed to it by the
Pullman law firm came in for harsh treatment by the Second Circuit. The
Pullman court was especially critical of Continental's attempts to plead a
direct duty in the district court, describing Continental's amended com-
plaint as "[r]esonating . . . with bald conclusions." ' In its amended
complaint, Continental alleged that it shared an attorney-client relation-
ship with Pullman because the law firm communicated with it about the
progress of the medical malpractice action, advised it with respect to
settlement, and served as its counsel on the appeal of the underlying ac-
tion." 6 Continental never pleaded B nor could it B that it retained Pull-
man, a fact the Pullman court found interesting, but not dispositive.81 7
"It is clear beyond cavil," the Pullman court observed, "that in the
insurance context the attorney owes his allegiance, not to the insurance
company that retained him but to the insured defendant.8 18 Though a
defense attorney may be retained and paid by the insurer, and may in-
form the insurer about the progress of the case he is defending, the attor-
ney owes his allegiance to the insured.81 9 Accordingly, the district court
810. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir.
1991).
811. Cont'lCas. Co., 929 F.2d at 106.
812. See id.
813. See id. at 107 (citing Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733 (Conn. 1988)).
814. See idL at 106 (citing and quoting Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733, 735-36 (Conn.
1988)).
815. See id. at 108.
816. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir.
1991).
817. Cont'l Cas. Co., 929 F.2d at 108.
818. See idt (citing 16A John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice
'8839.35, at 108 & n.9.5 (1981)).
819. See id. (citing Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 316 A.2d 394, 405 (Conn.
1972); Martyn v. Donlin, 198 A.2d 700, 706 (Conn. 1964)).
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did not err in dismissing Continental's amended complaint for pleading
insufficient facts to support an attorney-client relationship.82°
Although some courts may find Pullman persuasive, the last portion
of the opinion may not travel well. Connecticut is a "single client" state
in the insurance defense context, meaning that the law considers the in-
sured to be the defense attorney's sole client.82 Many jurisdictions fol-
low the "dual client doctrine," '822 which holds that so long as the insured's
interests and the insurer's interests are aligned, they are each a client of
the defense attorney and the defense attorney owes each client an equal
duty of loyalty.823 Of course, even in dual client states, the primary in-
surer hired the defense attorney and the defense must be faithful to both
the primary insurer and the insured. The defense attorney shares an at-
torney-client relationship with the primary insurer and the excess insurer
remains a step removed.
A Kentucky court rejected an excess insurer's equitable subrogation
claim against defense counsel hired by the insured under its SIR in
American Continental Insurance Co. v. Weber & Rose.824 The American
Continental court was convinced that permitting an excess insurer to sue
defense attorneys under an equitable subrogation theory "would be in-
imical to the preservation of traditional and longstanding concepts asso-
ciated with [the] attorney-client relationship. 8 25 Allowing excess insur-
ers to sue their insureds' defense attorneys would undermine the tradi-
tional view of the attorney-client relationship as both personal and fidu-
ciary.
826
The American Continental court also rejected the insurer's claim
that it was an intended and foreseeable beneficiary of the defense attor-
neys' services to the insured.82 7 Unlike Pullman, in which the primary
insurer hired the defense counsel, the insured hired the defense counsel
as authorized by the SIR. 28 Accordingly, there was even less of a basis
for the court to conclude that the defense attorneys were hired to repre-
820. See id.
821. See Higgins v. Karp, 687 A.2d 539, 543 (Conn. 1997) (citing Novella v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 316 A.2d 394, 405 (Conn. 1972); Martyn v. Donlin, 198 A.2d 700, 706 (Conn.
1964)).
822. See, e.g., Home Indem. Co. v. Lane, Powell, Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1330 (9th Cir.
1995) (interpreting Alaska law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20,
24 (Ct. App. 1999); Unigard Ins. Group v. O'Flaherty & Belgum, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565, 569 (Ct.
App. 1995); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 681 N.E.2d 552, 561 (IIl. App. 1997); Moeller v.
Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 1062, 1070 (Miss. 1996).
823. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites Prof I Law Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 570, 575 (Ct.
App. 1991).
824. 997 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
825. See Am. Cont'l Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d at 13.
826. Id. at 14.
827. Id.
828. Id. at 12-13.
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sent the excess carrier. The insured hired the defense attorneys for its
sole benefit, and American Continental was at most an incidental benefi-
ciary of their contract. The defense attorneys did not owe American
Continental a duty that could form the basis for a malpractice action.829
C. Summary
The development of excess insurers' rights against defense attorneys
hired by primary carriers is far from complete. The law in many states is
uncertain, and there are good arguments both for and against recognizing
excess insurers' right to bring malpractice suits against defense attorneys
they did not hire. It is, for example, difficult to refute the American Cen-
tennial and Dowd & Dowd courts' conclusions that malpractice defense
attorneys should not be able to escape liability simply because an insured
prudently purchased excess insurance . 30 At the same time, excess insur-
ers are far from helpless. They can employ their own attorneys to work
with the defense attorneys hired by the primary insurer, sometimes re-
ferred to as devising a "shadow strategy," or providing a "shadow de-
fense." In some cases an excess insurer actually may be able to take over
the defense and direct counsel, control defense and settlement strategy,
and so on.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no questioning the importance of excess insurance and um-
brella coverage. Such policies protect insureds against catastrophic loss
at prices that most businesses and individuals can afford. Excess and
umbrella coverage are in fact quite common.
Controversies involving excess insurance are not new. Much of the
litigation involving excess insurers has involved claims by and against
primary carriers. Not surprisingly, there have been efforts over time to
structure the relationship between primary and excess insurers. In 1974,
several insurance industry associations and interested insurers jointly
created the Guiding Principles for Primary and Excess Insurers.83' The
Guiding Principles most particularly address settlement and trial deci-
sions. They are:
1. The primary insurer must discharge its duty of investigating
promptly and diligently even those cases in which it is apparent that
its policy limit may be consumed.
829. See id. at 14.
830. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023-24 (N.D.
I1. 1998) (citing Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex. 1992)).
These cases are discussed supra at notes 734-95.
831. See Baldwin & Midkiff, supra note 22, at 38-39.
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2. Liability must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts
which a diligent investigation can develop and in the light of applica-
ble legal principles. The assessment of liability must be reviewed pe-
riodically throughout the life of a claim.
3. Evaluation must be realistic and without regard to the policy
limit.
4. When evaluating all aspects of a claim, if settlement is indi-
cated, the primary insurer must proceed promptly to attempt a settle-
ment, up to its policy limit if necessary, negotiating seriously and
with an open mind.
5. If at any time, it should reasonably appear that the insured may
be exposed beyond the primary limit, the primary insurer shall give
prompt written notice to the excess insurer, when known, stating the
results of investigation and negotiation, and giving any other infor-
mation deemed relevant to a determination of the exposure, and in-
viting the excess insurer to participate in a common effort to dispose
of the claim.
6. Where the assessment of damages, considered alone, would rea-
sonably support payment of a demand within the primary policy limit
but the primary insurer is unwilling to pay the demand because of its
opinion that liability either does not exist or is questionable and the
primary insurer recognizes the possibility of a verdict in excess of its
policy limit, it shall give notice of its position to the excess insurer
when known. It shall make available its file to the excess insurer for
examination, if requested.
7. The primary insurer shall never seek a contribution to a settle-
ment within its policy limit from the excess insurer. It may, however,
accept contribution to a settlement within its policy limit from the ex-
cess insurer when such contribution is voluntarily offered.
8. In the event of a judgment in excess of the primary policy limit,
the primary insurer shall consult the excess insurer as to further pro-
cedure. If the primary insurer undertakes an appeal with the concur-
rence of the excess insurer, the expense shall be shared by the pri-
mary and the excess insurer in such manner as they may agree upon.
In the absence of such an agreement, they shall share the expense in
the same proportions that their respective shares of the outstanding
judgment bear to the total amount of the judgment. If the primary in-
surer should elect not to appeal, taking appropriate steps to pay or to
guarantee payment of its policy limit, it shall not be liable for the ex-
pense of the appeal or interest on the judgment from the time it gives
notice to the excess insurer of its election not to appeal and tender its.
policy limit. The excess insurer may then prosecute an appeal at its
own expense being liable also for interest accruing on the entire
judgment subsequent to the primary insurer's notice of its election not
to appeal. If the excess insurer does not agree to an appeal it shall not
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be liable to share the cost of any appeal prosecuted by the primary in-
surer.
9. The excess insurer shall refrain from coercive or collusive con-
duct designed to force a settlement. It shall never make a formal de-
mand upon a primary insurer that the latter settle a claim within it
policy limit. In any subsequent proceedings between excess insurer
and primary insurer the failure of the excess insurer to make formal
demand that the claim be settled shall not be considered as having
any bearing on the excess insurer's claim against the primary in-
surer.
832
Many primary and excess insurers either declined to adopt the
Guiding Principles or have withdrawn as signatories to them because
unfair claims practices statutes and newer policy language better frame
their respective obligations. 833 The Guiding Principles have also drawn
scholarly criticism.834 At least two courts, however, have specifically
applied the Guiding Principles as though they are an industry standard,
with liability flowing from of their breach. 35
The law of excess insurance goes far beyond the primary in-
surer/excess insurer relationship, however, and much of it is unsettled.
Excess insurance has received little scholarly attention, and many courts
do not fully appreciate or understand excess and umbrella insurers' dif-
fering obligations. Nevertheless, that understanding must come because
litigation involving excess and umbrella carriers is growing and that
growth seems sure to continue. The size of many losses and verdicts
gives excess insurers a powerful incentive to vigorously enforce and
protect their rights and interests.
Clarifying and steadying the law of excess insurance might rest with
the insurance industry. Aspirational standards such as the Guiding Prin-
ciples, while perhaps well intended, are unnecessary. The industry must
standardize excess and umbrella policies, just as the industry standard-
ized primary liability policies long ago.
832. See id. at 39-40.
833. See id. at 39; See also Puritan Ins. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 76, 79 (3d
Cir. 1985) (observing that "very few [insurance] companies ultimately subscribed" to the Guiding
Principles).
834. See Baldwin & Midkiff, supra note 22, at 39.
835. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1320,
1324-25 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (applying North Carolina law); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Warner-




ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW: THE SUPREME COURT DODGES
THE RACE BULLET IN FOURTH AMENDMENT TERRY
STOPS
INTRODUCTION
This comment analyzes the Supreme Court case Illinois v.
Wardlow, which applies the reasonable suspicion standard for investi-
2gative stops initially established in Terry v. Ohio. Although the deci-
sions are separated by more than thirty years, during which the Court has
had the benefit of jurisprudential discourse
3 and social science research 4
1. 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. See, e.g., Honorable Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional Analysis of
Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 617-18 (1999)
("Whether the impact of racial profiling is real or perceived, damaging or benign, underreported or
overblown, it remains a public policy concern that must be confronted, both in the federal and state
courts ... state courts must recognize that resolution of the problem in the context of equal protection
may only be theoretical. Furthermore, even if the matter can be addressed under the Equal Protection
Clause, a resolution may be neither swift nor effective."); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic
Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Bennett L. Gershman, Use of Race in "Stop-and-Frisk":
Stereotypical Beliefs Linger, But How Far Can The Police Go?, 72-APR N.Y. ST. B. J. 42, 44
(2000) ("courts should take a very hard look at the government's justification for its actions. There is
no place in constitutional law or criminal justice for a theory of "reasonable" racial discrimination.");
David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84
MINN. L. REV. 265, 325 (1999) ("we must strive to avoid police practices that impose high costs on
law abiding citizens, and that skew those costs heavily on the basis of race"); David A. Harris,
Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court
Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 975, 1023 (1998) ("Courts must consider the
facts in each case, not simple assertions that any time a person is suspected of crime X, they are
always likely to be armed. Using categorical judgments robs Terry of its legitimacy. Without such a
correction, Terry will continue to become what the Supreme Court still says it is not--pure and
simple, a device for stopping people about whom officers have a hunch, perhaps with a racial cast,
and searching them for evidence. And at that point, we will be right back where we started--in 1960,
before Mapp, in the time of 'giving 'em a toss."').
4. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 984 (1999) (discussing that the "five essential goals of human organi-
zation" will often lead to biased or discriminatory opinions about race). In notes 152, 160, and 167,
Thompson cites additional social science approaches to this issue. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK &
JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 99 (1993) ("recount-
ing story of black man stopped by police while strolling in white neighborhood because he was
'incongruous in [his] surroundings' and thus suspicious"); SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, A
CATEGORIZATION APPROACH TO STEREOTYPING, IN COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND
INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR, 83, 84-86 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981); Birt L. Duncan, Differential
Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping
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concerning the impact of race on investigative stops, the Court has re-
fused to change how it analyzes such stops justified by reasonable suspi-
cion. Simply stated, the majority of the Court has not reflected on how
race can undermine the reasonable suspicion standard in Terry stops de-
spite evidence that it can be a substantial, albeit an often hidden, reason
for the stop. Race can affect Terry stops by both influencing how a de-
tainee reacts to the police and contributing to the reason why the police
decide to make the stop.5
Because of the Court's reticence to discuss how race could factor
into an officer's judgment when observing a suspect, it is not surprising
that the outcomes of Wardlow and Terry are similar. In fact, the Court
has effectively precluded Fourth Amendment relief for police action in-
fluenced by race. Whren v. United States6 held that "the constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.",7 A remedy
sought under the Equal Protection Clause, however, presents practically
insurmountable obstacles to a minority who has been improperly de-
tained. For an equal protection claim, a suspect must show that "the law
enforcement policy had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose." 8 As one commentator stated, "short of an
admission by the police officer or similarly incriminating physical evi-
dence, a [detainee cannot] prove that race served as the only reason or
the primary reason for the stop." 9
While the Court has practically foreclosed minorities from alleging
racial bias in Terry stops, distrust of the police by inner city, minority
populations has only seemed to increase. A training model developed for
social workers illustrates this point well.1° In the model, individuals are
audibly presented four scenarios and asked to arrange them in the order
in which they occurred." The first scenario depicts a man climbing out
of a window. 12 The second picture includes the same man running down
of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595-97 (1976) ("discussing psychological
research revealing common stereotype that blacks are prone to violence").
5. The Wardlow dissent recognizes the first of these propositions. As Justice Stevens stated,
the "accepted axiom of criminal law that 'the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous
are as bold as a lion' is inaccurate in light of current tensions between the police and minorities who
reside in high crime areas. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
7. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
8. Davis, supra note 3, at 437.
9. Id.
10. See LARRY WRIGHT & CHARMAINE R. BRtTTAIN, SPECIALIZED INTERVIEWING SKILLS
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a street.1 3 The third picture depicts the man before a judge, and in the
fourth picture, he is in jail. 14 Results have shown that a white respondent
will often order the sequences as they are presented, one through four.
15
The rationale behind this sequential ordering is that the man was doing
something wrong when he climbed out of the window and likely ran to
avoid police officers who were legitimately in pursuit. 16 The man was
then arrested, convicted, and incarcerated for the crime he committed. 7
At the same time, results have also shown that a person of color
would often sequence the scenarios differently. 18 A common response
was to start with the man in jail. 19 He was in jail because the police pur-
sued him and took him to court. 20 The police chased him because he was
running down the street, and to justify the stop, the police later said the
man was breaking into a house.E This training tool starkly illustrates the
strained relations between minorities and law enforcement, arguably
created in large part by improper racial considerations in Terry stops.
2 2
Although these studies tend to show that race is a factor that can contrib-
ute to both the reaction of the detainee to a police officer and to a police
officer's suspicion in making a stop, the Court refuses to consider it in
this context. Admittedly, including race in a Fourth Amendment analysis
would be difficult for a court. This difficulty should not, however, pre-
clude race from being included in a reasonable suspicion determination










22. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 680 n.7 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Johnson, Americans' View on Crime and Law Enforcement: Survey Findings, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE JOURNAL 13 (Sept.1997) (reporting that "43% of African-Americans consider 'police
brutality and harassment of African-Americans a serious problem' in their own community"); Ca-
simir, Minority Men: We Are Frisk Targets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, MAR. 26, 1999, p. 34 ("informal
survey of 100 young black and Hispanic men living in New York City; 81 reported having been
stopped and frisked by police at least once; none of the 81 stops resulted in arrests."); see also
Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 680 n.8 (citing Alex Kotlowitz, Hidden CasualtiesL Drug War's Emphasis
on Law Enforcement Takes a Toll on Police, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1991, at A2 ("'Black leaders com-
plained that innocent people were picked up in the drug sweeps .... ' Many stops never lead to an
arrest, which further exacerbates the perceptions of discrimination felt by racial minorities and
people living in high crime areas.")); Id. at 681 n.9 ("the Chief of the Washington, D.C., Metro-
politan Police department, for example, confirmed that 'sizeable percentages of Americans today -
especially Americans of color - still view policing in the United States to be discriminatory, if not by
policy and definition, certainly in its day-to-day application.").
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Part I of this comment is a brief discussion of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the historical Terry decision, and the more recent search and sei-
zure case Whren v. United States.23 The reader will note that prior to
Whren, the topic of race is noticeably absent from this section, and for
good reason: the Court does not address race in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. Part II presents the reasoning of the Court in Wardlow, and
discusses the part concurrence and part dissent by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Part III is a critical analysis of Wardlow,
in which the Court adheres to the Whren holding and refuses to consider
race in its Fourth Amendment analysis. This article maintains that by
applying an analysis similar to the totality of the circumstances test as
suggested by Justice Stevens in his dissent, courts can effectively con-
sider race more explicitly. Finally, Part IV concludes that until courts
consider race as a pertinent factor in Fourth Amendment analysis, the
government will continue to prevail on the majority of the claims that
24contest frivolous stops based on the lenient Terry standard.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Reasonableness Clause and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
25
Historically, momentum in support of the Fourth Amendment
stemmed from the use of writs of assistance in the colonies before the
26
American Revolution. The writs were a prevailing legal practice in
England that authorized the British "examination of suspected ships and
vessels, vaults, cellars, warehouses or other places in which might be
23. 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996) (in which the Court considered "whether the temporary deten-
tion of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic viola-
tion is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a
reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic
laws.").
24. See George C. Thomas Il, Terry v. Ohio in the Trenches: A Glimpse at How Courts
Apply "Reasonable Suspicion ", 72 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1025, 1029 (1998) (addressing a random
sample of criminal cases involving reasonable suspicion and determining that the government pre-
vails 72% of these cases).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. See EDWARD C. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 4 (1970).
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found smuggled goods or those on which the required duties had notS,,27
been paid. These warrants, oftentimes exercised with discretion, sig-
nificantly contributed to colonist dissatisfaction that culminated in the
28Revolutionary War. In drafting the Bill of Rights, enacted in 1789, the
republic's founders intended in part to ensure that private citizens would
be free from this or any other kind of unwarranted governmental intru-
29
sion.
No statutes exist to guide judges and juries through the process of
deciding whether law enforcement officers obtained information in com-
pliance with a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.3 ° Instead, the Fourth
Amendment itself is the "ultimate yardstick," and judges must turn to the
court's prior decisions that interpret it.31 Like much of the language of
the Constitution, the "unreasonable search and seizure" clause is a vague
term that courts have interpreted differently, and "[t]here is no mathe-
matical test for determining reasonableness other than balancing the need
to arrest or search against the invasion that is entailed."32
To further complicate a court's analysis of Fourth Amendment vio-
lations, a judicially created doctrine known as the exclusionary rule pre-
vents a court from considering evidence if the evidence was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 33 Commentators have criticized the
doctrine because it is not included in the language of the Amendment,
and at one point the Supreme Court nearly repudiated it in Adams v. New
York. 34 The rule was reaffirmed soon after the Adams decision,
however,35 and it continues to be a method to exclude evidence, regard-
27. Id.
28. See LAWRENCE C. WADDINGTON, ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE 1 (1974).
29. See J. DAVID HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 1 (1979).
30. See WADDINGTON, supra note 28, at 1.
31. Id.
32. id. at 8.
33. See JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEADING
SUPREME COURT CASES AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT 55 (2000 ed.).
34. 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904).
35. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914) ("The effect of the 4th Amend-
ment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to
forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable
searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of
crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our
Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the
latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which
are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights ... The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
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less of the evidence's relevance or materiality.36 Chief Justice Warren
explained the policy rationale of the exclusionary rule in Terry, stating
that it "has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless
police conduct." 37 Additionally, "without [the rule] the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere
'form of words.' ' 38 Thus, reinforced by the judicial acceptance of the
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment guarantees private citizens a
right to privacy against unreasonable or unwarranted actions by govern-
ment officers.39
B. A Precursor to Terry
Every state has its own constitutional provision relating to search
and seizure that provides the same guarantee discussed above.4 Nearly
twenty years before deciding Terry, the Supreme Court determined that
search and seizure provisions apply to actions of state law enforcement
41 42officials as well as federal officers. In Wolf v. Colorado, the Court
held that although "the Fourth Amendment did not per se apply to state
action, nevertheless search and seizure is a matter implicit in the modem
concept of due process of law, guaranteed to every person by the Four-
teenth Amendment .... ,,43 The Court reasoned that
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the po-
lice-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society. It is therefore implicit in ,the concept of ordered liberty"
and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause. The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prel-
the sacrifice of those great principles established be [sic] years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.").
36. See WADDINGTON, supra note 28, at 3; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
210 (1960). "To the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States there has been unquestioning adher-
ence for now almost half a century." Id. (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 (1931); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)).
37. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-
93 (1914)).
38. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).
39. See FISHER, supra note 26, at 1I.
40. See id. at 8.
41. See id. at 9.
42. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
43. FISHER, supra note 26, at 9. The Fourteenth Amendment states in part: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... .U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
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ude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority
of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be
condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights en-
shrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of Eng-
lish-speaking peoples.
Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that were a State af-
firmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacz it would
run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After extending the protection of constitutional provisions in cases
involving state as well as federal action, the Court was confronted with
issues of warrantless searches and seizures. In Beck v. Ohio, 45 the peti-
tioner (Beck) was driving when he was stopped by police officers.
4 6
Without a search warrant or an arrest warrant, the officers arrested Beck
47and searched his car. Finding nothing, the officers took him to the po-
48
lice station and searched him. They found some clearing house slips in
an envelope that Beck had tucked into his sock.4 9 He was charged with
possession of the slips in violation of a state criminal statute.5 °
Beck argued that the evidence should have been excluded because
the police had obtained it through an unreasonable search and seizure
that violated his constitutional rights.5 1 The trial court overruled the mo-
tion to suppress, and both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Su-S. 52
preme Court affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to determine whether the arresting officers had probable cause to
conduct the arrest, and whether a warrantless arrest was constitutionally
valid.5 3 Upon review, the Court concluded that Beck's arrest could not
"be squared with the demands of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. ,54
44. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.
45. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
46. See Beck, 379 U.S. at 89-90.
47. See id. at 90.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. (charging Beck for possession of "numbers game" ticket in violation of a statute
that stated: "No person shall own, possess, have on or about his person, have in his custody, or have
under his control a ticket, order, or device for or representing a number of shares or an interest in a
scheme of chance known as 'policy,' 'numbers game,' 'clearing house,' or by words or terms of
similar import, located in or to be drawn, paid, or carried on within or without this state." OHIo REV.
CODE, § 2915.111 (Anderson 1972)).
51. See Beck, 379 U.S. at 90.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 90-91.
54. Id. at 93.
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In its analysis, the Court noted that the trial court was informed of
two facts: "the officers knew what the petitioner looked like and knew
that he had a previous record of arrests .... [b]ut to hold knowledge of
either or both of these facts constituted probable cause would be to hold
that anyone with a previous criminal record could be arrested at will."55
Furthermore, the Court warned of the dangers of a warrantless arrest,
stating that "[a]n arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards pro-
vided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes
instead the far less reliable procedure on an after-the-event justification
for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar
shortcomings of hindsight judgment.
' 56
Probable cause, the court noted, "is a practical, nontechnical con-
ception affording the best compromise that has been found for accom-
modating ... often opposing interests, 57 because to require more of of-
ficers would "unduly hamper" their efforts.58 At the same time, requiring
less would "leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim
or caprice. 59 Pursuant to the probable cause standard, although the offi-
cers may well have acted on good faith in stopping and arresting the pe-
titioner, "good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough."
60
If good faith was the applicable test, the Court concluded that "the pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people
would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in
the discretion of the police.,,6 1 Accordingly, Beck prevailed on his claim
that his rights had been violated because officers had unjustifiably in-
truded into his car and person.
C. The Reasonable, Articulable-Suspicion Standard of Terry
In Terry v. Ohio the Supreme Court established that reasonable sus-
picion, a standard short of probable cause, was enough to justify a police
62
stop and investigation. Terry addressed the Fourth Amendment's role
in confrontations between law enforcement and private citizens.63 In
Terry, a plainclothes policeman with 39 years of experience observed
two men on a street corner.64 Though the officer was unable to articulate
55. Id. at 96-97.
56. Id. at 96.
57. Id. at 91 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
58. id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 97 (citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)).
61. Id.
62. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
63. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 4.
64. See id. at 5.
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what exactly aroused his suspicion, he stated at trial that "when I looked
over they didn't look right to me at the time. '65 He proceeded to observe
one of the men walk past a store window and peer in, then walk back to
the corner.66 After a brief conference, the second man walked past the
67window, peered in, and returned. They repeated these actions five or
68six times each and met up with a third man. The officer suspected the
men were "casing a job, a stick-up," and that "they may have a gun.",
69
After this surveillance, the officer approached them, identified him-
self as an officer, and when he did not recognize them he asked their
names.70 After a mumbled response, the officer grabbed Terry, spun him
in the direction of his associates, and frisked the outside of Terry's
clothing. 7' During the stop, the officer felt and removed handguns from
72two of the three men and arrested all three. The police charged both
Terry and his associate with carrying concealed weapons.73 The officer
later testified that he had not placed his hands beneath either defendant's
clothing until he felt the contours of a gun.
74
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the ad-
missibility of the guns violated Terry's Fourth Amendment rights.75
Chief Justice Warren noted the importance of protecting personal liber-
ties by citing Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Botsford76 to state that
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded.., than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and un-
questionable authority of law."77
The Court first discussed the "stop and frisk" rule.78 Under suspi-
cion that an individual may be connected with criminal activity, the
Court supported the principle that the police can stop that individual and
detain him or her briefly to determine if that person might be armed.7 9
The minor inconvenience or embarrassment to the suspect is outweighed
65. id.
66. See id. at 6.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
70. See id. at 6-7.




75. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
76. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
78. Id. at 10.
79. See id.
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by the competing societal interest to facilitate effective and safe law en-
forcement by officers who act on their suspicions.
80
The Court introduced the argument that the stop and frisk rule is a
"substantial interference with liberty and personal security by police of-
ficers whose judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involve-
ment in 'the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. ' ' 81 The
court noted petitioner's argument that such a rule would only intensify
tense relations between the police and inner-city urban communities and
perpetuate a sense of distrust and invasion when officers stop citizens to
determine whether they should investigate further.
82
The Court questioned whether the officer "seized" defendant Terry
and whether the officer conducted a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.83 The Chief Justice rejected the argument that a stop
and frisk was not the same as a search and seizure:
[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an in-
dividual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that
person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English lan-
guage to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a
person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weap-
ons is not a "search.
84
Thus, the Court determined that "the Fourth Amendment governs all
intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security ....
The Court then turned to analyze whether the officer's search and
seizure "was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably re-
lated in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place. ' '86 Justification, pursuant to the language of the Fourth
Amendment, requires probable cause. Yet the Court pointed to a reason-
ableness standard and stated that an officer must be able to cite "specific
and articulable facts" which "reasonably warrant [an] intrusion. 87 Justi-
fied by the governmental interest in safe neighborhoods and effective
crime prevention, the Court concluded that a police officer was justified
80. See id. at 10-11.
81. Id. at 12 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
82. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 19 n.15.
86. Id. at 20.
87. Id. at 21.
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to investigate ossible criminal activity even though he or she lacks
probable cause.
In deference to the safety of law enforcement, the Court inserted a
reasonable suspicion test in lieu of the probable cause standard of the
Fourth Amendment:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that
the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger.
89
The Court concluded that the gun seized from Terry was admissible
based on the arresting officer's experience. 90 The officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that Terry was armed because of observable, unusual
behavior.9' It was necessary for the officer to protect himself and the
92
community to take action to discover whether a crime was afoot. Fur-
thermore, the search was restricted to the items the officer expected to
find.93 Such a search was reasonable, and according to the Court, it fell
within the guidelines of the Fourth Amendment.94
As Justice White explained in Alabama v. White,9' over twenty years
after the Terry decision, reasonable suspicion is a different standard than
probable cause:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be estab-
lished with information that is different in quantity or content than
that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that
reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable
than that required to show probable cause.
9 6
Thus, when it embraced the reasonable suspicion standard instead of
probable cause as stated in the Fourth Amendment, the Terry Court sub-
88. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
89. Id. at 27.
90. See id
91. See id. at 28.
92. See id at 30.
93. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
94. Seeid at 31.
95. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
96. White, 496 U.S. at 330.
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stantially lowered the degree of suspicion required for police officers to
stop and search a citizen.
The Terry decision also established a reticence by courts to present
the facts of cases without any mention of race.98 This was challenged by
Whren v. United States,99 in which police officers pulled over and ar-
rested two men who aroused suspicion with a variety of factors: they
were young, the car had temporary plates, the driver was looking into the
passenger's lap, and after seeing the officers, they turned quickly and
sped away.1°° When the officers approached the car, one officer observed
what looked like bags of drugs through the window. 0 1 Though the Court
omitted defendant's race from the statement of facts, initially describing
them as "youthful,"' 0 2 defendants were eventually revealed by the Court
to be black, but only when the Court rejected the argument that race
should be relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis of the case at
bar.
103
The Whren Court determined that defendant's admission that he
committed a traffic violation furnished the requisite probable cause.104
The appeal under the Fourth Amendment was misguided because "the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory applica-
tion of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.
Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis. ' 1°5 In other words, the Court would not consider
racial motivations as factors to challenge the legitimacy of the probable
cause to necessitate a stop and frisk or a search and seizure.
Thus, the Whren decision essentially precluded illicit racial motiva-
tion from being relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. 1°6 As discussed
below, the Terry rule is still adhered to today, and pursuant to Whren,
race continues to be a non-issue in a Fourth Amendment analysis of in-
vestigative stops based on reasonable suspicion.
97. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Marvel or Mischief? Terry
v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 911,926 (1998).
98. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 978 (discussing a challenge to the constitutionality of a
spot check of motorists without probable cause in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) and
whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits using deadly force against an unarmed, fleeing citizen in
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
99. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
100. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
101. See id. at 808-09.
102. Id. at 808.
103. See id. at 810-13.
104. See id. at 810.
105. Id. at 813.
106. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 981.
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II. TERRY'S LEGACY IN ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW
0 7
On September 9, 1995, shortly after noon, a four-car caravan of
police officers drove through an area well known for crime, includingS 108
drug transactions. While driving, uniformed officer Nolan observed
Wardlow standing next to a building, holding a bag. 09 When Wardlow
saw the officers drive toward him, he turned and ran." 0 Suspicious of
Wardlow's flight, Officer Nolan and his partner pursued and eventually
stopped Wardlow."' An experienced officer, Nolan knew from practice
that weapons were frequently found in the presence of drug transactions,
and accordingly, Nolan frisked Wardlow. During the pat down, Nolan
felt a heavy object in the shape of a gun in Wardlow's bag. 1 3 Nolan
opened the bag, found a loaded handgun, and arrested Wardlow. "
4
Wardlow filed a motion to suppress evidence of the gun because
Officer Nolan did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop
him.115 The Illinois trial court denied the motion and convicted Wardlow
for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. 16 The Illinois Appellate Court
agreed with Wardlow that Officer Nolan did not have reasonable suspi-
cion to justify the stop and frisk and overturned the conviction." 7 The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. 1 8 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.' 
19
The Court analyzed Wardlow based on a standard first applied in
Terry.1 20 The Terry rule requires "a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot... [and] [w]hile 'reasonable suspicion' is a less
demanding standard than probable cause,"' 21 the officer must rely on
more than a vague, unjustified suspicion or simply a gut-feeling about
criminal activity. 22 The Wardlow Court held that the officers' stop and
protective frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment.123
107. 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
108. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 674.











120. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 675.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 676.
123. See id. at 674.
20001
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Court initially noted that Wardlow's presence in a high crime
area was not enough to support the requisite reasonable suspicion, for it
was just one of the "relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analy-
sis." The Court also cited several cases that suggest nervous behavior
can be an additional contributing factor to determine reasonable suspi-
cion.125 The Court characterized defendant's flight from police as nerv-
ous conduct, 126 but noted that citizens are free to conduct their business
and ignore a police officer who approaches without reasonable
suspicion. 127 A citizen's refusal to cooperate does not give an investigat-
ing officer the justification to stop and search. 28 Yet according to the
Court's interpretation of the facts, Wardlow did not merely avoid the
officers and continue about his business - instead, he fled. 12 While flight
itself is not indicative of illegal behavior, it is, as the Court stated, "the
consummate act of evasion... [and] certainly suggestive of [wrongdo-
ing]. 13°
The Court also reasoned that it would be impossible to police effec-
tively if "scientific certainty" 131 was required of law enforcement in order
to stop someone. Simply stated, such certainty will never exist. Thus,
the Court concluded, reasonable suspicion must be based on "common-
sense judgments and inferences about human behavior. ',132 In light of
that standard, the Court held that Officer Nolan was justified in his sus-
picion that Wardlow was involved in illegal activity, and further investi-
gation was legitimate.
1 33
A. Justice Stevens' Dissent: Per Se Rules, Race, and the "Totality-of-
The-Circumstances Test"
In his dissent, Justice Stevens began by commending the Court for
rejecting requests by petitioner and respondent for "per se rules. 134 The
State of Illinois requested a rule to authorize "the temporary detention of
anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer. 1 35 Respondent
124. Id. at 676.
125. See id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975); Florida v.
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989)).






132. Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (198 1)).
133. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 675.




asked for an opposite rule that a person who flees from law enforcement
136cannot on its face be enough to justify a Terry stop. Justice Stevens
raised the issue of what reasonable conclusions about a person's behavior
could be drawn from one who flees. 37 There are a variety of reasons for
flight, some evasive and criminally motivated, others legitimate and law
abiding. 38 Because of these various reasons, a bright-line rule would be
unworkable. 139
Instead of a per se rule, Justice Stevens reasoned that inferences
about motivation for flight could be drawn from several circumstances,
including "the time of day, the number of people in the area, the charac-
ter of the neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform, the way the
runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the flight, and whether the
person's behavior was otherwise unusual. ' 4 The dissent then turned to a
factor not discussed by the majority: race.141
Justice Stevens recognized that there is sufficient evidence to indi-
cate that some citizens, especially minorities who live in low-income
areas, may have good reason to distrust the police.142 When any contact
with the police can be considered dangerous, "unprovoked flight is nei-
ther 'aberrant' nor 'abnormal. ' "1 43 Evidence explaining minority skepti-
cism of police is "too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and
too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient."' 44 In
other words, statistics from social science studies of strained relations
between police and minorities could contribute to a "commonsense con-




Because Justice Stevens finds this type of evidence credible, his ap-
proach is inherently subjective since people will often respond to en-
counters with law enforcement differently. Accordingly, Justice Stevens
seems to suggest that on a case-by-case basis, courts could consider the
subjective, personal perceptions and responses of individuals whose
seemingly suspicious behavior to police officers might be either practical
and sensible or indicative of wrongdoing. Thus, because reasons for
136. See id.
137. See id. at 678.
138. See id. at 678-79 (listing with good humor a variety of circumstances in which a reason-
able person would run, including "to get home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for
rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of nature - any of which
might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity").
139. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 679.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 680.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 681.
145. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 682.
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flight can be legitimate, only a consideration of the totality of the cir-
cumstances will determine the proper result."'
Applying the "totality-of-the-circumstances test"' 47 to the facts,
Justice Stevens concluded the State did not meet its burden of articulat-
ing facts to support reasonable suspicion.148 He did so, however, without
addressing race further. Instead, the dissent noted the absence of several
facts from the record that could have contributed to the reasonable suspi-
cion analysis. 149 Officer Nolan was not asked whether the other officers
were in uniform, or how fast the police cars were driving. 50 Nor did the
record indicate whether Wardlow noticed the other police cars or how
much of the caravan had passed before he started to run. 5' The only
factor that supported a finding of reasonable suspicion was the officer's
statement that Wardlow "looked in our direction and began fleeing."'
52
The simple fact that Wardlow was carrying a bag in a high crime area did
not incriminate him. 53 Similar to unprovoked flight, "presence in a high
crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent ex-
planation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry." 54 Thus, the dissent
concluded, the Court relied on an insufficient series of facts to conclude
that Officer Nolan's stop was justified.
55
III. ANALYSIS
Although the four-justice Wardlow dissent recognized that race
could be considered subjectively in a reasonable suspicion Terry stop,
this article suggests the analysis should go one step further. If there is
already substantial support on the Court, represented by the four-justice
dissent, to consider how a person's preconceived notions can contribute
to an outwardly suspicious response to the police, why should courts not
also consider the racial biases of police officers who make the stops?
There is little difference between the former and the latter; simply be-
cause the race issue is politicized does not mean it should be avoided.
Though Justice Stevens' dissent rightly noted that minorities often dis-
trust police enough to modify behavior, he did not suggest that race can
146. See id. at 682.
147. See id.
148 See id. at 684.
149. See id. at 683-84.
150 See id.
151. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 684.
152 Id.
153. See id.
154. Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)).
155. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 684.
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and should be a factor separately discussed by courts to assess the legiti-
macy of reasonable suspicion. This article takes that position.
Ironically, some courts already recognize that reasonable suspicion
should be based on the totality of the circumstances. For example, United
States v. Cortez156 held that a flexible standard, including certain mental
inferences and judgments by trained officers, could be used to substanti-
ate reasonable suspicion.157 Also surprisingly, courts have previously
considered race as a factor to permit officers to detain suspects.158 Thus,
because courts are already allowing officers the discretion to consider
race objectively in order to detain a suspect, there is little justifiable rea-
son why an examination of an officer's subjective motivations concern-
ing race should be disallowed in the context of the Fourth Amendment.
In such analyses, though Whren holds otherwise, courts should explicitly
consider race in the contexts of how the character of the neighborhood
affects the reactions of a detainee to police as well as how it influences a
police officer's judgment in stopping an individual.
A. The Character of the Neighborhood and Subjective Views of
Detainee
As demonstrated by Wardlow, courts already consider character of
the neighborhood evidence in a reasonable suspicion analysis; they do
so, however, in a limited context that prejudices the detainee. Courts
should make a shift from allowing officers to consider the character of a
neighborhood as a pretext to a stop to considering how citizens in a
neighborhood see and react to the police. The former is an objective de-
termination based on the following question: is the area known for un-
156. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
157. See id. at 418.
We have recently held that stops by the Border Patrol may be justified
under circumstances less than those constituting probable cause for ar-
rest or search. Thus, the test is not whether Officers Gray and Evans had
probable cause... Rather the question is whether, based upon the whole
picture, they, as experienced Border Patrol officers, could reasonably
surmise that the particular vehicle they stopped was engaged in criminal
activity. On this record, they could so conclude.
Id. at 421-22 (internal citation omitted).
158. See Davis, supra note 3, at 429 nn.28-9 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 563-64 (1976) (holding that border patrol agents detaining travelers based on Mexican ancestry
was not a constitutional violation); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975)
(concluding that border patrol officers can consider the race of a suspect as a factor to justify a stop);
United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394-96 (8th Cir. 1992) (justifying the detention of a black
man in an airport and holding that race, when coupled with other factors, is a basis for reasonable
suspicion); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975) (concluding that the ethnicity of a suspect
can be considered when that individual seems "out of place" in a neighborhood); State v. Ruiz, 504
P.2d 1307, 1307-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that the police were correct to consider race
when they stopped a Mexican in a predominantly black area)).
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lawful activity? This can be determined by data amassed by local gov-
ernments and police stations. The latter is a subjective approach: why did
this individual act suspiciously in the presence of the police? As stated in
the Wardlow dissent, either legitimate or unlawful motivations might
cause an individual to flee or act outwardly guilty. Moreover, according
to Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, distrust of law en-
forcement based on personal experience can be considered in the totality-
of-the-circumstances test.
Presently, the courts allow the character of the neighborhood to be
considered as a contributing factor to intensify an officer's suspicion.
While some courts have already considered the ramifications of suspi-
cion based on a suspect deemed out of place in a particular neighbor-
hood, 159 courts must devise a way to prevent the risk that everyone in a
poor neighborhood is "stop-eligible." 60 One way to do so is to carefully
limit the use of the character of a neighborhood in this particular context.
The Supreme Court has already held that the neighborhood alone cannot
constitute reasonable suspicion.16 Beyond this standard, however, courts
inconsistently address how a questionable neighborhood contributes to
justifying an officer's reasonable suspicion. Some courts have concluded
that "a single observation of ambiguous conduct is sufficient . . . when
coupled with a claim that criminal activity is prevalent in the surrounding
neighborhood,"' 162 while others have not. Similar behaviors in high-
crime neighborhoods will often lead to different results, even though
jurisdictions apply the same standard. 163
It is obvious, however, that character of a neighborhood should be a
factor to a police officer's assessment of suspicion. Quantitatively, a per-
son in a bad neighborhood is more likely to be engaged in criminal ac-
tivity.164 Yet a wrongdoer will never be accurately identified every time
by even the most astute of law enforcement officers, because there will
always be law-abiding citizens in the worst neighborhoods. 65 Conse-
quently, the use of character of the neighborhood in this context should
be carefully limited.
To more effectively assess the role of neighborhood character, courts
and police should consider the surroundings only when an actor's be-
159. See State v. Barber, 823 P.2d 1068, 1074-75 (holding that a person who appears racially
out of place in a neighborhood can never constitute a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal
behavior).
160. Margaret Raymond, Down on the Comer, Out in the Street. Considering the Character of
the Ne'ghborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 99-101 (1999).
161. See id. at 112 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)).
162. Id. at 116.
163. See id. at 122.




havior is not common among law-abiding citizens of that neighborhood
at the time and location where the actor is observed. 166 If observable be-
havior does not distinguish the suspect from other community members,
the investigating officer must not pursue the suspect. This approach
would insulate law abiders in a community whose cultural distrust of law
enforcement officers prevails. Manifestations of this distrust or fear
could never result in a stop unless the behavior is unusual in light of law-
abiding, albeit police-wary, citizens in the area. Only then can the officer
consider the character of the neighborhood as part of the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion is legitimate. 167
B. Thinking About Race and Subjective Views of Officers
Just as courts should subjectively consider the character of a neigh-
borhood as it reflects on the reaction of detainees, courts should look
more carefully at how police officers intuitively approach suspects. One
way to do so would be to address the influence of social science research
and cognitive psychology, which some legal scholars have suggested can
help courts understand how the human mind understands conduct and
draws on cultural understandings to evaluate behavior.' 68 According to
current cognitive research, people group information into organizational
categories or schemas that are easier to understand. A discussion of
schema "tries to explain how we store our knowledge, how we learn and
how we remember what we have learned."' 169 In other words, an activa-
tion of mental files will assist an individual's comprehension of a famil-
iar event. This connection of the new to the known may be either a con-
scious choice or without any awareness by the individual.
Within this process of categorization comes stereotyping, which
leads to prejudgments based on understandings of categorical behavior.
Though a sudden identification of a person's characteristics based on
166. See id. at 127.
167. See id. at 128. This approach does not, however, leave room for stopping individuals in
neighborhoods simply because it is not common to find them in those neighborhoods. See St. Paul
v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (examining the constitutional validity of "profile
stops"). This court addressed whether an officer was justified to stop a vehicle registered to a suburb
approximately 20 miles from the scene, simply because it was late at night and it was unusual to find
a car with the address in the area. See id. at 624. The driver committed no traffic violations. See id.
The court concluded the driver's fourth amendment rights had been violated. See id. at 629. Be-
havior is at issue, not appearance; race alone is never enough to justify a stop. Accordingly, a white
man driving in a black neighborhood cannot be stopped absent an officer's reasonable suspicion that
extends beyond an observation that the individual looks out of place. Assuming the man drives in a
manner consistent with other law-abiding citizens of the neighborhood, a stop is both unnecessary
and unwarranted. As the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded in Uber, "[t]here simply needs to
be something more than driving your own car in a proper and legitimate manner on the public streets
of a town 'other than the one you live in' before the authorities can stop citizens." See iL at 628.
168. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 983-84.
169. ELLIN OLIVER KEENE & SUSAN ZIMMERMANN, MOSAIC OF THOUGHT 50 (1997).
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age, sex, race, nationality, or occupation is not always accurate, it is of-
tentimes on what individuals base their judgments. 17 For example, if a
police officer has a disproportionate number of encounters with men of
color, an interaction with a Hispanic man will activate an officer's
schema that Hispanic men are more likely to commit crimes, and the
man before him will appear more suspicious.
Not surprisingly, stereotyping can play an integral role in a police of-
ficer's work, because officers are expected to investigate unusual be-
havior.17 1 Mental categorization helps define what an officer sees, and
personal biases can dictate judgments and behavior. That is, although an
officer may not have control over unconsciously concluding that a His-
panic man standing on a comer looks suspicious, it nevertheless can be
the controlling factor when that officer decides the person is suspicious
enough to warrant a stop.172
The courts and society in general may be legitimately uncomfortable
with the concept that racial biases not only exist, but can be attributed to
learned understandings that result from cognitive sorting. These biases
may not be outwardly malicious, but they can have a profound impact. A
police officer who has unconsciously, or perhaps consciously, learned to
differentiate between whites and non-whites with respect to the prob-
ability of criminal activity might very well suspect a non-white actor on a
street comer over a white on the same street comer, simply because of
race.
Contrary to the holding of Terry, race is an undeniable factor in
Fourth Amendment stop and frisks, and equal protection should not be
the sole remedy for Fourteenth Amendment questions considering race.
Accordingly, courts should determine how race influenced a police offi-
cer's judgment and analyze how the officer approached the suspect
through a social science lens. Though this science is far from perfect, and
many courts would be reluctant to confront an officer's racial biases, an
exploration of that officer's stereotypes could reveal whether the suspect
was stopped for legitimate or racially motivated reasons. Clearly, the
impact of race needs to be considered in the Terry reasonable suspicion
analysis that is supposedly based on "commonsense judgments and in-
ferences about human behavior.'
73
170. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 985.
171. See id. at 987.
172. See id.




C. Considering Subjective Objective-A Psycholegal Approach
As stated above, the legal system tends to view social science contri-
butions to the courtroom with little confidence. This reticence by courts
to embrace a "psycholegal"' 174 approach is summarized by Justice Black,
who questioned, "[h]ow long will trials be delayed while judges turn
psychologists to probe the subconscious minds of witnesses?"' 7  In Mis-
souri v. Jenkins,176 Justice Thomas reasoned that evidence presented by
studies of social behavior was "unnecessary and misleading."' 177 Re-
search findings are often determined "malleable and unreliable, not re-
flective of the reality and complexity of the real world. 1 78 Furthermore,
there is a paradoxical relationship between research produced by social
scientists and common sense employed by lawyers and courts. "When
research refutes common-sense psychology, it is often dismissed as in-
valid. When the research supports common-sense psychology, it is often
dismissed as unnecessary because it merely confirms common sense."'
179
Courts typically employ a common sense approach to analyze and
explain conduct. As the majority reasoned in Wardlow, "the determina-
tion of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments
and inferences about human behavior."'1 80 The Whren Court also ob-
served the objective method of analysis, determining that "the fact that
the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the
reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does
not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed ob-
jectively, justify that action."'
' 81
Just as courts are wary of psychological methodology, psychologistsS •• 182
have viewed the common sense approach with equal skepticism. This
objective, reasonable person test to examine an arresting officer's con-
duct, according to psychological interpretation, borrows from "such un-
reliable sources as 'the pages of human experience."" 8 3 The problem
174. Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycholegal
Research, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 107 (1998).
175. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 248 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
176. 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
177. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121(Thomas, J., concurring).
178. Redding, supra note 174, at 113.
179. Id.
180. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
181. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
182. See Redding, supra note 174, at 113.
183. Id. at 118 (citing Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme
Court's Reckless Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1569,
1594, 1596-97 (1992) (stating that to the Court, common sense is "often is far more persuasive than
data gleaned from methodologically sound research .. .the relationship between law and social
science is less than perfect. 'Like an insensitive scoundrel involved with an attractive but funda-
mentally irksome lover who too much wants to be courted, the judiciary shamelessly uses the social
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with relying on common sense in a courtroom is that it "lulls us into the
false security of believing that we already understand people,"184 while
psychology can "raise[] questions about what we really do understand
,,181and go[] beyond common-sense formulations.
Writing for the majority in Wardlow, Justice Rehnquist concluded
the Court did not have a precise method to assess the behavior of Officer
Nolan. "[I]n reviewing the propriety of an officer's conduct," Justice
Rehnquist resolved, "courts do not have available empirical studies
dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot
reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement
officers where none exists. ' 86 Though the proposed "subjective objec-
tives" approach cannot provide a court with absolute certainty of an offi-
cer's justification or wrongdoing, the benefits of psycholegal research
and considerations of an officer's subjective intentions could assist
courts in making legal conclusions with more precision.
Whether well received or not, a psychological approach is nothing
new to the courts. Cognitive assessments are frequently made to deter-
mine whether defendants are mentally fit to stand trial. 18  The psychole-
gal approach sought by this article simply extends the consideration of
race, as suggested in part by the Wardlow dissent, to help explain the
reactions of the detainee to police as well as the impact that race may
sciences.' Courts cite the results of psychological research when they believe it will enhance the
elegance of their opinions, as in the most oft-cited example of Brown v. Board of Education, but
empiricism is readily discarded when more traditional legally acceptable bases for decisionmaking is
available.").
184. Redding, supra note 174, at 118. (citing HARVEY C. LINDGREN AND JOHN H. HARVEY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 7 (1981)).
185. Id.
186. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
187. See generally United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a person
is not responsible for a crime if that person cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of it due to a mental
disease or defect); State v. Green, 643 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (setting aside the defen-
dant's conviction, concluding the State had not met its burden of rebutting the defendant's sanity
defense); State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (Wash. 1910) (remanding to determine whether the defen-
dant had the will to control his body and comprehend the nature and quality of his actions). The
following articles discuss the insanity defense in detail. See generally Peter Arenella, Reflections on
Current Proposals to Abolish or Reform the Insanity Defense, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 271 (1982) (After
the acquittal of John W. Hinkley, Jr., Congress considered several bills to abolish or reform the
federal insanity defense. The article is Professor Aranella's testimony before the House of Repre-
sentatives' Subcommittee on Criminal Justice.); Donald H.J. Hermann, Assault on the Insanity
Defense: Limitations on the Effectiveness and Effect of the Defense of Insanity, 14 RUTGERS L.J.
241, 244 (1983) ('This article undertakes an examination of the principal changes in the rules gov-
erning the use and effect of the insanity defense."); Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally
Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 497 (1985)
("Redefining the insanity defense, carefully structuring the commitment process for insanity acquit-
tees, and ensuring treatment for those found guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity would more
directly and effectively, address the concerns underlying the current attraction toward the guilty but
mentally ill verdict.").
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have on the motivations of the police who made the stop. Though not a
definitive answer to a complex task, a psycholegal approach could be a
starting point to assist a defendant in demonstrating the stop was race-
based. If courts were more willing to consider the work of psychologists,
fact finders could determine how an officer schematically organizes
mental files, past experiences, and stereotypes. When the officer detains,
frisks, and/or arrests someone because of racial bias, lawyers and judges
should have tools to assess the subjective motivations of the officer. With
proper training, lawyers could develop skills to "identify and counteract
biases and prejudices ... that would otherwise interfere with their ability
to reach reliable verdicts." 188 Furthermore, lawyer-psychologist collabo-
ration could enable lawyers to "gather more reliable evidence before
trial, more effectively identify and eliminate biased jurors during voir
dire, reduce the biasing effect of evidence presented during trial, and
present clearer and more understandable arguments.' 89
Courts should permit and encourage the consideration of subjective
motivations of officers who search, seize, or stop and frisk suspects. The
analysis should not only consist of what a reasonable person, or experi-
enced officer, would do under the fact-specific circumstances. An analy-
sis of the psychological, schematic nature of the officer's suspicion
would include an exploration of the officer's background knowledge of
and experience with the detainee's race. Collaboration with cognitive
psychologists would be appropriate to develop a research-based line of
questioning to effectively assess the officer's previous experiences that
contribute to racially motivated action. This information could assist a
detainee in undermining the reasonable, articulable suspicion for a
Fourth Amendment claim.
The approach should not be entertained to deceive the officer with
psychological jargon, or to manipulate or damage otherwise honorable
and just police work. Nor would the examination be an overblown, inef-
ficient psychoanalysis of a witness. Rather, a psycholegal approach
would be a natural extension of the common sense, objective standard
approach currently employed by courts under Terry. At the same time, if
courts would permit it, lawyers might train with and learn from psy-
chologists in order to develop more precise methods to evaluate an offi-
cer's behavior, as Justice Rehnquist suggested was lacking in Wardlow.
188. J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741,775 (1987).
189. Id.
20001
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
Inner-city distrust of police is both ingrained and justified by re-
peated occasions of unjustified stops. Terry allows police officers to
make these stops based on reasonable suspicion, a lower standard than
probable cause. Wardlow is a modem application of the Terry doctrine,
which permitted officers to stop and search an individual in a high-crime
neighborhood because he made eye contact with an officer and fled.
Fleeing from police when there is a deep-rooted distrust of law enforce-
ment does not support the requisite reasonable suspicion required to stop
and frisk a suspect.
Police will continue to make unjustified stops and courts will con-
tinue to permit them unless the issue of race is brought to the forefront. It
is not surprising that the majority opinion of Wardlow made no reference
to race as a factor to be considered in light of the officer's reasonable
suspicion, because society-at-large is uncomfortable with confronting
racial biases. The dissent suggested that race could be a component of
the totality of the circumstances, yet stopped short of applying race ex-
plicitly to the facts. Courts should allow race to be a factor in Fourth
Amendment analyses instead of reserving the discussion solely for equal
protection claims. One approach would be to consider the character of
the neighborhood in determining whether an individual's behavior is out
of the ordinary among law-abiding citizens. Another would be to permit
an examination of whether an officer stopped a suspect based on reason-
able, articulable suspicion or racial bias. Until schematic categorizations
become a part of a court's assessment of an officer's motivations, on
occasion police will continue to intentionally or unintentionally act on
suspicions of race based on personal experience. This will only exacer-
bate the distrust between inner-city residents and the police, because





STUDENT-ON-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A CASE
COMMENT ON THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
DAVIS V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
Student-on-student sexual harassment is an increasingly serious and
pervasive problem for society and educational institutions.' Until re-
cently, however, few clear guidelines existed to inform federally funded
educational institutions of their potential liability for failure to identify,
investigate, and punish peer sexual harassment. While Congress enacted
Title IX to prohibit sexual discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance, it was unclear whether
an individual could bring a private damages action against a school board
in cases involving peer sexual harassment.2
In May 1999, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the
issue of school liability for peer sexual harassment in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education.3 The Supreme Court held that "recipients of
federal funding may be liable for subjecting their students to discrimina-
tion where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of stu-
dent-on-student sexual harassment, and the harasser is under the school's
disciplinary authority. ' 4 The Court based its decision on a series of Su-
preme Court and Circuit Court decisions. First, the Court relied on
Menitor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 5 to provide the foundation for the
inclusion of sexual harassment within those discriminatory acts prohib-
1. See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Sexual Harassment in Schools, 12 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 301
(1997); see also American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, Hostile
Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools 7-11 (1993) (finding
four out of five students between the eight and eleventh grades reported having been the target of
sexual harassment).
2. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
3. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
4. Davis, 526 U.S. at 646-47.
5. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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ited by Title IX.6 The Court also reinforced the notice requirement estab-
lished in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,7 finding that
Title IX inherently requires that the funding recipient receive adequate
notice so that it may adequately assess its potential liability.8 Third, de-
spite the failure of Title IX to expressly authorize a private right of action
by a person injured under Title IX, 9 the Supreme Court relied on Cannon
v. University of Chicago ° to establish an implied private right of action."
The Court further relied on Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 2 which held that monetary damages were available for plain-
tiffs claiming a private right of action under Title IX. 3 Finally, the Su-
preme Court adopted the standard developed in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District14 which requires "deliberate indifference" by
the school board to "known acts of student-on-student sexual harass-
ment" before imposing liability. 5
Unfortunately, while resolving the broad question of school
liability for peer sexual harassment, the Court has failed to clarify many
specifics and has generated a series of new controversies. This comment
reviews the jurisprudence surrounding Title IX and Davis, describes the
majority and dissenting opinions in Davis, and seeks to analyze these
controversies, as well as the state of law regarding student-on-student
sexual harassment in light of the Supreme Court's ruling.
6. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639.
7. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
8. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.
9. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994).
10. 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
11. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639.
12. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
13. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639.
14. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
15. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643-47 (in Gebser, the Court required: "actual knowledge" by a
school official "who at a minimum ha[d] authority to address the alleged discrimination and to
institute corrective measures" on behalf of the school district; and "deliberate indifference" by the
school district to the harassed student's rights under Title IX, Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290); see also C.
Scott Williams, Schools, Peer Sexual Harassment, Title IX, and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 1087, 1094-95 (1999).
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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any educational program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance."' 16 The impact of Title IX on the education system in the
United States has been widespread. Nearly every educational institution
is a grant recipient that accepts some type of federal financial assistance,
and, therefore, must comply with Title IX or risk revocation of its federal
funding. 7 However, the extent of the impact of Title IX continues to
evolve, reflecting both Congressional amendments that allow for a
broader application of the statute" and attempts by the courts to stretch
the boundaries of Title IX liability. As a result, Title IX has shifted from
a statute used primarily to "implement gender equity reforms in educa-
tion programs and activities into a powerful cause of action for employ-
ees and students seeking money damages for sexual discrimination in
educational programs receiving federal funds."'1 9
By enacting Title IX, Congress sought to close "loopholes in exist-
ing legislation relating to general education programs and employment
resulting from those programs,, 20 and in doing so, deter the use of "fed-
eral resources to support discriminatory practices" and "provide individ-
ual citizens effective protection against those practices.' Specifically,
Congress designed Title IX to bridge "the gender gap[s] in civil rights
legislation" 22 created by Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Congress enacted Title VI in 1964, in an effort to end discrimination
based on race, color, or national origin in any program receiving federal
16. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) (the statute defines education as "any public or private
preschool, elementary or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher
education except that in the case of an educational institution composed of more than one school,
college, or department which are administratively separate units, such term means each school,
college or department). 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c).
17. See id. at § 1681 (a).
18. See Julie Carroll Fay, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: Is it Really The
Final Word on School Liability For Teacher-To-Student Sexual Harassment?, 31 CONN. L. REV.
1485, 1490-91 (1999) (citing Rehabilitation Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1986)).
19. Franklin v. Gwinnet County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992); Williams, supra note 15,
at 1092.
20. Emmalena K. Quesada, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Har-
assment and the Standard of Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1021 (1998) (cit-
ing 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)).
21. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
22. Fay, supra note 18, at 1490.
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funding.23 Congress enacted Title VII, on the other hand, to prevent an
employer from discriminating against employees, or potential employ-
ees, with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
,,24national origin. Title VII provides protected classes of employees the
right to work in an environment free from discrimination, intimidation,
and ridicule.2' Like Title XII, Title IX prohibits discrimination based on
sex (shifting the setting from the employment context to the education
context); but the statutory language in Title IX more closely reflects the
language in Title VI, as both statutes prohibit discrimination in institu-
26tions receiving federal funds.
2. Sexual Harassment and Title IX: Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson 
7
To establish a cause of action under Title IX, an individual must
demonstrate that: 1) the educational program received federal assistance;
2) the individual was excluded from participating in, denied the benefits
of, or subjected to discrimination in an educational program; and 3) the
exclusion was on the basis of sex .2 As in Title VII, the statutory lan-
guage of Title IX does not explicitly define "on the basis of sex" or ex-
pressly prohibit sexual harassment as a form of discrimination.2 How-
ever, the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR), re-
sponsible for enforcement of Title IX, has adopted two categories of sex-
ual harassment. 30 The evolution of these categories can be traced to Title
VII and the employment context.3'
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII, promulgated
guidelines, which expanded the definition of 'exclusion on the basis of
sex' to include sexual harassment,32 thereby making sexual harassment in
23. See § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-2,
2000d-4 (1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (emphasis supplied).
25. See Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 1, at 306.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
28. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996).
29. See 20 U.S.C. §1681 (1994).
30. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (Mar. 13,1997) [hereinafter 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034];
ED/OCR: Sexual Harassment: It's Not Academic Pamphlet [hereinafter ED/OCR Pamphlet]; Karen
E. Edmondson, Davis v. Monroe Board of Education Goes to College: Holding Post-Secondary
Institutions Liable Under Title lXfor Peer Sexual Harassment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1203, 1206
(2000).
31. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
32. See id.
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the workplace a violation of Title VII.33 The EEOC divided sexual har-
assment into two categories: quid pro quo harassment and hostile envi-
ronment harassment.34
Six years later, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the United
States Supreme Court adopted the EEOC guidelines and recognized both
categories of harassment as discrimination "on the basis of sex., 35 In
Menitor, a female bank employee brought Title VII sexual harassment
suit against her employer and her supervisor alleging her supervisor
subjected her to a hostile work environment.36 The Supreme Court held
"that the plaintiff stated a claim under Title VII, and recognized that
'hostile environment' sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination
actionable under Title VII." 37
Relying on the EEOC Guidelines and the Menitor decision, the
OCR adopted similar guidelines stating both categories of sexual har-
assment were applicable to the educational context.38 According to OCR
guidelines, quid pro quo harassment "occurs when a school employee
conditions a student's access to educational opportunities on the stu-
dent's compliance with unwelcome sexual conduct."3 9 It can also occur
when an employee causes a student to believe that the employee will
make an educational decision based on whether or not the student sub-
mits to unwelcome sexual conduct.4° Hostile environment sexual harass-
ment "occurs when sexual harassment by an employee, student, or third
party is sufficiently severe to create a hostile educational environment or
interfere with a victim's access to education. ' This type of harassment
includes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."4' "Conduct is un-
welcome if the student does not request or invite the conduct, and views
it as offensive or undesirable."43
33. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985).
34. See id.
35. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The Court noted that the guidelines "constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."
Id.
36. See id. at 60.
37. Id. at 73.
38. See 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, supra note 30; ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30.
39. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, supra note 30; ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30; Kelly Dixson
Furr, How Well are the Nation's Children Protected from Peer Harassment at School?: Title IX
Liability in the Wake of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1583
(2000).
40. See 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, supra note 30; ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30.
41. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, supra note 30; ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30; Furr, supra note
39, at 1583.
42. Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 1, at 307; Furr, supra note 39, at 1583.
43. ED/OCR: Sexual Harassment: It's Not Academic Pamphlet.
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3. Notice under Title IX: Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman"
Title IX, like Title VI, has been "construed by the Supreme Court as
having been enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause of the Constitu-
tion. ' In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the Su-
preme Court likened legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' spending
power to a contract, whereby the State or recipient of federal funding
agrees to comply with federally imposed conditions in exchange for fed-
eral funds.46 Thus, Congress's power under the Spending Clause depends
on "whether the state or funding recipient voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the 'contract. ' ' '47 No acceptance of potential liability
can occur if the state or funding recipient is "unaware of the conditions
or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it."'48 Therefore, Congress
must speak with a clear, unambiguous voice if it intends to impose a
condition on the receipt of federal funds.49
In Pennhurst, a "mentally retarded" resident of Pennhurst, a state-
operated living facility for mentally retarded individuals, brought suit
against both the facility and the state of Florida alleging inhuman and
dangerous conditions. 50 Florida was a participant in the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Right Act (Act), a federal-state grant
program.51 The resident alleged that the defendants violated his constitu-
tional rights and his statutory rights under the Act (which states that
mentally retarded persons "have a right to appropriate treatment, serv-
ices, and habitation in the setting that is least restrictive of... personal
liberty.").52 The Supreme Court held that the States did not receive ade-
quate notice to be held liable since nothing in the Act or its legislative
history suggests "that Congress intended to require the States to assume
the high cost of providing 'appropriate treatment' in the 'least restrictive'
environment to their mentally retarded citizens. ' 3 In other words, Con-
gress failed to speak clearly enough so that the state could make an in-
44. 451 U.S. at 1.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 1; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S.
274, 286 (1998); Fay, supra note 18, at 1491.




50. See id. at 5-6.
51. See id. atl, 11-12.
52. Id. at I (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(1) and (2)).
53. id.
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formed choice. 4 As a result, the Court held that Florida was not liable for
monetary damages.5
Consistent with the Pennhurst decision, Title IX "creates a contract
between the government and the educational grant recipient 56 such that a
violation of Title IX by the grant recipient may ultimately result in the
revocation of its federal funds., 57 Therefore, Title IX inherently requires
that the federal government provide the grant recipient with adequate
notice in order to achieve the goal of voluntary compliance. 8 No accep-
tance of liability can occur by an educational funding recipient if the
recipient is unaware or unable to ascertain the conditions or prohibitions
outlined in Title IX.59
4. Private Right of Action Under Title IX: Cannon v. University of
Chicago6°
61Title IX does not expressly authorize a private right of action.
62However, in 1979, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme
Court determined that Title IX includes an implied private right of ac-
tion, thereby allowing an individual to bring a private civil suit for sex
discrimination committed by federally funded institutions. 6' The Court
held that a female student, denied admission to two medical schools
which received federal funding, was not limited to administrative reme-
dies for a Title IX violation and "instead had the statutory right to bring a
private civil lawsuit in federal court."64 "The Court inferred that Con-
gress had intended to provide a remedy under Title IX, even though the
language authorizing a private cause of action was absent from TitleI.65
The Court based its opinion on three factors. First, the "plaintiff was
a member of the class for whose benefit Title IX was enacted." 66 Second,
Title IX was "patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"
and "both statutes provide the same administrative mechanism for termi-
nating federal financial support for institutions engaged in prohibiting
54. See id. at 3.
55. See id. at 18.
56. Fay, supra note 18, at 1491.
57. id.
58. See id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994).
59. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
60. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
61. See § 901, 86 Stat. 373, codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. § 1681; Cannon, 441 U.S. at
683.
62. Cannon, 441U.S. at 677.
63. See id. at 689.
64. Id. at 717.
65. Id. at 688-89; Williams, supra note 15, at 1093 (1999).
66. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693-94.
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d .. . . ,67
discrimination. The Court reasoned that a private remedy must be
available under Title IX since "critical language in Title VI had already
been construed as creating a private remedy. 68 Third, a "private remedy
under Title IX would not 'frustrate the underlying purpose of the legisla-
tive scheme' since the use of federal funds by the university justified the
government's interest in a private cause of action. 69 Further, the Court
stated that historically the federal, rather than state, courts have protected
against "invidious discrimination, 70 and, thus, the creation of a federal
remedy would not infringe upon subject matter "traditionally regulated to
state law.'
5. Monetary Damages Under Title IX: Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools
72
The Supreme Court in Cannon, while "permitting a private right of
action under Title IX, limited available damages to equitable and injunc-
tive relief., 73 However, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools74 ,
where a female student alleged that intentional sexual harassment and
abuse by a male teacher made the school environment hostile75, the Su-
preme Court unanimously held that monetary damages were available for
plaintiffs claiming a private right of action under Title IX." The Court
relied heavily on its previous decisions permitting compensatory dam-
ages for claims of intentional discrimination under Title V1.77 Despite the
fact that Title IX is silent "on the issue of available remedies," the Court
presumed all appropriate remedies were available.78 The Court reasoned
"absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts
have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of
action brought pursuant to a federal statute."7 9 After all, "Congress surely
did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support the inten-
tional actions it sought by statute to proscribe."80
The Court further noted that the presumption that remedies are lim-
ited under statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause of the United
67. Id. at 695-96; Williams, supra note 15, at 1093.




72. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
73. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717.
74. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 60.
75. See id. at 63.
76. See id. at 76.
77. See id. at 70.
78. Id. at 66.
79. Id. at 70-71.
80. Id. at 75.
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States Constitution is not applicable to intentional violations. In addition,
the Court held that Title IX unquestionably places on public schools a
"duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminates' on the basis of sex." 8'
6. Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment: Title IX Standard
a. Institutional Liability: Rowinski v. Bryan Independent School
District 12and Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech Institute andState University8 3
Unfortunately, the Cannon and Franklin opinions provided "little
guidance regarding the specific analysis of a Title IX sexual harassment
8,4claim or the applicable standard for institutional liability." The Franklin
Court, like many other courts, strongly implied that Title VII principles
were applicable in evaluating Title IX sexual harassment claims within
85schools. Nevertheless, various circuits developed different theories for
86liability.
In Rowinski v. Bryan Independent School District87 , the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that institutional liability would arise only
if "a plaintiff [could] demonstrate that the school district responded to
sexual harassment claims differently based on sex."88 In Rowinski, three
male students repeatedly physically and verbally abused Janet, an eighth-
grade female student, and her sister. 9 One male student regularly swatted
Janet's bottom and made comments such as, "When are you going to let
me fuck you? What bra size are you wearing?" and "What size panties
are you wearing?" 90 The student also groped Janet's genital area and
grabbed her breasts.9' The girls and their mother complained eight times
before the school suspended the male student from riding the bus for
92three days. When another male student allegedly reached up one of the
girl's skirt while making crude remarks, the school suspended him for
three days.93 During class, a third student reached under Janet's shirt and
81. Id. at 75; Williams, supra note 15, at 1094.
82. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
83. 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
84. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677,771; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70-71.
85. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
86. See Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1226.
87. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1006.
88. Id. at 1016.




93. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1009.
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unfastened her bra.94 The school only suspended the boy for the rest of
the day and the following day, based on the Vice Principal's belief that
the boy's conduct was not sexual in nature.95 The girls' mother brought
suit alleging the school had "condoned and caused hostile environment
sexual harassment., 96 The Fifth Circuit dismissed her complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim under Title IX, finding that the school was liable only
if it treated sexual harassment of boys more or less serious than it treated
sexual harassment of females. 97 In other words, so long as the school
treated harassment consistently, regardless of whether the treatment was
appropriate, the school was not liable.
Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit developed a "knew or should have
known standard" in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech Institute and State
University.98 Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia Tech, was gang raped by
two university football players. 99 Following the rape, she became de-
pressed, attempted suicide, and withdrew from classes.' ° The University
found one of the players guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for a
year, but later, without notifying Brzonkala, set aside the suspension as
excessive, reduced the charge to abusive language, and allowed the foot-
ball player to return on full scholarship.' 0' Brzonkala filed suit alleging
that Virginia Tech, by failing to punish the rapist in any "meaningful
manner," violated Title IX.)° Affirming Brzonkala's claim under Title
IX, the Court held that to succeed in a Title IX hostile environment sex-
ual harassment claim, a plaintiff must establish: "1) that she [or he] be-
longs to a protected group; 2) that she [or he] was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment; 3) that the harassment was based on sex; 4) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the condi-
tions of her [or his] education and create an abusive educational envi-
ronment; and 5) that some basis for institutional liability has been estab-
lished."'  In reference to the fifth requirement, the Court stated institu-
tional liability would arise if the university "knew or should have known





97. See id. at 1016.
98. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 960.
99. See id. at 953.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 955.
102 See id. at 956.
103. Id. at 958; Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1210.
104. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 960.
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b. School Liability for Teacher Sexual Harassment: Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District°5
Thus, the stage was set for the United States Supreme Court to es-
tablish a consistent standard. In Gebser v. Lago, a female high school
student, allegedly seduced by a male teacher, "asked the district court to
hold the school district liable, because the teacher had subjected her to
sexual harassment sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's education and create an abusive learning environment. '"'
The student's argument, based on agency principles, was rejected by the
Supreme Court in favor of a standard requiring: 1) "actual knowledge"
by a school official " who at a minimum ha[d] authority to address the
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on behalf of
the school district;" and 2) "deliberate indifference" by the school district
to the harassed student's rights under Title IX.'07 This two-prong test,
used to assess liability for teacher sexual harassment under Title IX, pro-
vided a framework for judicial resolution of peer sexual harassment
cases, and it served as the foundation for the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.
II. DAV1S V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
A. Facts
The petitioner's daughter, LaShonda, was allegedly the victim of a
prolonged pattern of sexual harassment by G.F., a fifth-grade, male
classmate. °8 The harassment commenced in December 1992 and ended
in mid-May 1993 after G.F. was charged with, and pleaded guilty to,
sexual battery.' °9 During this period, LaShonda and her mother, Ms.
Davis, reported a series of incidents involving sexual harassment to
school faculty and administrators." 0 According to LaShonda, G.F. twice
attempted to touch her breasts and genital area making vulgar statements
such as "I want to get in bed with you" and "I want to feel your
boobs.""' LaShonda reported both incidents to her mother and her class-
room teacher."12 Furthermore, Ms. Davis contacted the teacher, who as-
105. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
106. Williams, supra note 15, at 1094-95.
107. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1995; see also Williams, supra note 15, at 1095.
108. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
109. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-34.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 633.
112. See id. at 633-34.
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sured her that she had informed the principal."' However, the school
took no disciplinary action.'
a
The alleged harassment continued when G.F. "placed a door stop in
his pants" and acted in a sexually aggressive manner toward
LaShonda.I 5 LaShonda reported the event to her gym teacher who took
no action.'1 6 Similarly, the school took no action when G.F. engaged in
harassing conduct towards LaShonda in front of yet another teacher,
even though both LaShonda and her mother reported the incident.1 7 De-
spite these reports, G.F. again directed sexually harassing conduct toward
LaShonda during gym class, causing LaShonda to again report the inci-
dent to two teachers. 18 G.F. continued the harassing conduct by rubbing
his body against LaShonda "in the school hallway in what LaShonda
considered a sexually suggestive manner."1 9 Again, LaShonda reported
the matter and told her mother she did not "know how much longer she
could keep G.F. off her."'
20
Other female classmates similarly were victims of G.F.'s conduct,
and a group of female students, including LaShonda, attempted to speak
with the principal, but a teacher denied them access. 12 LaShonda's
mother also spoke with the principal about G.F.. The principal told her
that he would "threaten him a little bit harder" and asked why LaShonda
was the only one complaining. 12 Ms. Davis then complained to the
school superintendent, but the school still took no disciplinary action to
punish or curtail G.F.'s harassing conduct.123 Despite numerous requests,
the school made no effort for three months even to separate G.F. and
LaShonda, who were seated next to each other in class. 124 At the time of
LaShonda's harassment, the County Board of Education "had not in-
structed its personnel on how to respond to peer sexual harassment and
had not established a policy on the issue."'25
113. See id. at 634.
114. See id.





120. Davis, 526 U.S. at 634.
121. See id.
122. Id.; see also Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F.Supp. 363, 364 (M.D. Ga.
1994).
123. Davis, 526 U.S. at 635; Aurelia D., 862 F.Supp. at 364.
124. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 635.
125. Id.
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Because of the harassment, LaShonda's previously high grades
dropped, she was unable to concentrate, and her father discovered she
had written a suicide note.
126
B. Procedural History
Ms. Davis, on behalf of LaShonda, sued the school board and school
officials under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 for failure
to remedy G.F.'s sexual harassment of LaShonda. 2 7 Ms. Davis alleged
that: 1) the board was a recipient of federal funding for purposes of Title
IX; 2) "the persistent sexual advances and harassment by" G.F. interfered
with LaShonda's "ability to attend school and perform her studies and
activities"; and 3) the defendant's deliberate indifference to "the unwel-
come sexual advances" of G.F. "created an intimidating, hostile, offen-
sive and abus[ive] school environment in violation of Title IX.,'' 28 The
United States District Court for the Middle Court of Georgia dismissed
the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
129
Specifically, the district court dismissed the suit against the school offi-
cials "on the ground that only federally funded educational institutions
[not School Boards] are subject to liability in private causes of action
under Title IX."'3 ° The Court dismissed the suit against the School Board
because "Title IX provide[s] no basis for liability absent an allegation
that the Board or an employee of the Board had any role in the harass-
ment.""'3 Thus, the Court found that peer sexual harassment provides no
ground for a private cause of action under the statute. 1
2
Ms. Davis appealed the decision regarding the school board. 133 The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that "Title IX
encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile educational
environment created by a fellow student or students when the supervising
authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate the harassment. ' 34 An en
banc Court then voted to vacate the opinion and grant the school board's
motion for rehearing."' The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
Title IX was passed pursuant to Congress' legislative authority under the
Constitution's Spending Clause'3 6 and that the statute, therefore, must
126. See id.
127. See id. at 634.
128. Id. at 636, quoting the complaint.
129. Aurelia D., 862 F.Supp. at 368.
130. Id. at 367.
131. Davis, 526 U.S. at 636 (quoting Aurelia D., 862 F.Supp. at 368).
132. See Aurelia D., 862 F.Supp. at 367.
133. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (llth Cir. 1996).
134. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193 (borrowing from Title VII law and the language in Franklin, see
supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
135. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1418, 1418 (11 th Cir. 1996).
136. U.S CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
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provide potential recipients of federal education funds with "unambigu-
ous notice of the conditions they are assuming when they accept" it.
37
While Title IX provides recipients with notice that they must stop their
employees from engaging in discriminatory conduct, it does not provide
"notice of a duty to prevent student-on-student harassment."''3 8 The dis-
sent argued that by not identifying "the perpetrator of discrimination,
[the statute] encompasses misconduct by third parties."' 39 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine "whether, and under what circum-
stances, a recipient of federal educational funds can be liable in a private
damages action arising from student-on-student sexual harassment.'' 40
C. Majority Opinion
On May 24, 1999, in a majority opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, the United States Supreme Court voted five to four to reverse
the Eleventh Circuit's decision. 41 The Court held that a private Title IX
damages action may lie against a school board in cases of student-on-
student harassment, "but only where the funding recipient acts with de-
liberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or ac-
tivities.' 42 The Court further held that "such an action will lie only for
harassment that is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit.'
143
The Court's decision reflects the 'actual knowledge plus deliberate
indifference' test developed in Gebser. 44 In addition, the Court relied on
its holdings Canton, where it held an implied private right action exists
under Title IX; Franklin, where it held monetary damages were an ap-
propriate remedy for violations of Title IX; and Pennhurst, where the
Court established the parameters of the notice requirement for statutes
enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Spending Clause. 45 The
Court also recognized, as it did in Gebser, that liability for damages un-
der Title IX is not based on agency principles. 46
137. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1399 (11 th Cir. 1997).
138. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1401.
139. Id. at 1412 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
140. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 637 (1999).
141. See id. at 632.
142. Id. at 633.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 642-43; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. at 1995
(1999).
145. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639-43.
146. See id. at 643.
[Vol. 78:1
2000] DAVIS v. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 163
Applying these judicial standards, the Court found that Title IX
"proscribes harassment with sufficient clarity" to satisfy notice require-
ments for Spending Clause legislation, 147 and noted that "the regulatory
scheme surrounding Title IX [and common law] has long provided fund
recipients with notice that they may be held liable for their failure" to
protect students from acts of a third party. 48 However, the court limited
liability for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX "to cir-
cumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both
the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.' 49
The court reasoned that by exercising control over the harasser and the
environment in which the known harassment occurs, a school district that
responds with deliberate indifference essentially subjects its students to
the harassment. 50 At a minimum, deliberate indifference must "'cause
[students] to undergo' harassment or 'make them liable or vulnerable' to
it." '' Whether sexual harassment has occurred depends on factors "in-
cluding, but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the
number of individuals involved.' 512 Damages, according to the Court, are
unavailable "for simple acts of teasing and name-calling," even where
these comments target gender differences.13
Contrary to the Department of Education Office of Civil Rights
guidelines, the Supreme Court further limited liability by adopting an
actual notice standard. 5 4 Thus, the courts cannot hold a school liable for
sexual harassment by a third party absent a school official's actual
knowledge of the harassment.
In the instant case, the Court held that petitioners stated a claim.
155
Labeling G.F.'s conduct as "severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive,"' 156 the Court recognized that the School Board was a funding re-
cipient under Title IX and that the Board retained significant "control
over the context in which the harassment occurred".'5 7 Furthermore, de-
spite numerous complaints, the school board made no effort whatsoever
to investigate or put an end to the harassment and, as a result, LaShonda
allegedly suffered harm. 58 Thus, the Court concluded that the Eleventh
147 Id. at 650.
148 Id. at 643.
149. Id. at 645.
150. See id.
151. Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1415 (1966)).
152. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
153. Id. at 652.
154 See id. at 650.
155. See id. at 653-54.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 646.
158. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 634-35.
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Circuit erred in dismissing Ms. Davis' complaint, and the case was re-
manded. 59
D. Dissent
In the dissent, Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) expressed a number of objections to
the majority's opinion. First, the dissent feared that the majority's deci-
sion would allow the federal government to interfere in the historically
state-controlled school system."6 Second, the dissent argued, "neither the
DOE's Title IX regulation nor state tort law... could [or does] provide
states" with the required notice that the statute prohibits the conduct.'
16
Third, the dissent asserted that the majority's decision would trigger a
wave of litigation resulting in an escalation of financial costs and a diver-
sion of scarce resources.162 They further asserted that the decision raises a
series of conflicting interests between the harasser's rights and the rights
of the harasser's victim. 63 Fifth, according to the dissent, the majority
fails to sufficiently define sexual harassment or provide clear
guidelines.' 64 Finally, the dissent argued that Title IX is applicable only




The Supreme Court's opinion in Davis purports to put an end to the
debate of whether, and under what circumstances, a recipient of federal
educational funds can be liable in a private damages action arising from
student-on-student sexual harassment. 66 However, the Court's decision
leaves many questions unanswered and is not without controversy.
Of particular concern is the question of federal interference in, and
potential control of, areas otherwise traditionally outside federal reach. 
6 7
The Court's decision arguably allows the federal government and courts
to set policy, becoming the final arbitrators and ever-present regulators
of school policy.168 The dissent argued that this grant of power fails to
protect state and local government autonomy required by our constitu-
159. See id at 654.
160. See id. at 654-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
162. See id at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
164. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 662-63 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 663.
167. See id. at 654-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 686 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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tional system. 69 Ultimately, the dissent feared that the introduction of
federal control into the school system "has the potential to obliterate dis-
tinctions between national and local spheres of interest." 7 There was
further concern that the Court's decision "invites courts and juries to
second-guess school administrators in every case to judge ... whether
the school's response was 'clearly unreasonable.'- 1 71 Questioning school
disciplinary action is something the Supreme Court has in the past, con-
sistently refused to do. 17 The dissent feared that ultimately, such inter-
ference could serve to transform every school disciplinary decision into a
jury question.'73 A strong argument can be made that day-to-day deci-
sions concerning school policy, student behavior, and disciplinary en-
forcement are best made by parents, teachers, and school administrators
guided by local- or state-based policy. 174 These entities are arguably bet-
ter able to monitor and react to the needs of local schools and students.
Conversely, increased federal interference may provide much
needed direction. In the past, school administrators, and school employ-
ees have been inconsistent, and often ineffective, in their treatment of
peer sexual harassment. 75 The Davis decision offers some uniformity in
the form of general guidelines to school administrators. Such consistency
could potentially allow schools to quickly address legitimate complaints
and weed out frivolous ones. Furthermore, despite federal interference,
the Supreme Court's decision arguably conferred a degree of deference
to school officials. To avoid liability, school districts "must merely re-
spond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unrea-
sonable.' ' 76 Thus, the Court's standard is flexible enough to accommo-
date different school districts' concerns and procedures.
Notice requirements are a second area of controversy. The Court
addresses several notice issues. First, there was a question as to whether
Title IX provides notice to fund recipients of potential liability for the
acts of third parties. The dissent argued that the Gebser decision makes
clear that the Spending Clause's 'clear and unambiguous notice rule'
"requires both that the recipients be on general notice of the kind of con-
duct the statute prohibits, and-at least when money damages are
sought-that they be on notice that illegal conduct is occurring in a given
situation."'' 77 Arguably, the majority is unfaithful to these principles since
"neither the DOE's Title IX regulation nor state tort law ... could or did
169. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
170. Davis, 526 U.S. at 654 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 678-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 674 ( Kennedy, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 684 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175.- See Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1205.
176. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
177. Id. at 672 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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provide States the notice required by our Spending Clause principles."'
' 78
Title IX does not give schools clear notice that the conduct the majority
labels peer sexual harassment is gender discrimination within the mean-
ing of the statute, nor does it give notice that the school could be held
liable for money damages for failure to respond to third party discrimi-
nation. 79 The dissent argued "most of the regulations cited by the major-
ity merely forbid grant recipients to give affirmative aid to third-parties
who discriminate." 80 The other regulations "forbid grant recipients to
delegate the provision of student (or employee) benefits and services to
third parties who engage in gender discrimination in administering...
the school's program.,,18' The regulations do not indicate a duty "to rem-
edy discrimination by third parties over whom the school may arguably
exercise some control."' 82 Each DOE regulation is "predicated on a grant
recipient's choice to give affirmative aid to, or to enter into voluntary
association with, a discriminating entity.""83 "The relationships regulated
by the DOE are thus quite different from school-student relationships....
[thereby] confirm[ing] that the regulations did not provide adequate no-
tice of a duty to remedy student discrimination. ' 84
The majority further concluded that state tort law provides states the
requisite notice."' However, they said it is wrong to conclude that a state
knows it is liable under a federal statute simply because the underlying
conduct might form the basis for a state tort action.
186
A related argument is that "Title IX did not give States unambigu-
ous notice that accepting federal funds meant ceding to the federal gov-
ernment power over the day-to-day disciplinary decisions of schools.' 87
Thus, the majority wrongly imposes on the "States liability that was un-
expected and unknown, but the contours of which are... [still] unknow-
able. 188
The Court's decision raises a second notice concern: whether a
school official needs to receive actual or constructive notice of peer sex-
ual harassment before the school can be held liable. The Court has
178. Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182. Davis, 526 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185. See id. at 644.
186. See id. at 668-69 ( Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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adopted an actual notice standard. 89 Such a standard is arguably too high
to protect children and "encourages school districts . . . to [simply] react
to harassment rather than take a preventive stance."' 90 Alternatively, a
constructive notice standard would force schools to develop clear poli-
cies to prevent, control, and detect harassment.' 9' The Court also failed to
clarify who must receive the actual notice in order to impute actual
knowledge to the school. 92 However, given the majority's reliance on
Gebser, an argument can be made for adopting Gebser's requirements.
Gebser required notice to "an official of the recipient entity with author-
ity to take corrective action to end the discrimination."'' 93
A third area of concern is the potentially significant financial costs
associated with the decision. Many school districts are currently admin-
istratively overwhelmed by all types of disciplinary problems, and "lack
the resources even to deal with serious problems of violence. ' 94 The
additional liability imposed by Davis will likely exaggerate this shortfall.
The dissent feared that the Court's opinion is "so broad that it will sup-
port untold numbers of lawyers who will prove adept at presenting cases
that will withstand the defendant school districts' pretrial motions."' 95
Furthermore, the limiting principles developed by the Court are not
likely to prevent litigation. The ease with which Title IX elements can be
alleged and proven could result in a staggering flood of liability and a
corresponding heavy financial burden on school districts, the taxpayers,
and the children they serve. 196 In fact, the cost of defending against a
single peer sexual harassment suit could overwhelm many school dis-
tricts, as the school's financial liability could approach or exceed a dis-
trict's total federal funding.
197
As legal and administrative costs rise, school boards and adminis-
trators will likely divert scarce resources away from basic education
services. 98 Associated costs will also likely rise. For example, the school
districts might be required to provide individual tutoring for those har-
assing students removed from the classroom setting. Potential financial
costs are further exaggerated by the absence of damage caps for judi-
189. See id. at 644; Harvard Law Review Ass'n, Title IX-School District Liability for Student-
on-Student Sexual Harassment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 368, 377 (1999).
190. Furr, supra note 39, at 1597; See also Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 189,
at 374.
191. See Furr, supra note 39, at 1596.
192. See Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1226.
193. Id.
194. Davis, 526 U.S. at 666 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
196. See Id. at 686 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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cially implied private causes of action under Title IX.' 99 Furthermore, no
provision exists in Title IX for agency investigation or conciliation of
complaints in an effort to eliminate "frivolous suits or settle meritorious
ones at minimal CoSt. ' ' 2°° The depletion of educational resources arguably
was not Congress' intent when it enacted Title IX.
2 0 1
A stronger argument can be made that a school district should be
financially liable if it fails to live up to its responsibility. "It is imperative
that schools create and foster a learning environment that will provide all
students the opportunity to reap the greatest rewards of the prescribed
202
curriculum" in an environment free of sexual harassment. Furthermore,
schools have a responsibility to society to guide and mold impressionable
201
people.2° If a school treats peer sexual harassment with indifference, the
school should bear the financial cost. It should bear the responsibility for
maintaining control and defining appropriate boundaries. If a school fails
to live up to this responsibility, there must be proper measures of ac-
countability. To avoid financial liability under Davis, school districts
need only make a legitimate effort to inspect the complaint, and take
corrective measures.2 °4 Only when the school responds with deliberate
indifference after actual knowledge would it risk liability under Title
Arguably, a consistent approach to peer sexual harassment would
allow school districts to avoid the financial liability. Under Davis, every
school district knows what it needs to do to avoid potential liability.
Therefore, legitimate complaints can be addressed more promptly and
effectively by imposition of these standards. However, consistency is not
likely to eliminate all risk of suit, since a school district under Davis may
risk suit regardless of the consistency or reasonableness of its
206
response.
A fifth concern is a series of potentially costly conflicting interests
arising under Davis and Title IX. First, a "student's demand for a har-
assment-free classroom will conflict with the alleged harasser's claim to
mainstream placement under the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tional Act [IDEA] or with his state constitutional right to continuing free
public education., 20 7 And, the majority does not explain what constitutes
199. See id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. Davis, 526 U.S. at 681 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202. Micheal W. McClain, New Standards for Peer Sexual Harassment in the Schools: Title IX
Liability Under Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 611,618 (1999).
203. See id.
204. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-45.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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'equal access to education'. Second, "a student's claim that the school
should remedy a sexually hostile environment may conflict with the al-
leged harasser's claim" that the First Amendment protects his offensive
speech.2 °8 This conflict is especially pertinent when the harassment oc-
curs at universities, which do not exercise custodial and tutelary power
over their adult students.2° In addition, certain states have enacted state
codes that prohibit private schools from encroaching on a student's First
Amendment rights.21 0 Third, "schools that remove a harasser from the
classroom and then attempt to fulfill their continuing education obliga-
tion by placing the harasser in any kind of group setting, rather than by
hiring expensive tutors for each student, will find themselves at continu-
ing risk of Title IX suits brought by the other alternative education stu-
dents., 211 Fourth, "federal law imposes constraints on school disciplinary
actions. 21 2 For example, the Individuals with Disabilities Act places
"strict limits on the ability of schools to take disciplinary actions against
students with behavior disorder disabilities, even if the disability was not
diagnosed prior to the incident triggering discipline. 2 3 If, as the major-
ity represented, the behavior constituting "actionable peer sexual har-
assment so deviates from the normal teasing and jostling of adolestence
that it puts schools on clear notice of potential liability, then a student
who engages in such harassment may have at least a colorable claim of
severe emotional disturbance within the meaning of IDEA.' '21 4 The courts
will need to adequately address these potential conflicts in the future.
What constitutes 'peer sexual harassment' presents a sixth area of
concern for schools and courts. The Davis Court did little to clarify the
boundaries except to note that teasing does not represent sexual harass-
ment.2 " The dissent argued, however, that most students' behavior may
be inappropriate, or even "objectively offensive," at times."' Similarly,
the dissent argued that almost all children are victims of childish behav-
217
ior inflicted by other children at one time or another as they mature.
Absent clear guidelines, the dissent feared that childish, immature be-
havior will be labeled as gender discrimination, and that the fear of li-
ability may breed a climate of alarm that encourages school administra-
tors to "label even the most innocuous of childish conduct sexual har-
assment. ' ,2 However, while unclear cases may arise, there is certainly a
208. Id. at 683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 666-67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210. See Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1221.
211. Davis, 526 U.S. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 666 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 676.
216. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
217. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 672-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 681 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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difference between childish and inappropriate behavior. Where to draw
the line should arguably be left to the control of local authorities, as this
interpretation is dictated by the circumstances surrounding each case.
What constitutes 'deliberate indifference' is a similar area of con-
cern. The Court's requirement that a school cannot respond in a clearly
unreasonable manner is arguably vague.
A final concern associated with the Davis decision is that of agency.
The dissent argued that the primary purpose of Title IX is "to prevent
recipients of federal financial assistance from using the funds in a dis-
criminatory manner."219 Thus, "Title IX prevents discrimination by the
grant recipient, whether through the acts of its principals or the acts of its
agents.,, 220 Based on this argument, there is "no basis to think that Con-
gress contemplated liability for a school's failure to remedy discrimina-
tory acts by students, or that the States would believe the statute imposed
on them a clear obligation to do so. '221 In fact, according to the dissent,
when Title IX was enacted, the concept of "sexual harassment" as gen-
der discrimination had not been recognized or considered by the
222courts. Nevertheless, the majority rejected an agency limitation on
Title IX thereby expanding the 'enough control' line to encompass stu-
dents. 23 While strong arguments exist on both sides, an even stronger
argument can be made that agency should not be an issue. The Supreme
Court's rationale for imposing liability on schools for a student's sexual
harassment is not to punish the school for the behavior of a student, but
rather to punish the school for failing to remedy persistent, severe,
known acts of sexual harassment.224
Thus, Davis, while resolving the broad question of school liability
for peer sexual harassment, failed to clarify many specifics and generated
a series of new controversies. Future rulings must address these issues. In
the interim, combating peer sexual harassment at the school level will
require a broad, proactive approach encompassing proper training, identi-
fication, investigation and discipline. Such an approach will serve to de-
ter peer sexual harassment and to decrease school liability should har-
assment occur. To decrease the frequency of sexual harassment, schools
225need to adopt clear anti-harassment policies and procedures. These
policies should be published by schools in manuals and presented to all
members of the school community. Students, parents, teachers, and
219. Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 663-64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
222. See id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
223. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 664.
224 See id. at 633.
225. See ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30; Williams, supra note 15, at 1110-12.
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school administrators must be educated as to the scope of peer sexual
harassment and the need for immediate incident reporting to appropriate
school authorities. The types of behavior that constitute sexual harass-
ment need to be identified and strongly condemned.226 There should be
no question of indifference on the part of the school. Schools should de-
velop a reporting system to process complaints and identify several
227
school employees as liaisons for students and parents.
Schools need to adequately inform school employees about Title IX,
the Davis decision, and potential school liability. If a sexual harassment
complaint arises, the school needs to investigate the complaint promptly
and reasonably. The accused harasser should be removed from the class-
room, parents should be notified, and the investigation procedure ex-
plained. The school should maintain detailed records of all interviews
with students and witnesses. Finally, schools need to develop and im-
plement clear disciplinary procedures. Remedial actions must be rea-
sonably calculated to end the harassment and prevent further incidents.
Appropriate action may include official written warning to the harasser,
sanctions, prohibition, potential suspension, or discharge. The discipline
should reflect the students' ages, frequency of inappropriate conduct, and




Davis provides broad guidelines to assess the liability of federally
funded educational institutions for student-on-student sexual harassment.
Federal fund recipients may be liable for subjecting their students to dis-
crimination where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts
of student-on-student sexual harassment, and the harasser is under the
229school's disciplinary authority.
While Davis offers consistency and general guidelines, it simultane-
ously generates a series of new, unresolved concerns and controversies in
need of clarification. Clearer boundaries will need to be established re-
garding the scope of the federal government's role in state school sys-
tems. Criteria need to be established for balancing the potential financial
costs associated with violations of Title IX with the societal costs associ-
ated with undeterred peer sexual harassment. What constitutes both sex-
ual harassment and deliberate indifference by a school is also in need of




229. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
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solve these issues if peer sexual harassment is to be successfully de-
terred.
Carie Manke*
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COMMENT
PORTUONDO V. AGARD: DISTINGUISHING IMPEACHMENT
OF CREDIBILITY FROM THE ACT OF BURDENING A
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo v. Agard' is the latest
in the debate over whether a prosecutor's comments regarding a criminal
defendant's decision to exercise his rights under the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment are a proper method of impeachment, or
an improper inference of guilt. Two opposing interpretations exist as to
how a defendant's right to remain silent can be treated by an opposing
party. The first interpretation takes an expansive view of the defendant's
right to silence, and considers any substantive reference to defendant's
exercising his immunity as an impermissible, unconstitutional burden.
The leading case supporting the expansive view of the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment is Griffin v. California.2 The second in-
terpretation takes a narrow view of the defendant's right to silence, and
contends that once a defendant has waived his privilege by taking the
stand, his credibility is open to impeachment. The leading case support-
ing the restrictive view of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment is Jenkins v. Anderson.3
This Comment will show that the Supreme Court's decision in
Portuondo was correctly decided along the narrow view of interpretation
established by the Jenkins line of case law. Accordingly, Part II of this
Comment provides the background for the two opposing interpretations
of a defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment by examining the
case law leading up to Portuondo. Part III provides the facts and proce-
dural history of Portuondo, and examines the reasoning behind the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions. Finally, Part IV analyzes the holding in
Portuondo, explaining why it is consistent with the narrow interpretation
1. 120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000).
2. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See discussion infra Part I.A.
3. 447 U.S. 231 (1980). See discussion infra Part I.B.
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of earlier Supreme Court case law, and suggesting an evidentiary alter-
native.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals in criminal cases from being compelled to testify against
themselves.4 The Supreme Court made clear that a criminal defendant
has a "right to remain silent."5 However, a debate exists over whether a
defendant's decision to exercise this right is immune from later com-
ments that might infer guilt; or, whether under certain circumstances, the
decision can be properly used to impeach his credibility. This debate
developed two lines of case law.' The first line of cases follows an ex-
4. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment specifically states, "nor shall [any person]
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witnesses against himself..." Id. See generally Leonard W.
Levy, Article: Origins of the Fifth Amendment and its Critics, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 821 (1997) (de-
fending on contemporary grounds his 1968 text that is still considered by most to be an exemplar of
fifth amendment constitutional law).
5. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring police to advise defen-
dant of the right to remain silent); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (holding that
the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment shall be given liberal construction); Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) (holding the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to
silence does not require use of particular words); but see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451
(1974) (holding that statements by defendants are not excluded in all contexts).
6. The circuit courts are split between the more expansive Griffin interpretation and the
stricter Jenkins view. The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits follow Griffin. See, e.g., Coppola
v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1564-68 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding the use of defendant's statement to
police that he was not going to confess was an unconstitutional burden on his Fifth Amendment right
when used by the prosecutor in his case in chief); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283-86 (6th Cir.
2000) (holding that defendant's statement to police to go "talk to his lawyer" was an exercise of his
Fifth Amendment rights and the prosecutor's use of this pre-arrest silence was substantive evidence
of guilt and therefore improper); but see Seymour v. Walker, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 20170, *41-42
(6th Cir.) (limiting the Combs measure and finding permissible and not an inference of guilt a prose-
cutor's comments, in closing argument, that made reference to the defendant's self-defense theory);
Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding it was an error of constitutional
magnitude for the prosecutor to comment on defendant's pre-arrest refusal to speak with police);
United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding void under the Fifth
Amendment the prosecutor's statement that defendant had not responded to authorities questions,
and holding that is was "immaterial" whether the defendant had invoked his privilege to remain
silent). The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuit courts follow Jenkins. See, e.g., United States v.
Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1408 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a prosecutor's comments as to the defen-
dant's denial of certain business dealings were not improper because there existed an "equally plau-
sible" reason other than to infer guilt for defendant's not testifying); United States v. Cabrera, 201
F.3d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument
were not improper and the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights not violated because he chose to take
the stand and testify); United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the prosecutor's comment, during closing argument, as to defendant's innocence did not violate the
self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Riveria, 944 F.2d 1563, 1569-70
(11 th Cir. 1991 ) (holding as harmless error the prosecutor's comments made during closing argu-
ment that defendant's pre-arrest demeanor was inconsistent with her plea of innocent). For a review
of circuit court decisions following Portuondo, see infra note 139.
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pansive interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, while the second set of
cases take a more narrow view.
A. Expanding the Fifth Amendment: The Griffin Line of Case Law
The Supreme Court established an expansive precedent to interpret-
ing the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment when it decided
Griffin v. California.7 In Griffin, the Court held that the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment prevented the prosecutor
from commenting on the defendant's failure to take the stand in a state
criminal prosecution. 8 The prosecutor's comments to the jury highlighted
the fact that the defendant had not taken the stand.9 The Court held that
allowing the prosecutor's comments would penalize the defendant's right
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent.1° Moreover,
"[iut cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly."'"I The
Court distinguished that "[w]hat the jury may infer, given no help from
the court, is one thing [but] [w]hat it may infer when the court solem-
nizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite an-
other.'
12
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 3 the Court held unconstitutional a Tennes-
see law that penalized a criminal defendant's silence because it required
him to take the stand first, or not at all. 14 The Tennessee statute required
that all criminal defendants "desiring to testify shall do so before any
other testimony for the defense is heard by the court trying the case. ' ' 5
The Court found the law to be "an impermissible restriction on the de-
fendant's right against self-incrimination ...., Moreover, the Court
stated that "[a]lthough 'it is not inconsistent with the enlightened admini-
stration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros
and cons in deciding whether to testify,' . . . the choice itself may pose
serious dangers to the success of an accused's defense."' 7
7. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
8. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
9. See id. at 610-11. The prosecutor stated, "[w]hat kind of man is it that would want to have
sex with a woman that beat up if she was beat up at the time he left? He would know that. He would
know how she got down the alley .... These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or
explain." Id.
10. Seeid. at 614.
11. Id.
12. Id. It should also be noted that in the same paragraph of the majority's opinion, the Court
cautioned that comments on a defendant's right to remain silent "does not magnify that inference [of
guilt] into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege." Id.
13. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
14. Brook, 406 U.S. at 610.
15. Id. at 606 (quoting the Tenn. Code Ann. Section 40-2403 (1955)).
16. Id. at 609. See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that "the Fifth
Amendment guarantees against federal infringement --the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty..
17. Id. (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971)).
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In Doyle v. Ohio,18 the Court held that a prosecutor in a state crimi-
nal prosecution could not use the defendants' post-arrest silence for im-
peachment purposes at trial.' 9 The defendants chose to remain silent after
receiving their Miranda rights, but at trial testified a police informant had
framed them. 2° In affirming the convictions, the Court of Appeals, Fifth
District, Tuscarawas County Ohio, held that the evidence of post-arrest
silence was not "substantive evidence of guilt but rather [proper] cross
examination" of the witnesses' credibility.21 The Supreme Court rejected
the State's argument that use of post-arrest silence could be used for im-
22peachment purposes and was therefore proper cross-examination. The
Court stated that "it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of
due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach
an explanation subsequently offered at trial. 23
24In Carter v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court addressed whether de-
nial of a jury instruction was in violation of the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 2' The Court found the defendant had a right to
request a limiting instruction, which would have explained to the jury
that they were to draw no negative inferences from the fact he was not
26testifying. Placing this case in line with Griffin, Justice Stewart held
that "U]ust as adverse comment on a defendant's silence 'cuts down on
the privilege by making its assertion costly,' the failure to limit the ju-
ror's speculation on the meaning of that silence .... exacts an impermis-
sible toll on the full and free exercise of the privilege. 27
More recently, the Supreme Court extended the Griffin precedent to
21include the sentencing phase of criminal cases. In Mitchell, the defen-
dant entered a guilty plea to four counts of cocaine conspiracy. 29 The
District Court instructed the defendant that by entering the guilty plea
she would be waiving her right to remain silent under the Fifth Amend-
18. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
19. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.
20. See id. at 611-13.
21. Id. at615.
22. See id. at 616-17. But see Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958) (holding
that if a criminal defendant "takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be
impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is
determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.")
23. Id. at 618.
24. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
25. Carter, 450 U.S. at 289.
26. See id. at 305. The instruction was to read: "The defendant is not compelled to testify and
the fact that he does not cannot be used as inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any
way." Id. at 288.
27. Id. at 305 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. at 614).
28. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999). For a detailed analysis of the
Mitchell decision see generally Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law-Continued, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
244 (1999).
29. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 317.
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ment.3° The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.3' Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, affirmed the Third Circuit's holding
based on Griffin and Estelle v. Smith.32 The Court held, "[t]he concerns
which mandate the rule against negative inferences at a criminal trial
apply with equal force at sentencing. 33 Furthermore, the Court held that
[tihe rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for teaching
that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defendant
committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is whether
the Government has carried its burden to prove its allegations while
respecting the defendant's individual rights.34
B. Limiting the Fifth Amendment: The Jenkins Line of Case Law
The Supreme Court's preference for a narrow interpretation of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment dates back to the 19"1
Century with its decision in Reagan v. United States.35 In Reagan, the
defendant was found guilty of smuggling cattle from Mexico in to
36Texas. The defendant appealed his conviction based on the jury in-
structions.3' The Supreme Court held that "the court [may] call the atten-
tion of the jury to any matters which legitimately affect [the defendant's]
testimony and his credibility. 38 However, the Court cautioned that "[tihe
fact that he is a defendant does not condemn him as unworthy of belief,
but at the same time it creates an interest greater than that of any other
witness, and to that extent affects the question of credibility."39 In rea-
soning and language consistent with his 21' Century contemporaries,
Justice Brewer found that while a jury should not draw negative infer-
ences from a defendant's "deep" personal "interest," it is permissible for
the jury, in determining credibility, to consider those interests.
40
30. Seeid. at 317-18.
31. Id. at 319.
32. Id. at 329. See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (holding that it is a viola-
tion of the defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment for the state to compel testimony at a
sentencing hearing).
33. Id. at 329.
34. Id. at 330.
35. 157 U.S. 301 (1895).
36. Reagan, 157 U.S. at 302.
37. See id. at 304. The instruction stated, "The law permits the defendant, at his own request,
to testify in his own behalf. The defendant here has availed himself of this privilege. The deep per-
sonal interest which he may have in the result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weigh-
ing his evidence and in determining how far or to what extent, if at all, it is worthy of credit." Id.
38. Id. at 305.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 311. See also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 494 (1917) (holding
"[wihen [the defendant] took the witness stand in his own behalf he voluntarily relinquished his
privilege of silence, and ought not to be heard to speak alone of those things deemed to be for his
interest and be silent where he or his counsel regarded it for his interest to remain so, without the fair
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In Fitzpatrick v. United States,4' the Supreme Court upheld the con-
viction of a defendant convicted of murder.42 The conviction was ap-
pealed on grounds that the government was allowed to improperly cross-
examine the defendant at trial. 43 The Court rejected this argument,
pointing to the fact that the defendant had voluntarily taken the stand to
establish his alibi for the time of the murder." The Court held that when
a defendant chooses to take the stand and testify, he waives his Fifth
Amendment right to silence, and a prosecutor can treat him as any other
witness 5 Furthermore, the Court stated, "[w]hile no inference of guilt
can be drawn from his refusal to avail himself of the privilege of testify-
ing, he has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his
favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those
facts. '
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Fitzpatrick, and strengthened the
waiver principle, in its holding in Raffel v. United States.47 In Raffel, the
defendant was charged and twice tried for violation of the National Pro-
hibition Act.4 8 At the first trial defendant chose not to testify, and the jury
was unable to reach a verdict. 49 At the second trial, in which a guilty ver-
dict was reached, the defendant elected to take the stand and was ques-
tioned as to why he did not do so at the first trial.50 The question certified
to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was
whether it was a violation of the Fifth Amendment to compel the defen-
dant to testify as to his choice to exercise that constitutional right at his
first trial." The Court held that the defendant's "waiver is not partial;
having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at
will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrass-
ing." 12 The Court conceded, however, "if the defendant had not taken the
stand on the second trial, evidence that he had claimed the same immu-
nity on the first trial would be probative of no fact in issue, and would be
inadmissible., 53 Yet, the Court made clear that the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment is a privilege only for those criminal de-
inference which would naturally spring . .
41, 178 U.S. 304 (1900).





47. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
48. Raffel, 271 U.S. at 495.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 496.




fendants who chose not to testify in their own behalf, and not for defen-
dants who elect to take the stand.54
In Jenkins v. Anderson,5 the Supreme Court reasserted its narrow
view of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, and in
doing so clarified and limited its holding in Griffin.56 In Jenkins, the
Court upheld the manslaughter conviction and sentence of petitioner
Jenkins.57 Jenkins stabbed and killed a man, then turned himself into
authorities two weeks later alleging self-defense.58 Jenkins' appeal was
based on the claim that the prosecutor's comments during closing argu-
ment regarding his pre-arrest silence were a violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights.59 The Court rejected Jenkins' Fifth Amendment
claims, pointing out the distinguishing fact from Griffin was that Jenkins
voluntarily took the stand in his own defense.6 Rather, the Court relied
heavily on its holding in Raffel, that "recognized that the Fifth Amend-
ment is not violated when a defendant who testifies in his own defense is
impeached with prior silence. 61 Moreover, once a defendant has taken
the stand and "cast aside his cloak of silence," the "function of the courts
of justice to ascertain the truth . . prevail in the balance of considera-
tions determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 62
Thus, while the debate still continues among many lower court tri-
63bunals, the Jenkins holding clearly limited the Griffin line of case law
to only those circumstances where the defendant chose not to take the
stand. Therefore, it was only a matter of time until the first 2 1 st Century
showdown took place between the Jenkins and Griffin line of case law.
That case is now in the books, and we examine it below.
54. See id. at 499.
55. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
56. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235.
57. See id. at 241.
58. Id. at 232.
59. See id. at 234. The prosecutor told the jury that Jenkins "'waited two weeks, according
to the testimony--at least two weeks before he did anything about surrendering himself or reporting
[the stabbing] to anybody."' (quoting App. transcript at 43).
60. See id. at 235.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 238 (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)).
63. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
2000]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
II. PORTUONDO V. AGARD 64
A. Facts and Procedural History
1. State Court
On February 25, 1991, Ray Agard was convicted by a jury in the Su-
preme Court of the State of New York of one count of first-degree sod-
omy and two counts of third degree possession of a weapon.65 The vic-
tim, Nessa Winder and key witness, Breda Keegan, testified that Agard
physically assaulted, raped, and sodomized Winder, and threatened both
women with a handgun.66 Agard admitted to striking Winder, but denied
all other allegations, insisting that he and Winder had engaged in consen-
sual sexual intercourse. 67 What caused this case to make it to the United
States Supreme Court were comments made by the prosecutor during her
summation. Over objections from Agard's counsel, the prosecutor told
the jury:
You know, ladies and gentlemen, unlike all the other witnesses in
this case the defendant has a benefit and the benefit is that he has,
unlike all other witnesses, is he gets to sit here and listen to the testi-
mony of all other witnesses before he testifies .... That gives you a
big advantage, doesn't it. You get to sit here and think what am I
going to say and how am I going to say it?
68
The trial court judge denied Agard's motion for a mistrial, holding
that "'the fact that [Agard] was present and heard all the testimony is
something that may fairly be commented on. That has nothing to do with
his right to remain silent. That he was the last witness in the case as (sic)
a matter of fact.'
69
On appeal to the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, one
of the weapon's possession charges against Agard was dropped, but the
remaining charges were affirmed.7° The appellate court did find that the
trial court erred when it prevented Agard's expert witness from testify-
ing, but held that "the error was harmless in view of the overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt. . . ."" As to Agard's constitutional claims
regarding the prosecutor's comments, the appellate court held that such
64. 120 S. Ct. 1119(2000).
65. See Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 698 (2d Cir. 1997).
66. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1122.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. Agard, 117 F.3d at 707 (quoting People v. Agard, 199 A.D.2d 401, 403 (2nd Dept. 1993).
70. See People v. Agard, 199 A.D. 2d 401,402 (2d Dept. 1993).
71. Agard, 199 A.D. at 402.
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contentions were without merit.12 Agard next filed for a leave to appeal
with the Court of Appeals of New York, which was denied by Judge
Ciparick on April 14, 1994."3
2. Federal Court
Agard then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court for the Eastern District of New York.
74
Agard appealed three issues before the Second Circuit, but only the
third issue regarding the comments made by the prosecutor in closing
argument will be addressed below.7" Agard alleged that his constitutional
rights to confront his witnesses and have a fair trial were violated by the
prosecutor's comments made during closing arguments of his trial.76 The
Second Circuit agreed with Agard, and based their decision on the ex-
pansive Griffin line of case law.77 The court held that the Supreme Court
in Griffin "recognized that such [prosecutorial] commentary effectively
penalizes the defendant for exercising his Fifth Amendment rights . . .
,,78 The majority opinion held that it was unconstitutional "for a prose-
cutor to insinuate to the jury for the first time during summation that the
defendant's presence in the courtroom at trial provided him with a
unique opportunity to tailor his testimony. 79
3. Supreme Court Decision
a. Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion and held that the prosecu-
tor's comments to the jury that the defendant had the opportunity to
"tailor" his testimony after hearing other witnesses testify was a proper
impeachment of a witness's credibility, and did not violate the defen-
80dant's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
72. Id. at 403.
73. Agard, 117 F.3d at 698.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 702-07. Agard also alleged that his constitutional rights were violated because
the trial court had prevented his counsel from questioning the victim about her prior sexual history
and prohibiting his expert witnesses testimony. See id. The court found no error as to the first issue.
See id. As to the second issue, the court found there was error, but not arising to harmful or constitu-
tional error. See id.
76. See id. at 698.
77. It is worth noting that the majority opinion by the Second Circuit did not feel it necessary
to address the Jenkins line of cases with the exception of a brief mention in footnote 9 at page 710.
78. Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d at 709.
79. Id.
80. Portuondo v. Agard, 120 S. Ct. 1119, 1121-23. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Scalia in his opinion. It should be noted that the defendant
in Portuondo also claimed the prosecutor's comments violated his rights under the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments. See id. The Court rejected these claims with little comment. See id. Scalia made
it clear that Portuondo boiled down to whether the Court should extend Griffin v. California. See id.
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The Court began its analysis by distinguishing Portuondo from its
holding in Griffin v. California.8' Foremost, the Court pointed out that in
Griffin the prosecutor was asking the jury to do something they were
prohibited from doing-inferring guilt due to the silence of the defen-
dant.82 The difference in this case, according to the Court, is that "it is
natural and irresistible for a jury, in evaluating the relative credibility of
a defendant who testifies last, to have in mind and weigh in the balance
the fact that he heard the testimony of all those who (sic) proceeded
him. 83
Second, the majority distinguished that the prosecutor's comments
in Griffin were impermissible because of their substantive nature-
"Griffin prohibited comments that suggest a defendant's silence is
[substantive] evidence of guilt." By contrast, the prosecutor's
comments in Portuondo "concerned respondent's credibility as a witness,
and were therefore in accord with our longstanding rule that when a
defendant takes the stand, 'his credibility may be impeached and his
testimony assailed like that of any other witness."'
85
The Court next established that Portuondo was analogous to their
86holding in Jenkins v. Anderson. In Jenkins, the Court held that a prose-
cutor's comments made during closing argument regarding the defen-
dant's silence were permissible for impeachment purposes.87 The issue of
credibility distinguished Portuondo from the respondent's analogy to
88Geders v. United States that allowed a defendant to be "treated differ-
ently from other witnesses." 89 Justice Scalia made clear that "[w]ith re-
spect to issues of credibility, however, no such special treatment has
been accorded." 90
The Court next addressed the issue of "tailoring." Pointing to its
decision in Brooks v. Tennessee,9 ' the Court held that "arguing credibility
to the jury-which would include the prosecutor's comments here-is
the preferred means of counteracting tailoring of the defendant's testi-
For a thorough analysis of why the Sixth Amendment does not apply to Portuondo, see generally
Brett H. McGurk, Article: Prosecutorial Comment on a Defendant's Presence at Trial: Will Griffin
Play in a Sixth Amendment Arena?, 31 UWLA L. Rev. 207, 255 (2000) (concluding that the con-
frontation clause of the Sixth Amendment is not violated by a prosecutor's comments that the defen-
dant is present in the courtroom; and "unlike Griffin, the prosecutor's comments in Agard materially
advanced the fundamental societal interest in the ascertainment of truth at trial.").
81. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
82. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1124.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1125.
85. Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958)).
86. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
87. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240.
88. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
89. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1125. In Geders, the defendant was allowed special treatment as
to a sequestration order. Genders, 425 U.S. at 87.
90. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1125.
91. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
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mony. 92 Furthermore, the Court pointed to its decision in Reagan v.
United States93 that allowed the jury to be instructed that the defendant's
"deep personal interest" could be considered-"[1]ike the [prosecutor's]
comments in this case, [Reagan] simply set forth a consideration the jury
was to have in mind when assessing the defendant's credibility .. .
Finally, the Court rejected the dissent's contention that because the
prosecutor's comments came during closing arguments, and not during
cross-examination, they were impermissible. 95 The Court found no "con-
stitutionally significant distinction" because as in Reagan, "the chal-
lenged instruction came at the end of the case, after the defense had
rested, just as the prosecutor's comments did here. 96
b. Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion that Justice Breyer
joined.97 Justice Stevens, while joining in the majority's final conclusion,
found the prosecutor's comments to be demeaning and disrespectful to
the "truth-seeking function of the adversary process. 98 Justice Stevens
found that while the prosecutor's comments survived constitutional scru-
tiny, such comments should be "discouraged rather than validated. 99
c. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg dissented from the majority's opinion, arguing in
favor of an expansive interpretation of the Fifth Amendment."' Such a
broad protection of the defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment is,
according to the dissent, supported by the Court's decisions in Griffin
and Doyle.'0' Justice Ginsburg found no distinction with the Court's de-
cisions in Griffin and Doyle- "[b]oth decisions stem from the principle
that where the exercise of constitutional rights is 'insolubly ambiguous'
as between innocence and guilt, a prosecutor may not unfairly encumber
those rights by urging the jury to construe the ambiguity against the de-
fendant. ' 10 2 Ginsburg rejected the majority's contention that the prose-
cutor's comments were permissible because they were directed at im-
peachment of the defendant's credibility-"[n]or can a jury measure a
defendant's credibility by evaluating the defendant's response to the ac-
cusation, for the [comments are] fired after the defense has submitted its
92. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1125.
93. 157 U.S. 301, 304 (1895).
94. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1126.
95. See id. at 1126-27.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 1129.
99. Id.
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case." 0 3 Rather, Justice Ginsburg would "rein in a prosecutor solely in
situations where there is no particular reason to believe that tailoring has
occurred and where the defendant has no opportunity to rebut the accu-
sation."' 4
Furthermore, the dissent found the majority's analysis that distin-
guished Griffin "unconvincing"-"[t]he [substantive] inference involved
in Griffin is at least as 'natural' and 'irresistible' as the inference the
prosecutor in Agard's case invited the jury to draw."'0 5 Moreover, Justice
Ginsburg contended that "[i]t makes little sense to maintain that juries
able to avoid drawing adverse inferences from a defendant's silence
would be unable to avoid thinking that only a defendant's opportunity to




Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that the
prosecutor's comments were permissible because they were directed at
impeaching the credibility of the defendant, and not toward inferring
substantive evidence of guilt.I17 Justice Ginsburg argued that such a po-
sition is not, as the majority contended, supported by the Court's deci-
sions in Brooks and Jenkins.'°8 Rather, "Jenkins supports the proposition
that cross-examination is of sufficient value as an aid in finding truth at
trial that prosecutors may sometimes question defendants even about
matters that may touch on their constitutional rights, and Brooks suggests
that cross-examination can expose a defendant who tailors his testi-
mony.,,1°9
III. ANALYSIS
The holding in Portuondo has been applauded by those who advo-
cate a narrow, post-Jenkins view of the Fifth Amendment; and criticized
by those who would prefer an expansive Griffin view of the Fifth
Amendment. Section A takes a closer look at the facts in Portuondo,
showing why it is distinguishable from Griffin; and then identifies the
key similarities between Portuondo and the Jenkins line of cases. Section
B reviews the academic literature on the two views represented by Grif-
fin and Jenkins. Lastly, Section C offers an evidentiary alternative to
resolving Portuondo.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1130.
105. Id. at 1133.
106. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1133.
107. See id. at 1134.
108. See id. at 1135.
109. Id. (quoting Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238; Brooks, 406 U.S. at 609-12).
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A. Portuondo: In the Tradition of Griffin or Jenkins?
The Supreme Court's holding in Portuondo correctly placed it
among the line of cases following the narrow view of the Fifth Amend-
ment taken in Jenkins v. Anderson."° A look at the facts reveal why
Portuondo is clearly distinguishable from the more expansive interpreta-
tion found in the Griffin v. California1 ' line of cases.
First, unlike the defendant in Griffin, who elected to exercise his
constitutional right to remain silent,"2 the defendant in Portuondo
elected to take the stand and testify in his own defense." 3 Second, the
defendant in Griffin was penalized for exercising his right to be silent." 14
The prosecutor's comments in Griffin were held to be substantive evi-
dence that encouraged the jury to infer guilt on the silent defendant." 5
The defendant in Portuondo was not penalized for exercising his right to
be silent." 6 This would have been impossible because the defendant in
Portuondo did not exercise his Fifth Amendment right.' 7 Rather, the
defendant took the stand and testified in his own defense." 8 Hence, the
facts of Portuondo are clearly distinguishable from Griffin. Conversely,
the facts are much similar to those in Jenkins.
Like the defendant in Jenkins, the defendant in Portuondo chose to
take the stand and testify." 9 The Court correctly pointed out that in tak-
ing the stand a defendant waives his privilege of immunity afforded him
under the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.12 Once the
defendant has taken the stand and waived his privilege to remain silent,
he can be treated like any other witness, and the opposing party may at-
tack his credibility.' 2' The Court's holding in Portuondo makes clear that
such a waiver is not only open to attack on cross-examination, but
equally vulnerable to a prosecutor's closing argument comments.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's holding in Portuondo places it
among the Jenkins line of case law, and establishes the restrictive view
of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause as the preferred
method of interpretation for the 21" Century. There remain, however,
those who would prefer a Griffin revival.
110. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
111. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
112. See id. at 609-10.
113. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1122.
114. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
115. See id. at610.
116. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1128.
117. Seeid. at 1122.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235 (discussing why the right to remain silent becomes effec-
tively waived when the defendant takes the stand as was established by its precursor Raffel v. United
States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926)).
121. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235.
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B. Viewing the Opposing Camps: Jenkins verses Griffin
Some critics have argued that the Fifth Amendment must be viewed
in an expansive role or it will lose its meaning.' 22 Notz contends that the
Fifth Amendment is not limited to trial contexts, but rather "the privilege
may be asserted in any situation where the defendant might make self-
incriminating statements that could be used against her in a future crimi-
nal proceeding.' 23 Furthermore, in her analysis of Griffin, Notz con-
cluded that only "an expansive interpretation of Griffin would prohibit a
prosecutor's use of a defendant's decision to remain silent whenever
such use could penalize the defendant for exercising her constitutional
right."' 24 While advocating an expansive Griffin view of the Fifth
Amendment, Notz admits that the recent Supreme Court's treatment of
the "penalty doctrine"'
' 25 in Griffin is on "shaky ground."'
126
One of the most recent academic supporters of a Griffin revival al-
leges that the Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo takes the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "a step backward.' '127 In
support of his position, Douthat makes three arguments.
First, Douthat accuses the Portuondo Court of not providing reasons
for why a prosecutor "should" be permitted to impeach a defendant's
credibility once they have taken the stand. 28 Yet, in the same breath, he
admits that the Court provided reasons why a prosecutor "can" make
comments for impeachment purposes. 12 9 Thus, Douthat's argument is
nothing more than an argument about semantics. Douthat's reference to
whether a prosecutor should make such comments to a jury is more a
question of prosecutorial misconduct. Misconduct was not at issue in
122. Jane E. Notz, Prearrest Silence as Evidence of Guilt: What You Don't Say Shouldn't Be
Used Against You, 64 U. CHi. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997). See also Martin D. Litt, Commentary by
Co-Defendant's Counsel on Defendant's Refusal to Testify: A Violation of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination?, 89 MicH. L. REV. 1008, 1037 (1991) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment
should prohibit any and all comments regarding a criminal defendant's decision to take the stand or
remain silent).
123. Notz, supra note 122, at 1013.
124. Id. at 1014-1015.
125. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 99 SuP. CT. REV. 145,
146-47 (1977) (coining the phrase "penalty doctrine" and at the same time predicting its demise).
126. Notz, supra note 122, at 1016.
127. J. Fielding Douthat, Jr., Commentaries on Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away
From the Courts: Casenote: A Right to Confrontation or Insinuation? The Supreme Court's Holding
in Portuondo v. Agard, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 591, 619 (2000).
128. See id. at 618 (quoting from footnote 4 of Portuondo: "Our decision ... is addressed to
whether the comment is permissible as a constitutional matter, and not to whether it is always desir-
able as a matter of sound trial practice.").
129. Id. It should be noted that Douthat does not complete the quote of footnote 4 in Portuondo.
The last sentence of that footnote answers his question as to why the Supreme Court did not address
the "sound trial practice" of a prosecutor's comments. "[T]he desirability of putting prosecutorial
comment into proper perspective by judicial instruction, are best left to trial courts, and to the ap-
pellate courts which routinely review their work." Portuondo, 120 U.S. at 1127 n.4.
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Portuondo.3 ° The question in Portuondo was whether the rights of the
defendant were burdened or penalized by the prosecutor's comments.
Second, Douthat ridicules the majority in Portuondo for basing its
holding largely on a one hundred-year-old precedent, Reagan v. United
States.'13 Yet, Douthat provides no other basis for this criticism other
than the fact that Reagan is old. In fact, Reagan is actually a one hundred
and five year old precedent that is still law. The fact that Reagan is still
applicable in the 21s" Century is evidence for, not against, its reliance by
the Portuondo Court. 1
32
The third argument raised by Douthat is that the holding in Por-
tuondo now allows a government prosecutor, without proof, to accuse the
defendant of lying. 33 This argument is simply a misstatement of the
opinion. Justice Scalia made it clear that Griffin was not being overruled,
but only limited when he stated:
It is one thing (as Griffin requires) for the jury to evaluate all the
other evidence in the case without giving any effect to the defen-
dant's refusal to testify; it is something else (and quite impossible)
for the jury to evaluate the credibility of the defendant's testimony
while blotting out from its mind the fact that before giving the testi-
mony the defendant had been sitting there listening to other wit-
nesses. Thus, the principle respondent asks us to adopt here differs
from what we adopted in Griffin in one or the other of the following
respects: It either prohibits inviting the jury to do what the jury is
perfectly entitled to do; or it requires the jury to do what is practically
impossible. 134
Professor Snyder has confirmed that the Supreme Court's decision in
Jenkins v. Anderson reaffirmed the waiver analysis used fifty-four years
earlier in Raffel v. United States.35 Snyder points out the critical fact
linking Jenkins and Raffel is that in both cases the defendant took the
130. For a detailed analysis on prosecutorial misconduct, see generally Tara J. Tobin, Note:
Miscarriage of Justice During Closing Arguments By An Overzealous Prosecutor and a Timid Su-
preme Court in State v. Smith, 45 S.D. L. Rev. 186, 189 (2000) (advocating the need for stricter
rules governing closing arguments because of an increase in the "win at all cost" mentality among
prosecutors); Rosemary Nidiry, Note: Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 1299, 1334 (1996) (concluding that trial judges should be given more discretion to
limit misconduct of both prosecutors and defense attorneys during closing arguments to the jury);
James W. Gunson, Comment: Prosecutorial Summation: Where is the Line Between "Personal
Opinion" and Proper Argument?, 46 Me. L. Rev. 241, 282 (1994) (suggesting that only prosecutorial
misconduct that is truly egregious should lead to a court overturning a defendant's conviction or
sanctioning of a prosecutor).
131. Douthat supra note 127, at 618.
132. See supra discussion Parts I.B.
133. Douthat, supra note 127, at 618.
134. Portuondo, 120 U.S. at 1124.
135. Barbara R. Snyder, A Due Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of Silence in Crimi-
nal Trials, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 285, 288 (1988).
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stand and thus waived his privilege of remaining silent. 3 6 Moreover, the
Jenkins' Court reaffirmed that "[in determining whether a constitutional
right has been burdened impermissibly, it is also appropriate to consider
the legitimacy of the challenged governmental practice."'3 7 As in Raffel
and Jenkins, the defendant in Portuondo waived his Fifth Amendment
right to immunity by taking the stand to testify. Thus, Professor Snyder's
analysis was a correct forecast of the Supreme Court's decision in Por-
tuondo.
If the supporters for a Griffin revival felt they were on "shaky
ground"'138 prior to the Court's holding in Portuondo, it is now becoming
apparent that Griffin's precedent is quickly losing ground. 39
C. Seeking a Different Approach: An Evidentiary Analysis of Portuondo
Although the Supreme Court's holding in Portuondo relied on the
constitutional precedents established by Jenkins and Raffel, there is sup-
port for the theory that such cases could be resolved on purely eviden-
tiary grounds. 140 The Portuondo Court focused much of its opinion on the
fact that the defendant, by taking the stand, effectively waived his privi-
136. Snyder, supra note 135, at 288-289.
137. Id. at 289 (quoting Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980)).
138. See Notz, supra at Part IV.B.
139. The following courts have made post-Portuondo rulings: Soering v. Deeds, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15443, at *13-14 (4th Cir. June 30, 2000) (holding that even if the lower court wanted
to extend Griffin, the Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo permitted the prosecutor's comments
regarding the defendant's refusal to consent to searches); United States v. Ducott, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4680, at *3 (8th Cir. March 24, 2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments at closing
argument that the defendant had lied were proper in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Portuondo); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22941, at *23-24 (9th Cir.
Sept. 13, 2000) (holding that the government's references to the defendant's defense as a "sham"
were proper impeachment of the defendant's testimony under the Supreme Court's holding in Por-
tuondo); United States v. Pemberton, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15814, at *16-17 (10th Cir. July 7,
2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument that the defendant had heard
every witness in the case and therefore had the opportunity to tailor his testimony were permissible
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo); United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313,
1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments to the jury that the defendant had the
opportunity to tailor his testimony were not improper under the Fifth Amendment following the
Supreme Court decision in Portuondo); United States v. Jenkins, 2000 CAAF LEXIS 948, at *35
(C.A.A.F. Aug. 31, 2000) (holding that the defendant's rights were not violated under the Fifth
Amendment per the Supreme Court's holding in Portuondo) (Crawford, J., concurring); State v.
Alexander, 755,A.2d 868, 872 (Conn. 2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments during closing
arguments that the defendant had the ability to tailor his testimony was not unconstitutional based on
the Portuondo decision); State v. Marshall, 4 P.3d 1039, 1044 n.l (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
based on Portuondo, a prosecutor is allowed to point out the fact that a defendant has not presented
evidence to support his theory). For a recent analysis advocating the Jenkins line of case law over
Griffin, see generally Stefanie Petrucci, Comment: The Sound of Silence: The Constitutionality of
the Prosecution's Use of Prearrest Silence in Its Case-in-Chief, 33 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 449, 452
(2000) (concluding that it is constitutional for a prosecutor to use evidence of a defendant's prearrest
silence in her case-in-chief).
140. See generally Snyder, supra at note 135, at 293-301 (providing a detailed evidentiary
analysis).
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lege to remain silent, and opened himself to impeachment. Moreover,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, insisted that the issue at trial in
Portuondo "ultimately came down to a credibility determination."' 4' Yet,
there have been two significant cases where the Supreme Court rejected
the Raffel and Jenkins waiver test and instead based their holdings on
evidentiary principles.
142
1. Application of Grunewald v. United States
143
In Grunewald, the Court found that it was impermissible for the trial
court to permit cross-examination of the defendant's choice to exercise
his privilege to remain silent at an earlier grand jury appearance.' 44 In
rejecting the lower court's use of Raffel, the Court held that "[Raffel]
does not, however, solve the question whether in the particular circum-
stances of this case the cross-examination should have been excluded
because its probative value on the issue of the [defendant's] credibility
was so negligible as to be far outweighed by its possible impermissible
impact on the jury.' ' 145 Thus, in reaching its holding in Grunewald, the
Court essentially applied an evidentiary analysis now codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.' 46 Indeed, the Court acknowledged this fact
when it stated, "[w]e are not unmindful that the question whether a prior
statement is sufficiently inconsistent to be allowed to go to the jury on
the question of credibility is usually within the discretion of the trial
judge.' 47
2. Application of United States v. Hale
48
In Hale, the Court held that it was impermissible "prejudicial error
for the trial court to permit cross-examination of respondent concerning
his silence .. . . 149Again, the Court rejected the reference to Raffel, dis-
agreeing with the government's position that the defendant's silence was
"similarly probative and should therefore be admissible for impeachment
141. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1122.
142. See infra Parts I and 2.
143. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
144. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 424.
145. Id. at 420.
146. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... Fed. R. Evid. 403. For a recent review of the
case law utilizing Rule 403, see generally Steven J. Halasz, Annotation, Propriety Under Rule 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Permitting Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice,
Confusion, or Waste of Time, of Attack on Credibility of Witness For Party, 48 A.L.R. Fed. 390,
392 (1980) (explaining that prior to the adoption of the balancing test under Rule 403, the courts
utilized what was known as "collateral impeachment").
147. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 423-24 (the Court went on to add, "[blut where such evidentiary
matter has grave constitutional overtones, as it does here, we feel justified in exercising this Court's
supervisory control to pass on such a question.").
148. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
149. Hale, 422 U.S. at 181.
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purposes."' ' ' ° The Court held that "the probative value [of]... silence in
this case was outweighed by the prejudicial impact of admitting it into
evidence." '' Furthermore, in deciding Hale on evidentiary principles,
the Court admitted, "we have no occasion to reach the broader constitu-
tional question that supplied an alternative basis for the [lower court's]
decision below.'
52
Professor Snyder explains that the Supreme Court's holdings in
Grunewald and Hale both reasoned that "the probative value of the evi-
dence of silence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect."'' 53 However,
Professor Snyder rejects the Court evidentiary analysis, calling it "a con-
stitutional analysis in disguise."' 5 4 In support of this criticism, Snyder
cites to the Court's holding in Griffin v. California.'55 Given the Court's
holding in Portuondo, which severely limits the Griffin precedent, Sny-
der's comment is turned on its head.
In Portuondo, the probative value of the prosecutor's comments
(reminding the jury that the defendant had an opportunity to tailor his
testimony) was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect (penalizing or
burdening the defendant's right to exercise his right to silence). This is
further supported by two additional facts in Portuondo. First, there was a
proper limiting instruction given to the jury. 156 Second, the defendant
chose to take the stand and testify in his own defense, which effectively
waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. Moreover, it took the Griffin
penalty test out of play because now the prosecutor's comments are not
substantive in nature. Rather, the prosecutor's comments are merely
pointing out a procedural rule of evidence-that the defendant took the
stand last. Thus, the holdings in Grunewald and Hale provide an eviden-
tiary alternative to the Court's ruling in Portuondo.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo was correctly decided
following the strict interpretation of the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The defendant in Portuondo voluntarily chose to take
the stand and testify in his own defense. In doing so, the defendant ef-
fectively waived the immunity afforded him under the Fifth Amendment.
150. Id. at 175.
151. Id. at 173.
152. Id.
153. Snyder, supra note 135, at 300.
154. Id. at 301.
155. Id. at 301 n.93 (concluding that the Supreme Court's holding in Griffin rejected, on Fifth
Amendment constitutional grounds, California's evidentiary rule that would have allowed the jury to
consider the fact that Griffin had failed to testify).
156. See Portuondo, 120 S.Ct. at 1127 (quoting from transcript at 834 ("A defendant is of
course an interested witness since he is interested in the outcome of the trial. You may as jurors wish




Moreover, the defendant's right to exercise his silence was never bur-
dened, nor in any manner penalized. Once the defendant in Portuondo
elected to take the stand, he opened the door for the prosecutor to im-
peach his credibility. The Court correctly established that there is no dis-
tinction between the prosecutor electing to impeach the defendant on
cross-examination, or waiting until closing argument.
Furthermore, Portuondo is clearly distinguishable from the Court's
more expansive holdings in the Griffin line of case law. In Griffin, the
prosecutor's comments were impermissible because they encouraged the
jury to infer guilt based on the defendant's decision to remain silent. The
Court correctly held that such substantive inference was an impermissi-
ble burden that penalized the defendant for exercising his constitutional
right. In Portuondo, the prosecutor's comments were not substantive in
nature. Rather, the comments sought to remind the jury what the instruc-
tion had already pointed out-that they could consider the fact that the
defendant testified last. Because the defendant had waived his right to
silence by taking the stand, the prosecutor's comments were permissible
for impeachment of credibility; and, in no manner burdened or penalized
the defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo
was correctly decided following the more narrow interpretation of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.
John Owens
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